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This study introduced the framing theory, Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical 
model, and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions into a cross-cultural comparative analysis of 
news coverage of the Internet in China from 2000 to 2004 in selected newspapers in 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Significant differences were found to exist across the societies in both the salience 
of Internet-related issues and the usage of generic news frames. The issue of Internet 
diffusion and use was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers from China, 
Singapore, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the 
issue of Internet censorship and regulations; whereas the issue of e-commerce and 
Internet business most frequently appeared in the newspapers from Hong Kong. In terms 
of generic news frames, the newspapers from China were significantly more likely to use 
the human interest, morality and leadership frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong 
mainly relied on the factual and economic consequences frames to report the Internet in 
mainland China. The U.S. and U.K. newspapers were distinct for their highly frequent 
usage of the conflict frame.  
This study also investigated how much variations in media framing could be 
explained by such national-level factors as freedom status and cultural dimensions across 
societies. Logistic regression models indicated that the patterns of influence varied across 
the societies with different types of news frames and their associations with different 
types of Internet-related issues. The cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation 
was found to be a general factor influencing the presence of different types of news 
frames. 
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In addition, a literature review of the changing Chinese media suggests that the 
Chinese press has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function. 
Therefore, another goal of the study was to test the influence of extramedia-level factors 
within a society by examining whether the framing of the Internet in the leading Party 
organ newspaper, the People’s Daily, would differ from the Beijing Youth Daily, a local 
newspaper with national influence and more financial and operational autonomy. They 
differed from each other in presenting the politically sensitive issue, Internet censorship 
and regulations. 
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The rapid growth of the Internet, and in particular the World Wide Web, has 
attracted a number of research interests across disciplines. Although China, the 71st 
country to join the Internet, embraced the so-called fourth medium later than did most 
developed countries, the Internet has penetrated China at an exponentially rapid rate since 
the end of the last century. According to statistics provided by the Chinese Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), the population of Internet users reported in 
January 2006 is 111 million, which is 179 times as much as that in November 1997 
(Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China). 
Such a leapfrog development has drawn intensive interests from researchers both 
in China and abroad, with particular attention to such issues as Internet diffusion and use, 
the government’s cyberstrategies, particularly its control of the Internet, and the 
implications of the Internet for freedom of expression and China’s democratization. Only 
one study has been found to provide a rough picture of the Internet in China portrayed in 
news stories. McMillan and Hwang (2002) compared an English-language newspaper 
published in China and four U.S. newspapers to see how such Internet-related topics as 
business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions 
were covered in the newspapers. No specific theories of media content directed the 
descriptive presentations, and no explanations were given to the differences in coverage 
between the newspapers in China and the United States and how the underlying political 
and cultural factors might affect coverage, thus leaving areas for further research. The 
current study aims to systematically conduct multicultural comparisons of framing 
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China’s Internet1 in selected newspapers in mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, during the time period from 2000 to 2004, to see 
how the differences of political systems and cultural dimensions across the societies 
might affect issue selections and news frames in stories. 
Chapter 2 provides information about the origin and history of the Internet in 
China, with attention paid to the incentives for the Chinese government to promote 
Internet development, while a political and cultural understanding of the Chinese 
government’s attempts to control the Internet is also given. Previous scholarly research is 
briefly integrated into the descriptions and interpretations of China’s Internet.  
Chapter 3 introduces research on media content and influences on media content, 
such as Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, and media framing that provides a 
theoretical framework for the current study, which focuses on the socio-political, 
ideological and cultural factors at the macro level that shape media content. The seminal 
work of Hofstede (1980) and subsequent studies in cultural dimensions lays the 
conceptual foundation for relating the variants of frame to the impacts of culture.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to a review of the changing role of the media in China, 
including the Party organ press’s struggle in the commercialized media market. Such an 
investigation serves as a proper rationale for a comparison of the differences between the 
People’s Daily, the leading Party organ newspaper in China, and the Beijing Youth Daily, 
a local newspaper with national influence, to see whether the newspapers might be 
                                                 
1 The phrase China’s Internet is used in the paper in a general way, referring to any aspects of the Internet, 
from Internet growth to Internet use to Internet regulation, in China. It does not imply there is a separate 
Internet specifically belonging to China. 
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different in news coverage of the new medium with the dynamic of structural change of 
media and the fast diffusion of the Internet in China. 
The other chapters inform readers of research questions/hypotheses, methods, and 
results. Chapter 5 addresses the research objectives and research questions/hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 details the methodological steps and the reasons for undertaking the steps as a 
process of answering the research questions and testing the research hypotheses. Chapter 
7 presents the results of the current study. Chapter 8 offers discussion about the findings, 
the contributions and limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
While exploring the frames constructed in the new stories of the examined 
newspapers and providing a dynamic picture of the Internet in China as painted in the 
newspapers, this study also attempts to test empirically the predictability of the assumed 
factors in the literature, that is, the underlying political and cultural differences in 
societies. It examines how those factors might affect news frames of the Internet in 
China, and the integrated influences of those factors on news frames building. Such tests 
are mainly based on a quantitative content analysis. In addition, the quantitative 
comparison between the selected Chinese newspapers aims to see the effects of 




CHAPTER II.   
BUILDING A REGULATED NETWORKED EMPIRE: 
A REVIEW OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA 
 
On September 20, 1987, Professor Qian Tianbai sent China’s first e-mail titled 
“Crossing the Great Wall to Join the World” (yueguo changcheng, zouxiang shijie), after 
the China Academic Network (CANet), the first computer network in China, was set up. 
The network provided e-mail access and support for academic and science research in 
computer science (Evolution of Internet in China; Tsui, 2001). On March 2, 1993, a 64K 
dedicated circuit to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), built by the Institute 
of High-Energy Physics under the Chinese Academic of Sciences (CAS), was opened 
officially. China was not accepted to directly and fully connect to the Internet until April 
1994 (Evolution of Internet in China). Since then, the Internet has penetrated China at an 
exponentially rapid rate. The tremendous progress of telecommunications in recent years 
has provided a matrix for the development of Internet in mainland China. 
The Chinese government has actively encouraged and invested in the growth of 
the Internet to capture the Internet’s vast commercial potential. The central government 
has encouraged the competing state-owned telecommunications providers, China 
Telecom (zhongguo dianxin), China Unicom (zhongguo liantong), China Mobile 
(zhongguo yidong tongxun), China Netcom (zhongguo wangtong), JiTong 
Communciations Company (jitong tongxun gongsi), and China Railway Telecom 
(zhongguo tiantong), to build their own networks. Government-funded technology parks 
provide low-cost homes for Internet start-ups, and Beijing offers tax breaks for high-tech 
firms. On the other hand, China has also exerted state control over the Internet and its 
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use, preventing this commercial gold mine from becoming political quicksand. Faced 
with an entirely new networked society, and potential political or social challenges that 
the new medium may bring, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has utilized a multiple-
part network control strategy to create the maximum possible scope of official authority. 
It includes blocking certain websites’ IP addresses through a national firewall, acquiring 
and developing software and hardware to filter out certain information, producing 
legislation to control the Internet, and fostering a culture of self-censorship. 
 The rapid development of the Internet in China has drawn much attention both in 
China and abroad. There is an extensive amount of literature on the Internet itself, which 
talks of how the Internet has a culture of its own. Particularly, the past 15 years have seen 
numerous scholars keeping their eyes on China’s Internet. Much of the attention in 
discussions and studies among both professionals and academia has been paid to the 
physical infrastructure and diffusion of China’s Internet (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 
1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), the government’s cyberstrategies, particularly its 
control of the Internet (e.g., Hachigian, 2001; Hartford, 2000; Harwit & Clark, 2001; 
Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Qiu & Zhou, 2005; Tsui, 2001; Wu, 1996), and the implications 
of the Internet for freedom of expression and China’s democratization (e.g., Hong & 
Huang, 2005; Marsh & Whalen, 2000; Peters, 2002). 
2.1. Informatization and Modernization Strategies 
 It may be more useful to place the Internet development into a wider economic 
and political context in China to better understand the country’s Internet policies and the 
whole picture of Internet development in China.  
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The big Internet boom in China did not grow out of throwing the Net open to the 
private sector – as was the case in the United States – but out of a state-centric strategy 
for comprehensive “informatization (xinxihua),” envisioned as essential to China’s future 
growth and international competitiveness. The key lies in the Party’s commitment to 
modernize China, and to strengthen modern China as a global economic, military and 
political powerhouse. One of the macro-level forces was the shift in China Ninth Five 
Year Plan (1995-2000) from an economy fueled by capital goods development to one 
fueled by consumer goods development. The shift was heralded by the revisions to the 
Eighth Five Year Plan (1990-1995) when the service industry was given a planned annual 
growth target of over 10 per cent (Li, 1991). China’s leaders hoped to skip certain stages 
in the development process and integrate information technology into all sectors of 
society, with the understanding that at some level modernization would help consolidate 
popular support for the current regime. The simple rationale here was what Confucius 
said, “Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the common people will have 
trust in you” (Analects 12:7). They used the concept of “informatization” to describe the 
process, using information technology to modernize the economy and help decentralized 
decision-making, yet also make the administrative process more transparent for better 
control at the center. 
 Informatization goes hand in hand with decentralization. In fact, China’s 
leadership has held out the vision that information technology will allow the country to 
decentralize decision-making, while allowing the central government to monitor and 
control the economy. Since 1993, the central government has launched its own “National 
Information Infrastructure” projects, known as the Golden Projects, to introduce 
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information technology into various sectors of government and society. For example, 
projects have been initiated to utilize information technology to transform the way the 
state handles taxation, customs, and other transactions. 
 In 1993, the National Joint Conference on Economic Informatization, replaced by 
the State Council’s Steering Committee on National Information Infrastructure2 in 1996 
(China Internet chronology 1), was created under the chairmanship of former Vice-
Premier Zou Jiahua. The first national meeting of the National Informatization Work 
Conference, held in Shenzhen on April 18, 1997, was opened with an address by Zou 
Jiahua, who set out the “24-character direction for China’s informatization: Overall 
planning (tongchou guihua), state dominance (guojia zhudao), unified standards (tongyi 
biaozhun), joint construction (lianhe jianshe), link up to supply each other (hulian 
hutong), and shared resources (ziyuan gongxiang)” (China information chronology 2). 
Development of the Internet was put on the top of the Chinese government’s new policy 
agenda for creating a national information infrastructure and developing economy. 
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the annual growth rate of China’s information 
equipment manufacturing and service industries was over three times as much as that of 
the GNP. The information industry emerged “prominently as a new growth point of 
China’s national economic development” (China’s IT develops at tremendous pace). 
                                                 
2 Also called the Information Leading Group, a cross-ministerial coordination group reporting directly to 
the State Council, was responsible for the first attempt to establish regulatory guidelines for Internet 
development in China. It was in charge of overseeing the Internet in China based on Article 5 of the State 
Council’s Order No. 195. The Steering Committee served before the Ministry of Information Industry 
established in 1998, as the final decision-maker on Internet regulations by coordinating relevant 
government agencies/regulators. The temporary/transitional status of the Steering Committee was similar to 
an Administration’s Task Force in the United States. 
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 In November 2001, China’s State Economic and Trade Commission published the 
“Tenth Five-Year Plan of Industrial Structure Adjustment.” One of the six major 
adjustments was “to promote industrialization by information” (Du, 2001). The Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly 
pointed out that: 
Informatization is an important tendency in today’s global economy and social 
development. It is also a key link for enterprise upgrading, industrialization, and 
modernization in our country. We should prioritize the informatization of the 
national economy and society, comply to the development trend of global 
information technology, meet the terms of market demands, and move toward 
with institutional innovations, trying to leap-frog in our information industry 
(Recommendations from the CCP Party Center on the Tenth Five-Year Plan for 
national economic and social development). 
 
As the Internet boom hit the United States, Chinese policymakers concluded that linking 
with the global network of networks was essential to the overall strategy. The Internet 
was a vital factor in China’s transformation from a developing country to a superpower 
(Sinclair, 2002).  
2.2. Building a Networked Empire 
 Widely recognized as critical to the modernization strategy of the CCP has been 
the development of telecommunications, computers, and communication networks. China 
has invested heavily in its information infrastructure at the same time encouraging 
foreign investment in key information-related sectors (Hachigian, 2001). Starting from 
the ground up, China has quickly built a vast information infrastructure. China’s Internet 
backbone began by building the telecom system. Historically, China’s telecom provision 
was a bottleneck in the national economy in the 1960s and 1970s when telecom 
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availability was very poor. At the outset of the reform era, for instance, almost no private 
households had telephones. In the 1980s, China changed its telecom policies to speed up 
telecom development. As a result, the growth rate of telecom traffic from the early 1980s 
to the mid-1990s had dramatically increased, with 1994, the highest year of the value in 
the telecom industry, about five times higher than GDP (Wang, 2001). Telephone lines 
have been laid by the state telecommunications monopoly, China Telecom, at a 
skyrocketing rate. In 1990, there were fewer than 10 million telephone lines in China; by 
June 2001, the total number of telephone users hit 281 million (Li, 2001). Many 
advanced technologies have been incorporated into the Chinese telecommunication 
infrastructure, including digital microwave, satellites, program-controlled exchange, 
movable telecommunication and data telecommunication. China has also increasingly 
seen the type of cross-media convergence common in Western countries whereby mobile 
and wireless communications devices are made Internet accessible, increasing the 
penetration and depth of the Internet (Wang, 2001). 
The Internet has been one of the cornerstones of the information technology 
explosion in China. As in other countries, China’s early computer networking efforts 
came from the research and education communities. The CANet, established in 1987, is 
generally recognized as the first computer network in China. Since China realized a full-
function linkage to the Internet on April 20, 1994, the Chinese Internet has rapidly 
expanded throughout many sectors of Chinese society. From 1997 to 2005, computer 
hosts, Internet users, domain names registered under the top level “.cn,” Web sites and 
total bandwidth capacity of leased international connections respectively increased by 
over 150 times (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1. Internet Growth in China 
 








Nov. 1997 299,000 620,000 4,066 1,500 18.64 Mbps
July 1998 542,000 1,750,000 9,415 3,700 84.64 Mbps
Jan. 1999 747,000 2,100,000 18,396 5,300 143.00 Mbps
July 1999 1,460,000 4,000,000 29,045 9,906 241.00 Mbps
Jan. 2000 3,500,000 8,900,000 48,695 15,153 351.00 Mbps
July 2000 6,500,000 16,900,000 99,734 27,289 1,234.00 Mbps
Jan. 2001 8,920,000 22,500,000 122,099 265,405 2,799.00 Mbps
July 2001 10,020,000 26,500,000 128,362 242,739 3,257.00 Mbps
Jan. 2002 12,540,000 33,700,000 127,319 277,100 7,597.50 Mbps
July 2002 16,130,000 45,800,000 126,146 293,213 10,576.50 Mbps
Jan. 2003 20,830,000 59,100,000 179,544 371,600 9,380.00 Mbps
July 2003 25,720,000 68,000,000 250,651 473,900 18,599.00 Mbps
Jan. 2004 30,890,000 79,500,000 340,040 595,550 27,216.00 Mbps
July 2004 36,300,000 87,000,000 382,216 626,600 53,941.00 Mbps
Jan. 2005 41,600,000 94,000,000 432,077 668,900 74,429.00 Mbps
July 2005 45,600,000 103,000,000 622,534 677,500 82,617.00 Mbps
Jan. 2006 49,500,000 111,000,000 2,592,410 694,200 136,106.00 Mbps
(Source: CNNIC’s semiannual reports, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm)3
 
                                                 
3 The table was created based on the information provided in the CNNIC’s reports from 1997 through 
2006. The Chinese Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), located in Beijing’s Haidian district, 
was established in June 1997 and was authorized by the government to be a domain name management 
entity. It operates under the leadership of the Ministry of Information Industry and the Chinese Academic 
of Sciences. Its responsibilities include registering domain names, distributing IP addresses, and conducting 
statistical surveys on the development of the Internet in China. The CNNIC has issued sixteen reports. 
Although these statistics are challenged by several other companies that specialized in market research, 
such as IAMAsia and NetValue, the enormous growth of the Internet in China is undeniable.  
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age. Two state ministries construct the optical backbone of China separately – the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the State Administration of Radio Film and 
Television (SARFT). By the end of 2001, MII had deployed 1.46 Mkm of optical 
network mainly for voice and data communication services covering all provinces and 
cities. SARFT had deployed 30,000 Km of optical cable mainly for cable-TV delivering, 
which covered over 30 major provinces and most cities, and the switch capacity at main 
segments reached 1,600 Gbps. Fiber optic cable networks now cover across the country. 
By 2000, China had established more than 300 ISP companies and more than 1,000 ICPs 
(China’s IT develops at tremendous pace, 1995). Unlike some authoritarian governments 
that exert larger control over the Internet by limiting bandwidth, the amount of data 
traffic per second the network can process, the Chinese government instead chooses to 
continue expanding bandwidth. The total Internet bandwidth is listed in the latest CNNIC 
report at 136.1 Gbps, which is almost 388 times as much as six years ago (see Table 2.1). 
 Also, as a part of the strategy for driving the information economy, thus fostering 
economic growth and further increasing legitimacy of the government, Chinese officials 
have focused on ways that the Internet can be used to enhance government performance, 
to reduce tension between the government and the citizens. For instance, the central 
government demanded in the early 1990s that all government offices throughout the 
country move online, starting minimally with information carrying websites as the first 
step towards more complex and comprehensive interactive services (Zhou, 2004a). The 
Government Online Project (GOP), launched on January 22, 1999, interconnects 
government offices of every province, autonomous region and municipality, and is to 
establish the basis for the development of e-government in China, provide more effective 
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coordination between and across governments at different levels, so that the public can 
have more access to government information and procure specific government services 
via the Internet (Lovelock & Ure, 2002; Zhou, 2004a). 
 As identified in a series of surveys directed by Guo (2003b), the government, 
which encourages people “to access the ‘healthy’ Internet,” is one of the four key players 
in the fast growth of the Internet in China.4 For instance, the survey in Nanhai, 
Guangdong Province, reported that the Internet development in the city is typical of the 
“government driven model.” The Nanhai municipal government, which has invested a 
vast amount of money in its informatization endeavors, has realized its goal of connecting 
“every village” to an optical cable, and “every family” to the Internet (pp.3-9). As a 
matter of fact, the Chinese government is “actively promoting the Internet” at all levels 
(Hachigian, 2002a, p.49). 
2.3. Shaping the Internet within a Regulatory Framework 
 However, all of this significant effort to promote the wide application of the 
Internet in China does not mean that the Chinese government is prepared to relax its 
control over the Internet. As the Internet takes hold in the country, many international 
observers have begun to suggest that the technology poses an insurmountable threat to 
China’s authoritarian regime. The Chinese government has responded with a number of 
restrictions designed to counter potentially challenging uses of the Internet, as well as a 
range of proactive measure designed to reap the technology’s benefits. State strategies 
toward the Internet have addressed the balance between economic modernization and 
                                                 
4 The other three players are competitive Internet companies, Internet cafés, and Internet users. 
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political control. In fact, Internet control has become more systematic and comprehensive 
in China, both on the statute books and in real life. 
 From the very beginning, the Chinese government has successfully controlled 
Internet access in terms of both infrastructure and legislation. On February 12, 1996, the 
State Council issued Order No.195, “PRC Interim Regulations Governing the 
Management of International Interconnection of Computer Information Networks” 
(Zhongguo renmin gongheguo jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang guanli zanxing 
guiding, Ministry of Information Industry a), signed by former Premier Li Peng on 
February 1, 1996, later modified by PRC State Council’s Order No.218 on May 20, 1997. 
Article 3 of the order separated networks into Interconnecting Networks (IN, hulian 
wangluo), defined as those networks directly connecting into the global Internet through 
international leased circuits, and Access Networks (AN, jieru wangluo), which were 
required to obtain the connection through one of the four authorized INs.5 The order 
(Article 7) further specified that such four organizations would operate INs for the first 
backbone networks: two offering access to business and  the general public, ChinaNet 
and GBNet, which can Internet access (on commercial terms) to other ISPs 6, and two  
                                                 
5 The authorized nature of INs could also be seen from a perspective that diversity and competition have 
been recognized by the Chinese government. There were four administering organizations of INs rather 
than one. The number of telecom players, which were allowed to link their networks with those abroad, 
rose to nine in December 2000. The State Council recognized existing stakeholders instead of forcing 
Internet activity into one centralized organization. This is an important indication that China’s political 
process is not monolithic and that policy is a product of contending interests, not simply the political 
interests of the CCP. Further, the regulations permit authorization of new INs in the future, which may 
intensify the competition. There is no specific effort to centralize the ownership of ANs. Many different 
ANs can exist and compete. 
6 ChinaNet (China Public Computer Network, zhongguo gongyong jisuanji wang), which was originally 
based on the National Computing & Networking Facilities of China (NCFC), the first high-speed network 
funded by the State Development Planning Commission and the World Bank, and now is featured as tiered 
structure, high speed Internet connection, and multi-homing. ChinaNet was first operated by the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). After the merging of the MPT with the MEI into the Ministry of 
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reserved exclusively for educational and research institutions, CERNet and CSTNet 7.  
All these networks are state-owned, in line with the government’s insistence that 
the country’s communications infrastructure remain solidly under government control. 
Their overall structure reveals the attempt to create a “designer” competition cut to 
patterns set by state specifications. Which company may offer what services in which 
markets has been the subject of a great deal of bureaucratic politicking. Government 
moves to restrict the competitors of China Telecom,8 the state-owned monopoly, are 
more likely to be economically motivated than what some foreign observers suggest as 
being ideologically inspired. 
 In addition to the control of Internet access, China has promulgated numerous 
pieces of Internet-related legislation for the last five years, covering a variety of areas. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
Information Industry (MII), the operator of China’s national public telephone network, China Telecom, 
which is under the jurisdiction of the MII, has run ChinaNet. Often referred to as the 163 Network after the 
number users dial to gain access to it, ChinaNet, covering across the country, linking with more than 600 
cities, and embracing a registered collection of 3 million users (System integration – Merging of 163/169 
Network), is also the effective international gatekeeper by virtue of the fact that all networks must go 
through China Telecom’s international telecommunications access. ChinaGBN (Golden Bridge Network, 
zhongguo jinqiao wang), provides the commercial alternative to ChinaNet. Currently run by JiTong 
Communications, a state-owned company formerly linked with the now abolished MEI, ChinaGBN has 
focused primarily on the corporate market. 
7 CERNet (China’s Education and Research Network, zhongguo jiaoyu he keyan jisuanji wang, 
http://www.net.edu.cn) is the principle academic network centered upon Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua 
University and links together the universities, schools and education and research institutes via 
CHINAPAC (X.25). Its link to the Internet was primarily through the NCFC, and switched to Sprint 128k 
bps line in May 1995. CERNet plays an indispensable role in connecting the Chinese education system to 
the outside world and facilitates exchange and communication among academics and educators in China 
and their counterparts overseas. It is still technically distinct from the main public network such that 
websites blocked by the government on ChinaNet will often be accessible from CERNet. CSTNet (Chinese 
Scientific and Technology Network, zhongguo keji wang, http://www.cstnet.net.cn/gb/index.html) is 
similar to CERNet, but significantly smaller in scale: it connects subsidiaries of the CAS. It is also based on 
NCFC backbone. 
8 Since 1994, China Telecom has made enormous investments in developing two national networks, 
namely, 163 Network and 169 Network, also called China Public Multimedia Network, is more often 
known by its dial-up access number, 169, like 163 Network. It is an attempt by the government to build a 
China-specific content platform for domestic users. Effectively, an American Online style platform, it does 
not provide direct access to the Internet, but rather creates a Chinese intranet, allowing the government to 
provide cheaper access and Chinese-language content. 
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2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online business operation, 
information and news services, and Internet security were issued (Cheung, 2003, pp.79-
82).9 The rules issued since 2000 fall into four following major categories such as 
regulations governing the Internet infrastructure, regulations dealing with crimes related 
to the Internet, regulations monitoring Internet Services Providers (ISPs) and Internet 
Content Providers (ICPs), Internet users and online content, and regulations dealing with 
domain names. Although computer crimes and Internet security,10 and the issues of 
domain names are also two of primary concerns on the list of China’s cyber agendas11, 
regulations monitoring ISPs and ICPs, Internet users and online content have drawn 
particular attention from observers outside China, and have been widely criticized by 
Western commentators, journalists and politicians who are concerned with the issues of 
                                                 
9 For example, the Regulations on Secrets Management for International Networking of Computer 
Information System (jisuanji xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding), issued on January 25, 
2000 but applied retroactively from January 1, 2000, should be considered as legislation that specifically 
and most comprehensively addressed problems of prohibition of disclosure of state secrets through the 
Internet in China (China Legal Change, 2002). The Article 1 set the issue of security protection on the 
Internet under the broad umbrella of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of State 
Secrets (State Secrets Law), “in order to strengthen the administration of maintenance of secrets in the 
international networking of computer information system,” which was defined as interconnection between 
computer information systems inside China and foreign computer information systems in order to achieve 
international exchange of information, and “to ensure the security of state secrets.” The regulations further 
clearly distinguished the responsibilities of secrecy authorities at two levels. The national secrecy 
authorities are in charge of secrets preservation work for the international networking of computer systems 
on a nationwide basis. The secrecy authorities at country level and above are in charge of the work within 
their administrative districts. Central national organs are in charge of, or should guide, the secrets 
preservation work falling within the scope of their authority. 
10 Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the number of computer crimes has risen dramatically. According to 
the People’s Daily, hacker crimes in China increased at an annual rate of 30% by 1998 (12 October, 1998). 
In March 1997, the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the country’s criminal code, Criminal Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, with three articles, Article 285, Article 286, and Article 287, that 
included computer hacking and fraud as serious crimes. The information warfare involving international 
security, called “the smokeless war” (Hughes, 2003), between China and other countries, such as the 
United States, Taiwan and Japan, has become a central theme in the Chinese military.  
11 China entered the Domain Name System (DNS) at a comparatively late stage. It was not until 1990 that 
the system of “country code Top Level Domains” (ccTLD) “.cn” was delegated by Jonathan Postel to 
Professor Qian Tianbai, then manager and administrator of the CANet. In recent years, cybersquatting 
cases have emerged in China, forcing the Chinese government to put more efforts to strengthen its 
management of Chinese domain name disputes. As a result, the Provisional Rules for Chinese Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution was adopted on November 7, 2000. 
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censorship and human rights. The attempts of the Chinese government to interfere with 
network communications have frequently been viewed as an infringement on the freedom 
of information considered a basic human right in Western societies (e.g., Woesler, 2002). 
China’s regulations on Internet content involve such two major concerns as 
political and social stability and culture values, apart from the restrictions relative to state 
security. As early as in 1996, as mentioned above, the PRC Interim Regulations 
prohibited individuals “to produce, retrieve, duplicate, and disseminate information 
prejudicial to public order or pornographic materials” (Ministry of Information Industry 
a). The Internet content boundaries in China were clearly and systematically marked 
since the PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information 
Networks and the Internet was promulgated in 1997.12 The statute, criticized as 
“repressive” (Freedom of expression and the Internet in China), has become one of the 
major sources used to accuse China of restricting freedom of expression.  
2.4. Internet Censorship and Scholarly Concerns 
The major noticeable turning point implied in the Regulations on Secrets 
Management for International Networking of Computer Information System (jisuanji 
                                                 
12 The Article 5 of the 1997 statute stated nine forbidden zones of information that “no unit or individual 
may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit,” including: 
1. Inciting to resist or violate the Constitution or laws or the implementation of administrative 
regulations;  
2. Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system; 
3. Inciting division of the country, harming national unification; 
4. Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of nationalities; 
5. Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the order of society; 
6. Promoting feudal superstitions, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terrorism, or 
instigating others to criminal activity; 
7. Openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people; 
8. Injuring the reputation of state organs; 
9. Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations (Feiyu Net). 
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xinxi xitong guoji lianwang baomi guanli guiding) issued in 2000 was that the Chinese 
government strategically encouraged Chinese ISPs, ICPs, and individual persons to 
censor themselves. This mode of self-regulation and self-censorship (Tsui, 2001) at each 
level is said to be a characteristics of China’s cyberspace (Hachigian, 2001; Hartford, 
2000; Sinclair, 2002). Article 8 stipulates that the principle of “responsibility is borne by 
the person who placed it on the network” as a basis for regulating the revelation of state 
secrets on the Internet. This did not, however, exempt each ISP’s obligation to monitor. 
Information provided to or released on Web sites must undergo a security inspection and 
approval. Inspection and approval should be carried out by related departments. Units 
that provide the information should establish a security system for information 
examination and approval in accordance with certain work procedures. 
Under Article 10, ISPs, BBS, chat rooms or network news group organizers were 
required to set up their own management mechanisms to assist in ensuring that no state 
secrets were transmitted on the Internet by their users. The regulations also demanded 
that Internet access providers should provide instruction about protecting secrets as an 
important part of the Internet related technical training. Agreements and user rules signed 
between the controllers of national trunk lines and Internet access providers, and between 
Internet access providers and users should stipulate clearly that “state laws on protecting 
secrets must be obeyed and that state secrets shall not be leaked.” Internet access 
providers and users should assist department in charge of protecting secrets in 
“investigating illegal actions that divulge state secrets on the Internet.” Under such legal 
restrictions and driven by economic incentives, Internet-related companies in China 
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practice “a high degree of self-censorship” (Tsui, 2001, p.27),13 which is perceived as 
“the most effective way” for the Chinese government to control the information flow on 
the Internet (Hachigian, 2002a, p.48). 
In addition to extensive regulations, the Chinese government has also 
implemented various technical measures to achieve its goal of Internet censorship. For 
instance, the Beijing Telecom servers are known among Chinese Internet users as the 
“Great Firewall” (fanghuo qiang, a direct translation from English).14 The function of the 
“firewall” is not only to block unauthorized access to Chinese government or corporate 
websites but also to block access by Chinese citizens to “undesirable” foreign websites. 
As the Chinese proverb says, “walls have ears!” This centralized approach has made it 
possible for the government to censor the Internet broadly. In 1996 alone, the government 
blocked access to more than 100 websites outside China.15 By the end of 2005, Chinese 
police had closed 598 websites in a crackdown on pornography launched in March 2005 
(China reins in pornographic websites, 2005). With somewhat random choices of 
                                                 
13 For example, news portals such as Sina, NetEase, Sohu and Yahoo try to stay clear from politically 
sensitive issues in general. American companies also keep in the same line to gain the trust and cooperation 
of the government. At the government’s request, Microsoft Corp. shut down the Internet journal of a 
Chinese blogger that discussed politically sensitive issues in December 2005. On the one hand, non-
compliance with the government means no business in China; on the other hand, there is a big demand for 
filtering software to filter out a wide range of sensitive materials, from pornography to websites containing 
content related to Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political 
parties, or a variety of ant-Communist movements (See OpenNet Initiative, 2005, for the detailed 
information on the websites that have been filtered out during the period of 2004-2005), and the market for 
such kind of software was expected to become a billion dollar industry in 2004 (Silva, 2001). It is ironic 
that, as Wacker (2003) pointed out, while the Western media frequently criticize China for Internet 
censorship, “it is Western firms that are supplying the technological means which enable China to carry out 
surveillance” (p.69).  
14 A more popular phrase for it is wangguan, literally “NetWall” – a name harking back to an earlier effort 
to repel foreign invaders. 
15 The sites of some American news media, such as the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the 
Washington Post, the Voice of America, and CNN, the Taiwan Government Information Office, and some 
human rights groups, the US-based China News Digest (CND), and pornographic sources, such as Playboy, 
were blocked. See http://amarillonet.com/news/china9996.html for more information. 
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blocking certain websites and setting up examples to intimidate the public,16 the 
government has been able to reach the effect of “killing the chicken to scare the 
monkeys,” as the Chinese proverb suggests (Tsui, 2001, p.29), and nurture an attitude of 
“voluntary” self-censorship among users, a “firewall within one’s head,” as the People’s 
Daily puts it (Wacker, 2003, p.68).  
 Scholars frequently link the censorship practices of the Chinese government to the 
political implications of the Internet. They point out, those who are computer literate and 
Internet users belong to the well-educated group, “with its better than average ties to 
foreign people and information sources,” and represent “a potentially dangerous source of 
opposition and dissent” (Mueller & Tan, 1997, p.95). The Chinese government might 
lose its information monopoly on the Internet, a mass medium that can challenge state 
hegemony over the distribution of information and ideologies (e.g., Kalathil & Boas, 
2001; Taubman, 1998; Woesler, 2002). With new technology means, ordinary people are 
able to be more exposed to the Western ideas and information that was banned by the 
government before (e.g., Hong & Huang, 2005), and have more freedom of speech and 
more access to platforms for discussion of the issues regarding policies and public good, 
thus constituting a threat to the authoritarian regime and weakening the state power (e.g., 
Hachigian, 2002b). Especially with the number of Internet users and criticisms of a 
variety of subjects increasing, the demands for a more competent political system will be 
also increasing, and an “Internet-driven political revolution” is expected (Peters, 2002, 
p.106).  
                                                 
16 An increasing number of individuals have fallen victim to the government’s crack-down on “illegal” use 
of the Internet. The cases of Lin Hai, Qi Yanchen, Huang Qi, Du Daobin, and Li Dawei are several good 
examples of intimidation at work. 
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Yet, such arguments overlook the other side of the statistics of Internet users in 
China. To put things in perspective, Internet users are not representative of China on the 
whole. 111 million Internet users still only account for about 8.5 percent of the whole 
Chinese population. Users aged under 35 account for 81.3 percent of all the Internet users 
(Semiannual statistical report on the Internet development in China). Moreover, political 
use of the Internet has not been reported so far as the mainstream in the Chinese cyber 
society. For example, in a recent survey conducted in the five major cities of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha, 90 percent of young adult reported that 
they go online mainly for games, although reading online news was overall the most 
frequently mentioned usage of the Internet, accounting for 65.9 percent of the survey 
respondents (The Chinese Academic of Social Sciences, 2005). In addition, some 
scholars also have suggested, it is possible that “stability may be further reinforced” if 
online content helps with consensus building within the parameters set by the authorities 
(Harwit & Clark, 2001, p.406) 
 A few scholars approach the issue of Internet censorship in China from a 
perspective other than a politically-preoriented one. Wang (1999) pointed out, the reasons 
for taming the net in Asian countries “are not merely because of its ‘polluting influence,’ 
but also because it is full of decadent ‘Western’ values, something the leaders of former 
colonies are eager to keep out in order to maintain their own cultural integrity and 
autonomy. Simply put, it is a matter of gaining control of what is coming into and 
happening within a nation’s territory; or more briefly, a matter of sovereignty” (p.283). 
Foster and Goodman (2000) also acknowledged such concerns of Chinese leaders who 
fear that “massive exposure to Western culture and language will undermine China’s 
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culture and language, particularly among its youth” (p.32). In addition to political 
considerations, the policy-making process in China, a country with a cultural tradition 
that values human community and order more highly than individual rights, is also 
directed by cultural concerns (Wu, 1996, p.707). “In fact, social (and cultural) norms play 
a major part in explaining Chinese attempts to regulate the internet” (Ang, 2003). 
2.5. Culture Matters: An Alternative Perspective 
 Exploring the deep-rooted cultural and social backgrounds upon which the 
Internet regulations are built may provide us a thorough understanding of Internet content 
restrictions in China.  
 Traditionally, China’s cultural beliefs associate with its own dimensions of power, 
authority and legitimacy. Confucian culture, the dominating one in China, is a typical one 
of collectivism in that the interests of the collective must not be challenged by lesser 
groups and individuals. In such a culture, intermediate and ultimate ends are closely 
connected, and conceived of as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without 
threatening the whole. Associated with it, the government has to proceed on the basis of 
harmony rather than conflict. Rulers should be paternalistic in a political system. Most 
Chinese start with the ideal that all power should emanate from above, from the center, 
from a single supreme power (Pye, 1985). Most Chinese leaders believe that diversity 
and a pluralistic power structure lead to social disorder and do not foster more creativity 
or ensure faster modernization (p.183). 
Since 1949, the CCP has reinforced collectivism in the belief that collectivism is 
the highest noble moral of communist ideology. This ideology sees humans as social 
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beings. Social historical conditions and social relationships constrain an individual’s 
needs. Only through maintaining public order, safety and benefits, can one receive a true 
personal benefit – a country’s public and personal benefits are fundamentally the same. 
The Party inherited, consciously or unconsciously, the traditional administrative style, 
whereas the majority of Chinese comfortably accepted Party authorities as in the past. 
Using propaganda and organized study, the Party has spread the collectivist spirit by way 
of real life models, such as Lei Feng in Mao’s time, Li Xiangqun and Li Suli in the 
reform age. Whether culturally or politically, Chinese collectivism inhabits a hierarchical 
structure; thus it appears vertical. To maintain the system, social stability on the grounds 
of collective interests and harmony is the key. The preoccupation with preserving social 
stability is a perennial aspect of one-party rule. The Party slogan “one hand soft, one 
hand hard (yi shou ruan, yi shou ying)” after the reform and open door policy typically 
mirrors the CCP’s strong desire to simultaneously build two sides of socialist civilization 
– socialist materialistic civilization, which ensures its credibility by promoting economic 
reforms and market openings, thus getting people prosperous, and socialist spiritual 
civilization (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe),17 which is aimed at preserving the 
quintessence of traditional culture and maintaining the social stability, thus safeguarding 
the Party’s grip on political power. 
Reformers are giving up the effort to unify idea, instead, encouraging greater 
intellectual and cultural freedom under the slogan of “let a hundred flowers blossom and 
                                                 
17 The socialist spiritual civilization concept is vague and complex, but one high-ranking propaganda cadre 
explained in the interview with the author, working as a journalist with the Xinhua News Agency, in 1996 
that its basic components include putting the collective good above individual self-interest, esteeming 
education and science, and supporting the production of such public goods as a clean environment, social 
order, and refined art. 
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let a hundred schools of thought contend (baihua qifang, baijia zhengming)” (Harding, 
1987, p.225; White, 1993, p.152). In Deng Xiaoping’s China (1978-1997),18 great new 
things had been happening: the emergence, and expansion of the scope, of tolerance, the 
decline of ideocracy, the advocacy of “plural truths” by intellectuals, skepticism of 
unanimity and praise of plurality and dissidents, the emerging competing ideas (new 
constructed humanist Marxism, neo-Confucianism and Liberalism), the state’s neutral 
attitude towards different life-styles, and the reinterpretation of the traditional Chinese 
culture as being of a plural nature. 
Unlike in Mao Zedong’s time (1949-1976) when ideology was a major means for 
maintaining political and social integration, the Chinese leaders in post-Mao era 
introduce a legal line: any dissident who uses ideas or values to mobilize people will be 
prohibited in public; otherwise, dissenting views are tolerated in the private sphere, which 
has become an implicit rule of the Chinese government. There have been limitations on 
tolerance. As Deng said clearly: 
Can we permit such an open call for intervention in China’s internal affairs? Can 
we tolerate the kind of freedom of speech which flagrantly contravene the 
principles of our Constitution? (Deng, 1983, p.181) 
 
                                                 
18 Since Deng had made valuable contributions during the long revolutionary years, had waged a resolute 
struggle against the Gang of Four and had already achieved notable success in his efforts to restore order, 
he had earned enormous prestige in the Party and among the people. In July 1977, at the Third Plenary 
Session of the Tenth Central Committee, Deng was reinstated as Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, 
Vice-Premier of the State Council, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General 
Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. In March 1978 he was elected Chairman of the Fifth national 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. In December 1978, the Third 
Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee was convened, marking a fundamental turning 
point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. At a working conference of the Central Committee 
held before the Session, Deng delivered a speech which turned out to be the keynote of the Third Plenary. 
In this speech he explained in detail that people should emancipate their minds and seek truth from facts. 
Deng stressed that the Chinese people should be dedicated and steadfast in pursuit of socialist 
modernization and not let themselves be hindered by interference from any quarter. This was a fundamental 
rectification of the political line, and it ushered in a new era of reform and opening to the outside world. 
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The downfall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Europe in the 
1990s convinced the Chinese intellectuals that a “shock therapy” or “big bang” was not 
applicable to China, a clear example of reflexivity at work. The Chinese were convinced 
that democracy and a free-market economy could not be introduced without having the 
proper institutions in place, otherwise changes would result in chaos as was apparent in 
Russia and Eastern Europe. Rather, a safe and stable authoritarian government is 
preferred, signifying the Hobbesian state where personal freedom is exchanged for a 
sense of safety and security of the greater whole. Meanwhile, the open door policy19 and 
Westernization also have brought on some negative consequences, such as the moral 
maze of “money worship (baijin zhuyi),” in the Chinese society. The Chinese leadership 
and intellectuals point to the moral decline of the West as manifested by drug 
consumption, suicide, divorce, and increasing crime. The impacts could bring the country 
down. Asian values were the antidote to all that was wrong with Westernization. As some 
scholars have pointed out, traditionally based Chinese values, such as the morally 
autonomous individual, the absolute just ruler, the responsibility of the government for 
people’s welfare, and the ordinary person’s responsibility for the fate of the nation, have 
served as the positive elements in Confucian culture (Nathan, 1990, p.308-11, 384).  
Faced with social and political problems brought by the reforms, the reformers 
insisted on a socialist spiritual civilization that is very much traditional in the sense that it 
appeals to Confucian ideas of family, general love and loyalty. Also, they emphasized the 
                                                 
19 Unlike Mao Zedong, who promoted the radical politics-oriented and self-sustained policy, Deng started 
his economic reforms in 1978 by advocating China to open her door to the rest of the world, which is called 
the “open door policy,” including earmarking four southern cities as Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
which were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, to take advantage of their geographic proximity to 
overseas Chinese communities such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau and for their vast overseas 
connections. Foreign investment was encouraged and new factories were established in these SEZs. 
 24
balance between the necessity of plural ideas and of discipline. These ideas are believed 
to play a part in integrating political life. One of the important parts of building socialist 
spiritual civilization strongly promoted by the CCP is to rebuild “public morality 
(gongde),” which has two meanings in Chinese. One refers to the general moral 
requirement in the public life such as the rules of no smoking on bus or at a gasoline 
stand. Another meaning refers to the “Five Lovings (wu’ai),” which are counted as loving 
motherland, loving people, loving science, loving work, and loving socialism. In the 
1980s and 90s, the “Five Lovings” were considered as the most basic guideline in 
Chinese spiritual civilization reconstructions. As Huntington (1991) wrote, in Confucian 
societies, “[h]armony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. 
The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central value” (p.24). 
While being committed to rebuild and promote the morality norms with some 
political flavor, the central government has gone to great efforts to protect the Chinese 
society from the negative social and political impacts from outside the country. Its two 
major concerns are “bourgeois liberalization (zichan jieji ziyouhua),” such as assertions 
of the superiority of capitalism over socialism, of democracy over the “people’s 
democratic dictatorship,” and of foreign countries over China, and “spiritual pollution 
(jingshen wuran),” such as excessive sex, violence, and superstition in the symbolic 
environment, which are perceived in the view of the Chinese leadership as big threats to 
the social stability and its legitimacy in China. This can be clearly reflected in the 
injunction that Deng Xiaoping issued to the Twelfth Central Committee of the CCP on 
October 12, 1983: 
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Don’t think that a little spiritual pollution doesn’t matter much, that it’s nothing to 
be alarmed at. Some of its ill effects may not be immediately apparent. But unless 
we take it seriously and adopt firm measures right now to prevent its spread, 
many people will fall prey to it and be led astray, with grave consequences. In the 
long run, this question will determine what kind of people will succeed us to carry 
on the cause and what the future of the Party and state will be (Deng, 1987, p.36). 
 
In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, apparently apolitical communications can be 
loaded with subtle political implications whose consequences are only visible in the long 
run. In the March 1996 issue of Qiushi – the Party’s authoritative ideological journal – 
one theorist argued against more lax and liberal comrades that the arts can be equally as 
important as news in the formation of people’s political attitudes, even if the arts 
typically are less centrally concerned with politics: 
When ideology is mentioned, some people always fix their eyes on the core, 
naively thinking that nothing serious will come of it so long as the core is not 
touched upon. We cannot but say that this is ossified point of view. Content and 
form, and contents and levels can infiltrate and transform one into the other … In 
this regard, certain, Western political bigwigs are much wiser than some of our 
comrades. They said: As long as the youth of the country to be overturned have 
learned our language and dances and have a weakness for our movies and 
television programs, they will, sooner or later, accept our concepts of value. 
Unfortunately, this remark has been proved by what happened in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe (Liu, 1996).  
 
 Obviously, the Chinese leadership has clearly recognized the dialectical 
relationships between quantitative change and quality change, and does not want the 
country to be overturned, politically and culturally, under the influence of Western pop 
culture and political propaganda. With the exponential growth of the Internet, the new 
multi-medium, the Chinese government has been more and more concerned with the 
potential problems that the Internet may generate. The question regarding the restrictions 
on Internet content is not “whether,” but rather “how.” The leaders decided that the 
nation needs to retain a singular course, not affected by unpredictable factors. The 
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collective social order and behavior are superior to individual thoughts, which stems from 
the Confucius tradition. The state controls the media generally “in order to foster the 
values of group and hierarchy” (Winfield, Mizuno & Beaudoin, 2000).  
As the history of any kind of media in China has indicated, China’s Internet 
content regulations have strong traditional cultural backgrounds, and current social and 
political needs, which are reflected in the strong moralistic orientation and political 
utilization of the regulations. The nine boundaries of Internet content 20 have been 
reiterated in a series of subsequent regulations formulated by different departments in 
China, which implies the uncompromising standpoint of the Chinese government on 
some principle issues.21
2.6. Conclusion 
 Overall, Internet growth, rather than simply control, is the Chinese government’s 
primary objective, as has been demonstrated through the early 1990s in basic 
telecommunications. Clear evidence of this is, for example, the fact that in 1999 to 
expand access to the Internet, Chinese authorities twice cut the fees that ISPs pay to 
access telecommunications lines. The Internet development is the key to China’s 
                                                 
20 Refer to Footnote 12. 
21 Refer to the Article 57 in the Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dianxin tiaoli), the State Council’s Order No.291 issued on October 11, 
2000, signed by the former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry 
b); the Article 15 in the Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (Hulianwang xinxi fuwu 
guanli banfa), the State Council’s Order No.292, signed by former Premier Zhu Rongji on September 25, 
2000 and issued on October 11, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry c); the Article 1, 2, 3, 4 in the 
Decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on Safeguarding Internet Safety 
(Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu weihu hulianwang anquan de guiding, Guoxin China Law Net); and 
the Article 9 in Regulations for Managing Internet Electronic Bulletin Services (Hulianwang dianzi 
gonggao fuwu guanli guiding), the Order 3 of the MII, approved on October 8, 2000 and issued on 
November 6, 2000 (Ministry of Information Industry d). 
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informationzation and economic modernization, through which the government wants to 
build a powerful socialist country. The promotion of Internet-driven economic 
development has become another proactive strategy to increase the regime’s popularity 
and political legitimacy, in that the state responds to the challenge of economic 
liberalization by preemptively allowing certain forms of political liberalization while 
taking credit for economic prosperity.  
 Yet, the picture of China’s Internet is of a rather mixed character, showing that 
the Chinese government is struggling with walking on a balance beam, which requires a 
balance between economic benefits and political challenges, between maximizing the 
gain from the flow of economic information and protecting China’s networks and 
national security from attack, between opening to the outside world and maintaining the 
independence of Chinese nationality and preserving its own culture and values, between 
collective harmony and individual interests, and between freedom of expression and the 
need to protect the public from harmful materials, such as pornography. To the Chinese 
leadership, the situation of Internet development in China is just like what the Chinese 
word for “crisis” (weiji), literally meaning “crisis and opportunity.” 
Hartford (2000) pointed out, “Smart authoritarians do not try to control 
everything; they focus on controlling what really matters … keeping the vast majority 
from politically sensitive areas, and preventing the nonconforming small minority from 
organizing enough to mount a challenge.” To meet the political and social challenges, the 
Chinese government has been committed to building a coherent regulatory regime and 
formulating systematic regulations to better control the Internet. In general, China’s 
Internet policy and regulation follow precedents set by its treatment of other media, 
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which can be described as an attempt to balance gradual commercialization and 
modernization with controls protecting the CCP’s political dominance and the general 
guideline that “stability is the topmost priority” (Foster & Goodman, 2000, p.26). The 
policy is designed to allow development to proceed while maintaining a residual capacity 
to prevent the use of media to mount direct, organized threats to the regime. As what Lin 
Quan, secretary-general of China’s State Science and Technology Commission told a 
conference: official censorship would not be allowed to stop the growth of net use 
(FlorCruz, 1998). The key here is how to handle the scope and scale of control.  
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CHAPTER III.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  
FRAMING AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 
The past 15 years have seen numerous studies regarding the Internet in China. 
Yet, as stated earlier, only one study has been found to provide a preliminary 
investigation of newspapers’ treatment of China’s Internet by looking at the coverage in 
the China Daily, the only national English newspaper in China, and four U.S. newspapers 
(McMillan & Hwang, 2002). The researchers categorized their descriptive investigation 
based on three topics drawn from the literature of studying the Internet in China, such as 
business and economic concerns, culture and social issues, and law and policy directions.  
Such categorization, which reflects scholarly interests in China’s Internet from 
various disciplines, is meaningful to sort out the topics of related news stories in a general 
way. Yet it might be too general for a framing analysis, for the core idea of framing is 
selecting and highlighting certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, while leaving 
out others (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). In addition, although the authors 
acknowledged the importance of the media framing of an international story in terms of 
people’s understanding the world outside their own countries, the study did not 
theoretically interpret how framing is related to media content construction, and why 
differences in news coverage may exist across the countries in question.  
The current study hopes to fill this gap by introducing framing and media content 
theories into a cross-cultural analysis of newspaper treatments of China’s Internet in 
mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. 
Some cultural concepts are also introduced from the work of Hofstede and subsequent 
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cross-cultural research in the field of social behavior. Instead of looking at general 
aspects of China’s Internet, this study centers around the specific issues frequently 
addressed in scholarly discussions, such as the Internet diffusion and development in 
China (e.g., Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1997; Riquelme, 2002; Tang, 2000), Internet use 
(e.g., Bu & Guo, 2001; Guo, 2003a, 2003b; Zhou, 2004a; Zhu & He, 2002), issues of 
Internet censorship, regulation and policy (e.g., Cullen & Choy, 1999; Hachigian, 2001, 
2002a, 2002b; Hartford, 2000; Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Lacharite, 2002; Tan, 1999; Tsui, 
2001; Wu, 1996; Zhou, 2004b), hackers and Internet security (e.g., Deibert, 2002; 
Hughes, 2003; Thomas, 2001), and the political, economical, cultural and social 
consequences and impacts of the Internet (e.g., Bu, & Guo, 2001; Chen, 1999).  
3.1. The Hierarchical Model of Shoemaker and Reese  
Research exploring various forces shaping media content has identified a broad 
array of sources, ranging from news professionals and gatekeepers (e.g., Bass, 1969; 
Bleske, 1991; Donohew, 1967; Epstein, 1973; Gans, 1979; Lewin, 1947; Peterson, 1979; 
Sigal, 1973; White, 1950), to corporate ownership (e.g., Campaine, & Gomery, 2000; 
Einstein, 2004; Herman, & Chomsky, 1988), to cultural and ideological factors (e.g., 
Fishman, 1980; Peterson, 1979; Shoemaker, & Reese, 1991, 1996). Scholarship in media 
content analysis assumes that multiple and varying realities are constructed through 
discourse (e.g., Berger, & Luckmann, 1966; Gieber, 1964; Goffman, 1974). 
Summarizing previous studies, Shoemaker and Reese (1991, 1996) suggested a 
multi-level hierarchical model of influences on media content. The model consists of the 
following five levels: individual, media routines, organization, extramedia, and ideology  
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Figure 3.1. The Shoemaker and Reese Hierarchical Model of Influences  
on Media Content 22
 
 
(see Figure 3.1). They argued that each level has its own effects on content, which is 
limited by each hierarchically superior level. In their model, the authors placed 
“individual communication workers” at the center, which includes such influences as the 
personal attitudes and orientations of media workers. Then the circle expands outward in 
concentric rings with the next level being the routines of media work (i.e., deadlines, the 
beat system, notions of newsworthiness, official sources). The next circle includes 
influences on content at the organizational level (i.e., corporate policies, political 
endorsements, editorial positions). The next broader category in the model is extramedia 
influences, like the effect of the economic environment, the marketplace, cultural and 
                                                 
22 Figure was recreated based on Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p.64. 
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national variables, and public relations activities. The broadest level includes influences 
that occur due to ideology and societal level factors, such as societal definitions of 
deviance and normalcy or the influence of power centers within society.  
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) proposed building a more cohesive theory of media 
content, one that synthesizes “what is already known about the influences on media 
content into a more systematic set of interrelated statements about the relationships 
between media content and the influences on it” (p.261). They also suggested analyses 
that offer multiple perspectives of the influences of content, such that each level of 
influence is linked to or combined with another level of influence. They argued that 
combining the influences on content in media studies research offers a richer, more 
complete picture of the role of mass media in society (p.271). 
 A few years later, Shoemaker, along with several colleagues, tested one 
hypothesis suggested by the “hierarchy of influences model” – the effects of individual 
influences versus media routine influences (Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, & Wrigley, 
2001). The study examined whether newspaper gatekeeping is influenced more by forces 
on the media routine level, or by forces or “characteristics” of individual staffers. The 
authors expected that routines would exert more control on content than individual 
forces, based on Shoemaker and Reese’s suggestion that unless individuals hold 
significant power within the organization, they exert minimal influence on content (1996, 
p.102). The study found that characteristics of individual journalists had no effect on how 
prominently Congressional bills were covered in the newspapers, but the routine force of 
newsworthiness had a positive effect on the amount of coverage. The data showed 
consistency with the Shoemaker and Reese hierarchical model, in that influences on 
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media content occur on more complex and interwined levels than Lewin (1947) and 
White’s (1950) more simplistic notion of gatekeeping as a series of individual decisions. 
 The tests in the study of Shoemaker et al. remain at the lower levels in the 
hierarchical model. Few studies have been found to empirically test the significance of 
the factors at the higher levels, although they may be more important in shaping media 
content, especially when comparisons across different societies are involved. One of the 
major difficulties to deal with is how to measure and test the relationships between the 
factors at the macro levels and media content. Therefore, one of the purposes of this 
study is to further this aspect of this research stream by focusing on the influence of 
factors in Shoemaker and Reese’s model at the ideological level, which vary with 
political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, on news coverage and frames.  
3.2. Media Framing 
3.2.1. An Overall Review 
 The concept of framing has been developed as a tool for analysis in various fields, 
including psychology and sociology (e.g., Gonos, 1997; Taylor, 2000), business 
management (e.g., Goldratt, 1990; Watzkawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), decision-
making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and negotiation (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 
1985; Pinkley, 1990). The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman’s work (1974), 
which defined frames as embodiments of “the principles of organization which govern 
[social] events.” Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) were two of the earliest scholars who 
introduced framing to American media studies. They used the concept of framing as a 
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tool to understand, in Tuchman’s words, “news as a social construction and a social 
resource” (Tuchman, 1978, p.14). From the late 1980s onward, with Entman’s (1993) 
leading promotion, framing research has been transformed from a method of media 
content analysis to a theoretical concept or even a theory in the making. However, the 
concept is still not clearly conceptualized. The concept seems to be, as Smith (1997) 
pointed out, “many different things to different researchers because of the variety of 
potential locations and level of specificity” (p.2).23
 A large scholarship has qualified framing in a variety of ways. Yet the core idea 
of the concept is related to the fundamental process of meaning construction in which 
certain aspects or attributes of an issue or event, or certain ideas, themes and experiences 
are highlighted or drawn attention to, and others are left out. As Entman (1993) 
suggested, framing entails selection and salience. “To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described” (p.52, emphasis in original). Recently, 
Reese (2001) provided a synthesized definition, that is, “Frames are organizing principles 
that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully 
structure the social world,” and  framing is concerned with “the way interests, 
communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding 
the world” (p.11). Carragee and Roefs (2004) pointed out that most studies in framing 
have focused on the ways news stories articulate frames. “Although specific 
                                                 
23 See Yioutas and Segvic (2003) for discussions about the sources that cause conceptualizing framing 
problematic. 
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characterizations of frames differ, meaningful definitions emphasize the ways in which 
frames organize news stories and other discourses by their patterns of selection, 
emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion” (pp.215-6. See, for example, Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Reese, 2001).  
 Scheufele (1999, 2000) identified four distinct processes, which may be examined 
in framing research: frame-building, frame-setting, individual-level outcomes of framing, 
and a feedback loop from audiences to journalists. The middle two processes, in which 
media frames are usually taken as the independent variable, are related to the effects of 
media frames. A majority of framing studies have focused on these two processes, in 
which the impacts of media frames on audience frames, and the links between audience 
frames and individual information processing or political action are examined (Scheufele, 
2000, pp.307-8). Researchers have shown intense interests in examining framing in terms 
of audience effects (e.g., Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Iyengar, 1987, 1991; Iyengar & 
Simon, 1991; McLeod, & Detenber, 1999; Pan, & Kosicki, 1993; Price, Tewksbury, & 
Powers, 1997; Rhee, 1997; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 2001; Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, 
Zubric, 2004; Shen, 2004; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999; Zillmann, Chen, 
Knobloch, & Callison, 2004), leading to Carragee and Roefs’(2004) criticism that 
framing has been reduced to the study of media effects. 
In contrast, the other two processes identified by Scheufele -- frame-building and 
feedback loop from audiences to journalists -- have largely been marginalized in framing 
research, although researchers have conceptually recognized and examined extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors influencing the production and selection of news, as discussed above. 
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Issues, such as why certain frames dominate news texts or discourses and others do not, 
are virtually ignored (Carragee, & Roefs, 2004, p.220).  
Based on previous research, Scheufele (1999) suggested “at least five factors may 
potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue: social norms and values, 
organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic 
routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists” (p.109). Yet framing 
studies have not clearly related media frames to those factors in terms of empirical tests, 
or as Scheufele (1999) put it, “no evidence has yet been systematically collected about 
how various factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing” (p.109). 
Methodologically, researchers also tend to ignore the possibilities that these factors can 
have combined and interactive effects on media content.  
3.2.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process 
 Concentrating on the process of frame building, I propose an interactive model, in 
which the interplaying roles of the major elements are considered (see Figure 3.2). Media 
place in the center of the model, in which journalists, as primary actors, build a variety of 
media frames. In the process of journalists’ building media frames to present and 
interpret objective reality, the factors at the different levels summarized in the Shoemaker 
and Reese model are assumed to play major roles. Through the presentations of media 
frames, objective reality is translated into constructed reality, which is assumed to have 
an influence on taking shape of individual frames cognitively in the long term, while 
individual frames would in turn adjust and modify constructed reality with the synthetic 














Figure 3.2. An Interactive Model of Frame-Building Process 
 
 
circles represent. In the other direction, individual frames formed in the long term, in 
which ideological, cultural backgrounds, prior knowledge of constructed reality, and 
personal experience come into play, are assumed to play a role in how individual 
journalists working for media perceive objective reality and build media frames, and their 
further perceiving and understanding media frames. In the long term, both media frames 
and individual frames would influence how individual journalists perceive and construct 
objective reality.  
The reasons I propose such a model here are twofold. First, in previous research 
on frame building, the interactions between media frames and individual frames, and the 
roles of constructed reality, such as its direct influence on individual frames and its 
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indirect influence on media frames, have more or less been ignored. Second, I would 
assume that the Shoemaker and Reese model, if examined alone, could explain only a 
certain portion of variations in media frames. With the interactions between media frames 
and individual frames and the roles of constructed reality added in, the residuals might be 
explained more, although the current study may not be able to address all the elements in 
the model.  
The current study only looks at a part of the process of frame building, from 
objective reality through media, which are under the overarching influences of multiple 
factors posed in the Shoemaker and Reese model, to media frames. Attention is paid 
particularly to the factors at the higher levels, by looking at the relationships between the 
framing of the Internet in China and such factors as ideology and political system, social 
norms and cultural values, which theoretically should be examined and tested at a cross-
cultural level. The study aims to determine to what extent the variants of media frames 
could be explained by the combination of effects of political and cultural factors.  
Specifically, objective reality in this study is the Internet in China, which consists 
of many issues such as Internet use, Internet censorship, Internet business, Internet 
security, and the impacts of the Internet in China. The term framing refers to the selection 
of various issues related to the Internet in China and the process of presenting those 
issues. Different types of news frames are the results of the process. 
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3.2.3. Types of Generic News Frames 
Accordingly, news frames, as a result of framing, refer to the generic ways to 
present certain issues concerning China’s Internet in news stories (see Table 3.1), 24 
consisting of actors, operational processes and evaluations on actors and what have been 
done. A frame in this context is an interpretative tool that journalists use to make sense of 
the Internet in China. Previous framing studies (e.g., Gamson, 1992; Luther & Zhou, 
2005; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000) have identified at least six of what de Vreese, Peter, and Semetko 
(2001) term generic news frames, such as human interest, responsibility, morality, 
economic consequences, conflict, and leadership. Such generic news frames might not be 
determinative in attaining a detailed and thorough understanding of media interpretations 
of subjects or issues in question. Yet they can help framing researchers get around the 
limitations brought by the ad hoc frames, referred to by McCombs and Ghanem (2001) as 
“frames defined specifically for a single study with little or no attention to explicating 
either their basic characteristics or theoretical context” (p.79). This will make it possible 
to compare across cultures and generalize into different contexts. 
A human interest frame, as Valkenburg, Semetko and de Vreese (1999) put it, 
“brings an individual’s story or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, 
or problem” (p.551). Therefore, to personalize, dramatize, and emotionalize the news is 
one way for journalists to present and interpret the issues of China’s Internet. 
 
 
24 It might not be feasible to find all of the frames in a particular newspaper. Yet the absence, if any, still 
can illustrate the tendency of journalists to frame China’s Internet, especially for some issues.  
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25 These issues are not mutually exclusive; therefore more than one of them could appear in the same story. See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for details. 
26 See the coding forms (APPENDIX B), in which this category is broken down by political, cultural, commercial, and other aspects. 
 
  Responsibility frames present an issue or problem “in such a way as to attribute 
responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or 
group” (Semetko, & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). In the context of the Internet in China, for 
instance, journalists might attribute the responsibility for the social problems brought by 
wangba (Internet cafés) to different targets, e.g., governments, or business operators, or 
individual customers.  
Morality frames interpret an issue, event or problem in terms of “moral 
prescription,” such as presenting moral messages, or offering “specific social 
prescriptions about how to behave” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96). Taking 
wangba as an example again, journalists in different societies might frame the stories in 
terms of either responsibility or morality. Specifically, the media in China might have 
framed the regulation of wangba, in which there have been a lot of teenagers playing 
online games all day long and visiting pornographic Web sites, from the perspective of 
educating youths to be civilized Internet users.  
With regard to economic consequence frames, the actual or potential economic 
impact or consequences of an event, issue, action or problem on individuals, societies, or 
nations are emphasized (Luther & Zhou, 2005; Neuman et al., 1992; Valkenburg et al., 
1999).  
In terms of conflict frames, journalists rely on “conflict between individuals, 
groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interests” (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000, p.95). Luther and Zhou (2005) have observed that researchers have 
acknowledged the primary role the conflict frame plays in storytelling in Western media. 
They have also identified a new generic frame, the leadership frame in which the story is 
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centered on the activities, actions or speech of a leader of a nation, group, government 
agency, or an institution, or the discussion and assessment of leadership are highlighted.  
Besides these frames, scholars have proposed another type of news frame 
“without indication of implications,” that is, a factual frame presenting events or issues 
“in a straightforward fashion” (Zillmann et al., 2004, p.66).27  
In the current study, framing will be conceived in terms of the different sets of 
values in the socio-political and cultural environment of various countries, which provide 
the underlying rationale for particular issue interpretations in news stories. Although 
journalists, trying hard to be objective, do not deliberately insert values into the news 
(Gans, 1979), some overarching sets of values, as what Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) 
termed deeply held values, or as what Gans (1979) proposed as enduring values, are 
associated with reality judgments and included in the news, which also contains ideology 
(Gans, 1979). It is assumed that such values influence journalists, directly and indirectly, 
to frame the Internet, the medium itself, and its story in China. Thus cultural comparisons 
are given more attention in this study. 
3.3. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions and Subsequent Cross-Cultural 
Projects 
Culture can have many meanings. De Mooij and Keegar (1991) took culture to 
mean “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs 
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”(p.74). 
According to Hofstede (1980), culture is the “collective programming of the mind which 
                                                 
27 See the coding guidelines (APPENDIX C) for detailed information on how to determine the presence of 
each type of generic news frames based on a series of questions. 
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distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (p.260). For 
the purpose of this study, it is referred to in terms of shared values that symbolize a 
society and thus the thinking, feeling, and behaviors of members of that society. Or, it is 
what Srikandath called cultural values, “the governing ideas and guiding principles for 
thought and action” in a given society (1991, p.166). Values – judgments of good or bad, 
right or wrong – are often viewed as central tenets of a society’s culture (Kluckhohn & 
Strodtbeck, 1961). The underlying assumption is that general cultural characteristics 
within a particular society contributes to people within that society thinking and behaving 
in similar ways, with similar perceptions, mind sets and, indeed, expectations. So, it is 
understandable how different countries are associated with or characterized by different 
cultural traits. In the current study, using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, how such 
general cultural values embodied in a society, together with the political system in the 
society, influence framing and news frames will be examined. Such political and cultural 
factors are located at the broadest level in the Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model. 
3.3.1. Hofstede’s Original Work and Cultural Dimensions in Cross-Cultural 
Research 
The mapping of culture has usually been made by using values. The most widely 
known value mapping is the seminal work of Hofstede (1980). Before Hofstede, culture 
had been referred to as a residual explanation, because other factors or variables are more 
easily measured and allowing for a cause and effect relationship to be identified. In 
contrast, Hofstede concentrated on culture itself, mainly with “national cultures” (i.e. 
those cultural characteristics that are kindred to a particular nation). He conducted a 
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research project with a very large sample of IBM Corp. employees, involving 116,000 
questionnaires across 50 countries and three regions at two points in time, which makes 
Hofstede’s framework most useful in both academic and business settings (Cutler, 
Erdem, & Javalgi, 1997), to develop a way of describing culture according to similarities 
and dissimilarities among countries.28 He derived four dimensions of national culture: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/ collectivism, and masculinity/ 
femininity.  
 As Han (2003) pointed out, there has been no research effort with such a huge 
sample size in conducting cross-national comparisons; and no conceptual foundation as 
powerful as Hofstede’s has been yet established in the area of cross-cultural research. 
Hofstede’s original work has been used as organizing and explanatory constructs in many 
disciplines. In a number of publications (for example, Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1998; 
Hofstede & Bond, 1984, 1988), these dimensions have been thoroughly described and 
their correlates presented. By locating cultures on a four-factor map, this groundbreaking 
work has enabled cross-cultural psychologists to select cultures for comparison on an a 
priori basis (e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985). Later, 
tapping values salient to Chinese people, Hofstede (1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988) added 
one additional dimension, long- versus short-term orientation, also know as “Confucian 
work dynamism,” to his cultural dimensions. All five dimensions of culture-level values 
have provided the conceptual impetus for numerous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Hofstede, 
& Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1994).  
                                                 
28 See Hofstede and Bond (1988) for discussions about indirect and direct measures of culture, and how 
matched samples of respondents from a number of different countries are crucial for direct measures of 
culture. They provided strong arguments regarding the IBM samples, which “represented extremely well-
matched subsets from each country’s population.” 
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In short, the studies have demonstrated that national cultures vary substantially in 
a variety of dimensions. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are one of the most frequently 
cited frameworks for understanding culture, although concern over his methodology has 
also been expressed (e.g., Goodstein, 1981; Roberts & Boyacigiller, 1984). His typology 
has been greatly influential in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Albers-Miller & Gelb, 1996; 
Cutler et al., 1997; Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 
1991; Moon & Franke, 2000; Triandis, 1990). Scholars have shown that Hofstede’s 
research effort still provides a well-tested framework for analyzing cultural differences in 
multinational communication. After reviewing 61 studies using Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, Sondergaard (1994) found that these dimensions were stable across 
populations and time periods. According to several studies replicating Hofstede’s country 
classification in the late 1990s, findings were generally consistent with Hofstede’s 
original report (Cutler et al, 1997; Fernandez et al, 1997; Wildeman, Hofstede, 
Noorderhaven, Thurik, Verhoeve, & Wennekers, 1999), although some shifts in value 
classifications were found in some countries (Fernandez et al, 1997).  
The present study will introduce cultural dimensions to media content analysis. 
They will be taken as independent variables to see to what extent culture variations would 
influence the construction of media content and the framing of news stories. The 
underlying assumption is that journalists, the primary producers of media content, work 
in an overarching system of cultural values in which the way they perceive and interpret 
the world is shaped. The dimension of “masculinity versus femininity” will be excluded 
from the study because it mainly addresses gender roles in a society, and is not relevant 
 46
to the focus of the study; thus, the following brief descriptions of cultural dimensions will 
not cover it. 
3.3.2. The Dimension of Individualism versus Collectivism 
 The dimension of “individualism vs. collectivism” has been suggested to be the 
most prominent dimension of cultural variability identified by scholars (Cutler et al, 
1997; Taylor, Wilson, & Miracle, 1994; Triandis, 1990),29 and has been considered an 
appropriate choice for cross-cultural research, thus being most frequently used across 
disciplines (e.g., Belk & Bryce, 1986; Cho, Kwon, Gentry, Jun, & Kropp, 1999; Cutler et 
al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Han & Shavitt, 1994). Scholars have also warned 
researchers of the incorrectness to think of them as “end points at a continuum” (Cho et 
al., 1999), by noting that “the tendencies toward collectivism and individualism can 
coexist” (Triandis, 1990).  
Generally, the dimension pertains to the importance of the group versus the 
individual. Collectivism is where the members of a society operate within a close knit 
social framework, with a high emphasis on loyalty to members of that social framework, 
and “emotional dependence of members on their organizations” (Hofstede, 2001, p.212). 
In contrast, in individualistic societies, where the family in its nuclear form is the most 
common set up, “the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look 
after himself or herself”(Hofstede, 1991, p.51), rather than to function on the basis of a 
shared loyalty to society. Social ties are tighter in collectivistic countries, where “one 
                                                 
29 Taylor et al. (1994) drew such a conclusion from their reading of more than 75 articles and books in the 
area. 
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owes lifelong loyalty to one’s ingroup, and breaking this loyalty is one of the worst things 
a person can do” (Hofstede, 1991, p.50). Under individualism, “laws, rules and 
regulations are institutionalized to protect individual rights” (Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, 
Choi, & Yoon, 1994, p.8), whereas “morality among collectivists is more contextual and 
the supreme value is the welfare of the collective” (Triandis, 1995, p.77).  
In all, the emphasis in individualistic cultures is on a person’s initiative and 
achievement. Collectivistic cultures, in which attitudes toward others depend upon their 
group members, seek group harmony and consensus, and confrontations are to be avoided 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Zandpour, Campos, Catalano, Chang, Cho, Hoobyar, Jiang, Lin, 
Madrid, Scheideler, & Osborn, 1994). Reflected in communication, for instance, 
individualistic cultures are more likely to put more emphasis on individual differences or 
strength in argument and to put less emphasis on shared feeling and consonance among 
persons when they process persuasive messages such as advertising; and collectivistic 
cultures are the opposite (Zandpour et al, 1994).  
 The existence of cultural differences in the individualism vs. collectivism 
dimension has generally been accepted by scholars (Cutler et al, 1997; Frith & Sengupta, 
1991). There is a tendency to relate individualism to the West and collectivism to the 
East. As Hofstede put, “in the United States there has been and still is a strong feeling 
that individualism is good and collectivism bad” (Hofstede, 2001, p.213). Work by Lodge 
and Vogel (1987), led to the recognition that the major difference between the West and 
East lies in their different emphasis on communitarianism and individualism. Scholars 
tend to link Confucian ethic and thus the East to the notion of collectivism. For example, 
Gerth (1968) and Andreski (1983) noted how in Weber’s study, religion was found to 
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impinge on economic behavior, leading Weber to look at the Confucian ethic and 
Confucianism, which do not advocate individualism.  
3.3.3. The Dimension of Power Distance 
 Power distance, to some extent addressing human inequality or the issue of 
whether status is important, involves the extent to which people accept unequal 
distributions of power in society and organizations (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Bond, 
1988). A high power distance index (PDI) reflects the notion of knowing one’s place and 
accepting inequality. High PDI societies, such as China, are more tolerant of hierarchies 
(Fernandez et al., 1997). In such a society, where status consistency is supported, 
inequality is seen as the basis of societal order, and there is a preference for a dictatorial 
autocratic style of management. Thus decisions are taken from the top and dictated 
throughout the organization. The public tends to leave issues of public interest to the 
authorities, waiting for action by the government. There is a latent conflict between the 
powerful and the powerless. The underdog is to be blamed for anything wrong in the 
system, whereas no denouncement is against power abuse by superior (Hofstede, 2001, 
pp.97-121).  
Conversely low power distance does not readily accept inequality, leading to 
attempts to minimize positions of status and to eliminate inequality, seen as a necessary 
evil. It can be said that those nations with a high power distance place great emphasis on 
status and positions of power, whereas those with a low power distance, tend to place 
more emphasis on personal competence rather than status, put value on independence, 
and stress reward, legitimate and expert power. Freedom is seen in as important. The 
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society’s system is to be blamed if something goes wrong. In addition, unlike high-PDI 
societies, where the use of force is seen as the essence of power, in low-PDI societies, it 
is a sign of the failure of power (Hofstede, 2001, pp.97-121).  
3.3.4. The Dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance 
 This concept is concerned with the extent to which a society attempts to avoid 
uncertainty and puts measures in place to reduce uncertainty (Hofstede, 2001, pp.145-
146). Such measures may include: 1) life long employment; 2) adherence to rules and 
regulations; 3) refusal to tolerate deviant ideas or behavior; 4) resisting innovation; 
ignoring concepts; and 5) high power distance (Hofstede, 2001, pp.148-159). In strong 
uncertainty avoidance societies, its members are encouraged to anticipate the future, 
create institutions establishing and reinforcing security and stability, and avoid or manage 
risk. Members in such a society, as Japan and Korea, tend to avoid attitudes and 
behaviors that could increase anxiety, such as doing away with rules. Employees are 
more likely to feel that “company rules should not be broken – even if the employee 
thinks it is in the company’s best interests” (Hofstede, 1991, p.112). Loyalty is a virtue, 
and there is more resistance to changes in such a society (Hofstede, 2001, p.160). In 
contrast, members in a weak uncertainty avoidance society are encouraged to take risks, 
take each day as it comes, and perhaps have low expectations and a fatalistic outlook. 
Individuals in countries low in uncertainty avoidance, such as Singapore, are relatively 
comfortable with ambiguity and are tolerant of others’ behaviors and opinions. To them, 
truth is relative; the need for legislation in such a society is less than uncertainty-avoiding  
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countries (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 2001, pp.160-174).30  
3.3.5. The Dimension of Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation 
 To examine culture from an Eastern perspective, a group of researchers known as 
the “Chinese Culture Connection” developed the so-called Chinese Value Survey (CVS) 
based on Chinese values.31 This instrument revealed a fifth cultural dimension, long-
/short-term orientation, which was taken by Hofstede in his later research. The dimension 
presents the opposite poles of Confucian thinking: perseverance and thrift that are 
oriented towards future rewards, and saving face, respect for tradition and fulfilling social 
obligations that stress more past-oriented values (Hofstede, 2001, p.354, 359).32 Cultures 
with a long-term orientation, or a high score on a Long Term Orientation Index (LTO), 
are concerned with the demands of “virtue” – what one does (Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede 
& Bond, 1988). Members in such a country believe less in universal guidelines for what 
is good and evil, and tend to make judgments by considering the circumstances 
(Hofstede, 2001, p.363). This is a pragmatic approach that emphasizes Confucian 
principles, such as respect for the unequal status of individuals. Cultures with a short-
term orientation, or a low score on LTO, are more concerned with “truth” – religion-
                                                 
30 Hofstede (2001) also pointed out that such a need does not imply a greater trust in the legal system 
(p.174).  
31 See Chinese Culture Connection (1987). Specifically, Michael Harris Bond developed an instrument in 
Hong Kong from values suggested by Chinese scholars. The group conducted the survey among students 
from 23 countries around 1985. 
32 According to Hofstede (2001), the missing of the dimension from the original IBM data can be seen as a 
result of the thinking of Western minds that differ from Eastern minds. For instance, such a concept as 
“filial piety,” which is explained as “honoring of ancestors and obedience to, respect for and financial 
support of parents,” in the CVS seem unfamiliar to a Western mind, even though some values would be 
clearly recognized by the Eastern mind. A Westerner would not normally find them important. Hofstede 
also pointed out that cultural bias could be minimized by well designed and conducted “decentered 
research” and the dynamics of the research team (pp.351-355). 
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based issues of right and wrong involving what one believes. Tolerance and respect for 
others are seen as a matter of principle. People are expecting quick results in such a 
society (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 359-365).  
In general, East Asian countries scored highest on LTO, with China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea on the top five of the Hofstede’s list including 23 
countries.33 In contrast, Western countries were on the low side (Hofstede, 2001). Such a 
listing is consist with the findings in other studies, showing that people from East Asian 
countries such as China, Japan, and Korea tend to have a past orientation, while 
Westerners such as Americans and Northern Europeans have more of a future orientation 
(Hall, 1976; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Yau, 1988). After the pioneering study of 
Chinese Culture Connection, replications of their measurement were conducted by a 
U.S.-Hong Kong team of researchers who collected responses to the CVS from different 
organizations in China, Hong Kong, and the United States (see Ralston, Gustafson, 
Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993; Ralston, Gustafson, Elsass, Cheung, & Terpstra, 1992). This 
led to similar results. China scored on top, Hong Kong in the middle, and the United 
States last (as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p.355).  
3.4. Conclusion 
 The literature review suggests that there is much room left for researchers to 
examine the construction of media content and the factors influencing such a process. 
Ideological and societal factors at the broadest level in the hierarchical model of 
                                                 
33 This list is mainly based on the one generated by Bond and his colleagues (Chinese Culture Connection, 
1987). 
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Shoemaker and Reese have appealed to scholars in terms of theory and cultural studies. 
Yet, few studies have empirically tied such factors to media production, particularly in 
terms of framing, which concerns the selection and salience of issues and the way to 
present those issues, or news frames. Since the factors at the macro levels vary with 
political systems and cultural dimensions across societies, a cross-cultural study would fit 
into such examinations. Scholars have suggested several types of generic news frames, 
which are free from the limitations brought by individual news stories with different 
topics and cultural backgrounds in terms of generalization across studies. Their generic 
nature may make it possible to compare across cultures, although under such a 
framework detailed information cannot be obtained.  
 Cross-cultural studies have benefited from cultural dimensions since Hofstede 
published his seminal work (1980). With the contributions of later studies, cultural 
dimensions have demonstrated their strong practical values in cross-cultural studies 
across disciplines. Yet, few studies have been found to apply the dimensions to news 
content research, particularly in terms of framing, although numerous studies comparing 
advertising across countries have adopted the framework since the 1990s. The current 
study is exploratory to see whether such a framework suits to framing research; and if so, 
to what extent. The cultural dimensions, together with freedom status, were taken as 
independent variables to see to what extent cultural variations might affect the 
construction of media content and the framing of news stories.  
Such effects were also examined with the influence of factors at the extramedia 
level in Shoemaker and Reese’s model within a society, specifically China, to see the 
variations of newspapers’ treatment in the same overarching political and cultural 
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systems. In their model, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) detailed two primary factors at this 
level, government control and the marketplace (pp.199-215). The next chapter will 
address the unevenly developed Chinese media under the influence of the interaction 
between the party/state power and the market power and the structural differences 
between the two Chinese newspapers sampled in the current study, the People’s Daily 
and Beijing Youth Daily. 
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CHAPTER IV.  
FROM IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA  
TO COMMERCIAL OPERATION:  
THE CHANGING MEDIA IN CHINA 
 
 
 Since the mid 1980s, particularly the 1990s, the Chinese media have been 
undergoing the multifaceted transformation full of what Lee (1994) indicated 
“ambiguities and contradictions,” as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s moving China’s 
priorities from ideology to economic growth and embracing market-oriented 
socioeconomic reforms. The changing process is unique in that it is taking place in an 
authoritarian society within the general framework of the “commandist system” (Lee, 
1990).  
The “inherent paradox between political control and economic liberalism” 
manifested in the Chinese media (Lee, 1994, p.12) may suggest that the extramedia 
influences at the fourth level in Shoemaker and Reese’ hierarchical model would 
particularly contribute to differences in news framing patterns within a transitional 
society, thus being worth a close examination. Therefore, another goal of this study was 
to see whether the framing of the Internet in China would vary with the level of financial 
and operational autonomy enjoyed by individual Chinese newspapers. Accordingly, this 
chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of the media transformation, with an 
emphasis on newspapers, from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater 
relative autonomy from the Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multi-
level structure with media liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu, 
2002; White III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). This is followed by introductions to the People’s 
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Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily, two newspapers selected as the representatives of 
Chinese newspapers. 
4.1. Propaganda, Media Control and Power Dispersion in Reform 
China 
The Chinese media in Mao Zedong’s era had been analyzed within the dominant 
framework of a mass propaganda and persuasion model (Chang, Chen, & Zhang, 1993).  
In such a model, the media functioned as a mouthpiece of the central government and an 
ideological apparatus of the state, and were tightly controlled to meet the needs of 
political indoctrination and mass mobilization so that the state could impose ideological 
hegemony on the society (Edelstein & Liu, 1963; Lee, 1990; Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956). Many studies showed how the Party used the press to propagate its 
party line and party policies, and promote changes in the attitudes and behavior of the 
people in the early 1950s and early 1960s (e.g., Bishop, 1989; Houn, 1961; Liu, 1971).  
Today, while the Party still insists that the press is its mouthpiece and continues to 
employ different mechanisms of media control and censorship,34 the role of media as a 
propaganda tool has shifted in reform China. Thus, many scholars have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the propaganda model (e.g., Chang et al., 1993; Cheek, 1989; Huang, 
2003; Lee, 1994; Sun, 1995, 1996), which is seen as “inadequate in the increasingly 
multifunctional and multi-level media in China” (Sun, 1995, p.195). The use of media to 
maintain political control is now coupled with the dissemination of information to 
                                                 
34 See Polumbaum (1990) for detailed descriptions of the mechanisms of press control used by the Chinese 
government, such as regulatory control, financial controls, personnel management, prepublication review, 
news suppression, and self-censorship. Also see Chan (1995) for the pendulum-like pattern of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s ideological controls of the media from the early of 1980s to the mid-1990s. 
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promote the benefits of economic reform to the Chinese people (Pan, 2000; Wu, 2000). 
Scholars have found tremendous changes occurring in the Chinese media since late 
1970s, both structurally and functionally (e.g. Chan, 1993; Chang, et al., 1993; Chu, 
1994; Huang, 2001; Robinson, 1981; Sun, 1996; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 1998, 2000). 
Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in 1978. Taking the first step, Deng rejected the 
notion that political legitimacy could stem from the charismatic personality of one man, 
and institutionalized the political process, such as restoring the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1979 and promulgating a new CCP 
charter in 1981. Following it, Deng initiated an unprecedented discussion on whether 
Mao’s policies centered on class struggle should be rectified, later known as “Great 
Debate Concerning the Criterion of Truth” (gunyu zhengli biaozhun de dataolun). As a 
result, Maoist ideology was replaced with pragmatism and empiricism, and the country 
shifted its national policy from class struggle to economic construction with a new central 
policy goal, that is, to satisfy the material aspirations of the people without sacrificing 
CCP leadership (Kuan, 1991, 1.3). The phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
(you zhongguo tese shehui zhiyi), coined by Deng and officially proposed at the 12th CCP 
Congress in 1982, was used to justify the economic imperative (The theory of building a 
socialism with Chinese characteristics). On the other hand, the pace of political reforms 
has far lagged behind enthusiastic economic reforms. Although the 13th CCP Congress in 
1987 proclaimed that political reforms were important, it narrowly defined political 
reform in the official report of then-Premier Zhao Ziyang as improving government 
efficiency, strengthening the vitality of the CCP, fighting bureaucracy, and promoting 
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enthusiasm among people (Zhao, 1987).35 Both economic and political reforms were 
carried out within the context of the CCP’s overall goal of retaining power.  
The Chinese media, which began developing rapidly after the reforms, have both 
contributed to this shift and formed part of the re-orientation within this context. At the 
center of the media growth has been the Chinese government’s focus on reconfiguring 
the control and propaganda modalities of the domestic media system to promote 
economic reforms and growth through the introduction of a “competitive” environment, 
while the party-state still owns all mass media organizations in principle to ensure the 
control of information as a key to political and social order, an idea originating in years 
of history of a hierarchical society.36 From late 1989 to the immediate post-1992 
period,37 the dominant role of the media was to promote Deng’s agenda and champion 
                                                 
35 Even so, reformist journalists still took heart and got a moral boost because in the report Zhao also 
accentuated the importance of “supervision (of government) by public opinion” (yulun jiandu). When the 
author discussed such issues with her senior colleagues at the Xinhua News Agency in late 1990s, they all 
appraised it, seeing it as a new cast to the journalism reform. Zhao did not actually use the phrase 
“journalism reform” in this speech; he did so for the first time in a commemorative message published in 
Chinese Journalist (1988, no.1.1), a journal published by Xinhua. 
36 See Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin (2000) for more discussion about the idea of maintaining the social 
order of unidirectional flow of information within the five filial relationships, which was borrowed from 
Confucianism. A typical example of such a hierarchical system of information control is that the 
publications published by the Xinhua News Agency fall into two major categories, publicly circulated 
(gongkai baokan) and internally circulated publications (neibu baokan). The internal publications are 
available only to Party cadres at different levels. The readers of the publication at the top level, which is 
delivered only by Xinhua personnel, include only the members of the Politburo of the CCP. The People’s 
Daily also publishes such internal reference publications. Through the internal reporting, which is almost 
by definition investigative, negative and problem-orientated, journalists identify flaws in current policies 
and serious social problems, and highlight the need for disciplinary actions against delinquent officials, 
which are usually not available to the public. Instead of the mouth, such publications function as “ermu,” 
the eyes and ears of the central leaders for policy decision-making, by providing feedback in the 
implementation of particular policies and directives, and borrowing examples from foreign countries. 
37 In 1992, when visiting Shenzhen, one of the first Special Economic Zones in reform China, Deng gave a 
talk urging officials to forget about the “socialism versus capitalism” debate and focus, instead, on 
accelerating marketization. Newspapers in Shanghai and Shenzhen publicized his talks, subsequently 
leading to a media campaign, which marked the marginalization of the orthodox left. In the same year, the 
Ministry of Culture released ten policy guidelines on reforming cultural institutions, which included the 
policy allowing cultural organizations to form joint-ventures with foreign capital. Since then, ideological 
control has relaxed somewhat (Chan, 1993). Scholars recognize that the year of 1992 marked a more 
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market-oriented government officials and successful business operations. While 
advocating the ideology of the market, the Chinese media have found themselves to be 
involved in a process of commercialization, which is perceived by some scholars to 
represent a “peaceful evolution” or a “quiet revolution” toward establishment of a market 
system (e.g., Chun, 1993; Huang, 1994). The process started in 1978, and was accelerated 
after 1987 when the State Science and Technology Commission listed newspaper 
publishing and broadcasting as “information commodification industries” (Huang & 
Ding, 1997, as cited in Zhao, 2000). For instance, in the newspaper industry, the number 
of newspapers published from January 1, 1980, to March 1, 1985, across the country was 
1,008, which means there was one newspaper coming out every two days (Fang, 1999, 
p.504). The total number of newspapers reached 2,235 by early 1996, a 91.7 percent 
increase above the 1979 level, 186 (Rosen, 2000).38 A majority of newly published 
papers were market-oriented, such as Shopping Guide and Stock Exchange Herald, which 
increased their market share dramatically.  
Although the CCP continues its commitment to political control of mass media,39 
the macro-environment of media operations is seen to be moving away from the  
                                                                                                                                                 
visible mass commercialization in terms of both policy and reality (e.g., Chan, 1993; Zhao, 2000; See more 
information in the next section).  
38 The number has run back to 1,926 by the end of July 2005 (Interfax China, 2006), after the process of 
press conglomeration speeded up and the so-called No.19 Document was issued in 2003 to clean up the 
press industry. 
39 The post-Mao leadership continues to stress the mouthpiece theory. Hu Yaobang, widely considered one 
of the most enlightened post-Mao leaders, in a widely publicized speech in 1985 stated, “The Party’s 
journalism is the Party’s mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people’s government, which 
is led by the Party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves” (Hu, 1985). In November 1989, 
former President Jiang Zemin gave a speech on the Party’s leadership in journalism, stressing, “Party 
Committees at various levels should frequently discuss and study news work. Issues such as propaganda 
policy, guiding ideas, focus of news reporting, effects of propaganda in each period must be discussed in 
Party Committee meetings” (Jiang, 1990, p.199). Interestingly, Guo Chaoren, who had suffered the long-
time denial of Party membership but took over the directorship of Xinhua News Agency in 1992 and sat on 
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propaganda-led model toward a loosening of political controls and a relaxing of 
ideological orthodoxy (Chan, 1993, 1995; Huang, 2001; Zhang, 1993). Unlike the Mao 
era when state influence and ideological control were secured to pervade every domain of 
social life, as Lee (1990) pointed out, the post-Mao regime has not imposed “an all-
encompassing ideology,” which has made it possible for various cultural genres and less 
ideologically oriented content to flourish in the media.  
Wu (2000) analyzed two ways, decentralization and socialization, in which the 
Chinese media have become structurally diversified; that is, the Chinese media have been 
dispersed from the national and provincial capitals to localities, from the power center of 
the state system to different branches, departments and bureaus of the government, and 
from the state to some social sectors. For instance, the percentage of centrally located 
newspapers dropped drastically from 24.6 percent in 1979 to the bottom 5.2 percent in 
1984; it then climbed with difficulty to 9.6 percent in 1997 (Wu, 2000), 40 after the Party 
started the market consolidation campaign and the process of press conglomeration. Zhao 
(2000) asserted that they were mechanisms aimed at “enhancing political control, on the 
one hand, and facilitating press capitalization, on the other” (p.5). Due to the increasingly 
fierce competition from the local popular press, the major nationally circulated papers 
have declined on average 30 percent (Rosen, 2000, p.153).41 In fact, such structural  
                                                                                                                                                 
the Party Secretariat as an observer, published a book Houshe Lun (The theory of being a mouthpiece) in 
1997, voluntarily advocating the role of the press as an instrument of the Party at a time when most 
journalists in China loathed the notion of being a mouthpiece. Because of its slow-selling, each staff in the 
newsrooms at the agency was given one copy paid by different departments affiliated with the agency, 
which caused complaints in every newsroom. Most journalists, including the author who worked with the 
agency at the time, simply put the copies aside or threw them away after receiving them.  
40 Also see Lee (1990) for the diversity of newspapers’ structure and content genres in 1987 as an example. 
41 Refer to Tong (2003) for detailed descriptions of strong competitions among Chinese newspapers, which 
are represented as various “big wars (dazhan),” such as “big wars of news,” “big wars of expanding pages,” 
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diversification occurred across all media types.42  
Dispersion of power to run the press from the national center to peripheries 
carried important political implications, due to the fact that it has brought difficulties to 
the central government to unify voices of the media run by the local government.43 Also, 
various social or non-official organizations, such as the All-China Writers’ Association 
(Zhongguo quanguo zuojia xiehui; ACWA), and the All-China Federation of Women 
                                                                                                                                                 
“big wars of weekend versions,” “big wars of circulations,” “big wars of quotations,” “big wars of 
advertising,” and so on. 
42 A typical example is that the China Central Television (CCTV), the only national television station in 
China, has lost its monopoly over the television industry because numerous television stations have been 
set up at provincial and subprovincial levels of the government. See Chan (1995) for the television 
competition across the national, provincial and city levels; and see Lee (1990) for broadcasting 
regionalization. 
43 Scholars have also recognized the bureaucratic hurdles of inefficiency brought by the structural 
weaknesses of the Chinese administration system in a vertically-organized hierarchy and the not-well 
defined responsibilities of different administrative entities (e.g., Ding, 1994; Wu, 1996). The 
dismantlement of the central command economic system is freeing local governments and entrepreneurs 
from the control of central government. This is leading to highly dynamic and diversified developments in 
many provinces, especially in those remote areas, such as Guangdong Province. While all the state law-
enforcement bodies and the CCP’s discipline inspection commissions in an area help to achieve the 
“ultimate control,” the unified leadership may not keep a close eye on every operational detail of the 
organizations within its jurisdiction on a daily base (Ding, 2002). In China, there is a popular saying, 
“Shang you zhengce, xia you duice (Policy from the top will be met with counter-measures at the bottom),” 
which suggests the possibility of deviations, comprises, and even opposition to the policies issued by the 
political center, especially in the remote local workplace. The following is an interesting example to see 
how a policy from the central government is executed locally. The author emailed a friend of hers in 
Shenzhen, Guangdong, regarding the “PRC Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer 
Information Networks and the Internet” issued in 1997 (refer to Note 12 in Chapter 1), which required new 
users to sign a Net Access Responsibility Agreement in which they swore not to threaten state security or 
reveal state secrets or do anything that endangered the state, obstructed public safety, or was obscene or 
pornographic. She sent me two messages in English as follows:  
1) “for internet setup in my home: 1. call the local LAN company for setup broadband network and 
leave the home phone number; 2. the network company come[sic] to set up the LAN, installation 
fee RMB ¥200.00 (about $23.00) and they send network card for free; 3. Sign the payment 
contract by means of bank account deduction; 4. the fee rate per month = RMB ¥120.00 /month 
(less than $15). 
Note: if ADSL/cable is installed, the similar steps. The remarks u [sic] quoted is bullshitting 
(emphasis added by the author).” 
2) “in 94/95, the users had to sign the agreement with China Telecom, one of the terms is not to  
threaten … blahblah …” 
In terms of traditional media, it is not uncommon that editors play “an edge ball (caibianqiu),” a reference 
to journalistic practices that Chinese journalists sneak in their own ideas to stretch the editorial boundaries 
of the CCP’s tolerance, in their daily news treatment. He (2000a) mentioned four tactics frequently 
employed by Chinese journalists. See also Chan (1995) for the example to show how the Beijing Youth 
Daily broke the news about the event of Hongze Lake and escaped punishment. 
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(Zhongguo quanguo funü lianhehui; ACFW), have established their own media 
organizations, printing less ideological news and taking a more relaxed editorial line.44 
As Lee (1990) noted, such pluralistic semi-autonomous groups have gradually sought to 
articulate their self-interests within the system (p.5). With the loosened controls and the 
introduction of market mechanisms into media operation, the press has started pushing 
the ideological limits, thus eroding the commandist-commanded relationship between the 
Party and the media operations (Zhang, 2000).45  
4.2. State Power and Market Power: Uneven Patterns of Liberalization 
There is no doubt that much of the observed changes in China’s press are 
commercially driven, which is one of the least contested understandings shared among 
scholars of the country’s media.46 Two interlocking steps have mostly contributed to the 
dispersion of power to run the press: the reduction and gradual termination of state  
                                                 
44 In the mid-1990s, the author had personal experiences with a Beijing-located culture and lifestyle weekly 
newspaper, contracted out from the ACWA with a “publication number” (kanhao) from the Beijing Press 
and Publications Administration. To profit, the ACWA leased its kanhao to several individuals who had 
media experiences and were interested in running media operations. In return, the ACWA got paid in the 
form of annual fee within the contract duration for authorization to publish under its name. The actual 
editors-publishers were held responsible for the editing, printing, distribution, taxation and all other 
expenses, such as hiring staff. All the pages of the newspapers were further sub-contracted out to individual 
experienced editors or journalists in Beijing. This is one form of what is called the “contractual system” 
(chengbao zhi). Thanks to its content genre, and financial and personnel autonomy, the newspaper enjoyed 
no censorship from the authorities, even the ACWA. Yet, as Zhao (2000) noted, editors and publishers 
under such a system tended to focus on nonexplicit political content to avoid political troubles because of 
the dubious policy base upon which the contractual relationships were built. The highly controversial 
Shanghai-based World Economic Herald, who obtained its license from the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences and the World Economists Association, was one of the few exceptions (see Shen, 1995, for the 
information on the role of the independent newspaper in fighting press control and promoting economic 
and political reform in China during the 1980s). This contractual system applies also to the movie, 
television and other audio-visual media (see Chan, 1993, for more information). 
45 See his detailed comparisons of the Maoist Party-press system and the present market-based Party-press 
system. 
46 Liu and Jin (2006) stressed the dual attributes of government behavior in the commercialization process 
of the Chinese press. They held that the root cause of the process is the relatively loosening of government 
control. Using Howard Aldrich’s theory, the resource-power model, they argued that the Chinese 
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subsidies and “the return of advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao & 
Shen, 1995). The reduction and termination of subsidies applied to almost all media 
organizations except the People’s Daily, the Economic Daily, and the Qiushi (Seeking 
Truth), starting in 1992, “the year of commercialization.” That is the year when the 
National Working Conference on Press Management (NWCPM) recognized the 
“commodity nature” of the press, and formalized the policy to commercialize 
publications (Chan, 1993).47  
With the progress of economic reforms, the central government could not afford 
subsidizing the old media, let alone the new ones.48 To meet the needs of economic 
reforms, the central government promulgated a new policy at the 1992 NWCPM with a 
specific schedule for the transformation of the Chinese press. The press could no longer 
use state money to pay for wages and fringe benefits, to defray any deficit in operating 
costs, or to acquire and maintain fixed assets. Based on the schedule, the first batch of 
newspapers with subsidies terminated were local or non-official publications that mainly 
carried information about consumption and daily life (Chan, 1993). Coming next was the 
                                                                                                                                                 
government has provided the main resource, “permission,” for the media to achieve the goal of 
transformation. They further noted that the government is still the principal part of fostering and adjusting 
the market. Their views represent the views of some scholars in mainland China. 
47 In fact, as early as in December, 1949, the NWCPM proposed the policy of commercializing the 
management of the newspaper industry: “Newspapers should be managed as production enterprises, 
gradually realizing the business accounting system” (Liang, 1999, as cited in Yuan, 2006). In 1950, the 
Central Propaganda Department released “Guanyu baozhi shixing qiyehua jingying qingkuang tonggao” 
(the Announcement on the Situation of Newspapers’ Implementing Business Management), clearly stating 
that the policy of commercializing the management of newspaper industry was “completely right and 
realizable” (Yuan, 2006). The policy suffered serious setbacks in the Cultural Revolution era, when 
newspapers entirely lost their functions of commercial development. 
48 Press subsidies were implemented in 1949. Until 1992, the state had provided almost guaranteed 
revenues to the press through subscriptions and direct financial assistance, which had been one of the 
important mechanisms to control the media.  
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national or official press. Both the central and local governments adopted the new 
financial policy during 1992 and 1993, which is later known as the “weaning plan,” to   
reduce and finally end media subsidy.49
Consistent with the plan to increase the media’s financial autonomy was the 
Chinese government’s decision to separate the Party press from its mass-appeal 
counterparts, and liberalize Party control over publications traditionally considered to be 
at the lower political ranking. Greater autonomy was granted to: (1) afternoon and 
evening publications; (2) news digests; (3) papers specializing in culture and lifestyle, as 
well as (4) trade journals. They were not required to carry ideological propaganda, 
although political control still applied to Party mouthpieces, army papers and national or 
municipal general papers (Chan, 1993). 
Under these new policies, more and more Chinese newspapers have found 
themselves operating as business organizations, either financially relying on advertising 
revenue,50 or sponsored by business organizations (Chan, 1993; Yu, 1994; Zhao, 2000). 
                                                 
49 The author joined the Xinhua News Agency at the time when it started going through such a process and 
decided to change the Reference News, a digest newspaper enjoying the largest circulation in China, from a 
classified publication to a publicly circulated one, and expand from four pages to eight so as to increase 
profits. As a matter of fact, the newspaper has been the leading profit-making machine for Xinhua, with 
more than RMB ¥120 million (about US$14.5 million at the time) per year, accounting for a majority of the 
newspaper’s annual net profits, turned over to Xinhua since the mid-1990s. The number will be increased 
to RMB ¥250 million (about US$31million) for the year of 2006, according to a confidential source. See 
Chen and Lee (1998) for more detailed information on the numbers of papers at the central and provincial 
levels which reported to be partially subsidized or self-supporting by 1997. The reduction of state subsidies 
was companied by the provision for financial incentives, including tax breaks, performance-based salary 
supplements, and operational freedom (Zhao, 2000).  
50 Advertising has become an increasingly significant feature of the Chinese media. From 1990 to 1995, the 
advertising revenue of newspapers increased by 28% (Chan & Qiu, 2002). Total advertising revenue in 
China was reported in 1992 to have exceeded RMB ¥5 billion (about US$575 million at the time), an 
increase of about 43% over 1991. In some places like Beijing, Jiangsu and Shanxi, the growth rates had 
been almost as high as 100% (Chan, 1993). With media operation becoming more commercialized, 
divisions for advertisement, public relations, and other market-related activities are increasingly influential 
within media organizations (Chen & Lee, 1998). Some scholars viewed it as the “renaissance of press 
advertising” (Liang & Jacobs, 1996; Stross, 1990; Zhao & Shen, 1995). 
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The high ranking Party organs continue to juggle between the role of media in both 
functioning as the Party’s mouthpiece and serving the public life, between indoctrination 
and readability (Chan, 1993).51 The mid-1990s saw a large number of provincial organs 
jumping into the waves of city newspapers and evening newspapers, which are highly 
commercialized and urban-reader oriented (Huang, 2001), to release the “dual pressure” 
(shuangchong yali), that is, playing games within ideological restrictions while being 
financially independent (Wei, 2005).52 Most major Party media had expanded as large 
press conglomerates with a “one-Party organ many subsidiary media” scheme (Huang, 
2000).53 The past years have also seen the phenomenon of “one city, many newspapers” 
emerging in a number of cities across the country. In Beijing alone, according to statistics 
in 1999, there were 10 titles of local daily newspapers and 82 titles of central daily 
newspapers. This did not even include those non-daily newspapers (Zhongguo xinwen 
tongji ziliao huibian, 2000, as cited in Ming, 2002). 
                                                 
51 This antagonism, which does not sound every appropriate, suggests an example to see how unique the 
development of the Chinese press is. Under the pressure of commercialism, journalists are driven to 
conceptualize the news as a commodity in the pursuit of readers. “Kedu xing” (readability) has become a 
savvy word in newsrooms with a desire to feed readers with “soft,” entertainment-oriented and sensational 
material without forgetting the media function of indoctrinating the masses as suggested in traditional 
Chinese journalism principles. Such a paradox becomes part of “the irony of commercialisation” (Yu, 
1994, p.35), a situation in which the practice of professionalism might be undermined, and Chinese 
journalists have been forced to search for balance in their every day practices (e.g., Zhou, 2000). This is 
also part of the difficulties for Chinese journalists with dual missions to serve two masters, the leaders and 
the masses (see more discussions in Polumbaum, 1990). 
52 Faced with the increasing competition of so-called “xiaobao” (small papers, referring to those tabloids 
which mostly fall into the last three categories mentioned above and are market-oriented local newspapers 
usually with a small size of pages in terms of physical measurement), provincial Party organ papers have 
experienced a sharp decline in circulations since the 1990s. By 1996, among 30 of such newspapers, there 
were 23 reporting that their circulations had dropped more than 30 percent. The highest one was the Anhui 
Daily at 59.8% (Liang, 1996, pp.185-186, as cited in Wei, 2005).  
53 See Zhao (2000) for the example of the Guangzhou Daily Group. She viewed the nationwide press 
conglomeration as a redistribution of organizational resources and a means to enhance press control and 
strengthen party organs, to balance the fragmentary power of commercialization for optimal integration 
between propaganda and business. 
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 Because of the interplay of the two forces of state power and market power, the 
Chinese media, although all have more or less bureaucratic affiliations, have transformed 
from the commandist system into one that enjoys greater relative autonomy from the 
Party-state, and from the Party-organ structure to a multi-level structure with media 
liberalization unevenly developed (Chan, 1995; Chan & Qiu, 2002; Chen, 1996; White 
III, 1990; Zhang, 2000). According to Chan and Qiu (2002), such uneven patterns of 
liberalization are embodied in three factors: content genre, media type, and the media 
location. Politically sensitive content (vs. less sensitive genres like entertainment, sports, 
and art), newspapers and television (vs. film, advertising, and the Internet), and the media 
organizations located in Beijing and/or the center areas (vs. other cities and/or the 
periphery) are more subject to ideological control by the CCP than their counterparts. 
Unlike before, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the CCP’s central 
administration of media censorship, focuses its control on just eight institutions (the 
Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, the Qiushi, the Economic Daily, the 
Guangming Daily, CCTV, Central People’s Radio, China International Radio) and in 
important areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, and 
Liaoning (Gong, 1994, as cited in Chan, 1995). 
4.3. A Scheme of the Uneven Structures of Chinese Newspapers 
 Scholars who recognize the interaction of ideological control and market force 
and the diversity of function becoming a key feature of the Chinese press have 
categorized Chinese newspapers into distinctive groups (e.g., Chen & Lee, 1998; Chen & 
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Guo, 1998; Fang, 1999; Guo, 2001; Huang, 2000; Lee, 1990; Sun, 1994; Zhao, 2000).54 
Although the categories differ across studies, the literature has seen a common way to 
separate Party papers, or Party organ papers (dangbao, or dang de jiguanbao),55 from 
the others. Based on the discussions in the literature and the understanding of this 
author’s experiences with the Chinese press, a schematic representation was created to 
show different types of current Chinese newspapers operating in the Party-state sphere 
and the market sphere with two different powers, the pluralistic nature of the press 
structures, and the unevenly developed liberalization of the Chinese press (see Figure 
4.1). 
Instead of embracing a simplistic state versus market dichotomy, as Zhao (2000) 
suggested, the interaction between the press and their complicated institutional and 
financial relationships is recognized. Therefore, the Party-state sphere and the market 
sphere in the schema should not be understood as operating in two completely separated 
levels. The dashed line between the two spheres is vague because interactions, 
negotiations, and compromises of two forces, the state power and the market power, are 
more or less involved at various administrative levels and among all types of 
newspapers.56 Through administrative agencies, such as the CPD at the pinnacle of the 
administrative pyramid of the press control and its provincial and subprovincial  
                                                 
54 For example, Chen and Lee (1998) classified the newspapers in China into five types, such as the Party 
press, the target press, the enterprise/industry press, the mass press and a variety of digests. 
55 In this dissertation, the terms, Party papers, Party organ papers, and the Party press, are interchangeable, 
all referring to newspapers directly run by the CCP committees at given administrative levels. The 
capitalized term “Party” in this dissertation restrictedly refers to the CCP only. 
56 Refer to Guo (2001) He (2000b), Lee (1994, 2000), and Xue (1995) for the use of a political-economic 
perspective to explain the dynamics of the changes in the Chinese press, in which the two forces, 
Communist politics and market forces are involved. 
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Figure 4.1. Chinese Newspapers in Party-State and Market Spheres 
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administrations, licensing, centralized allocation of resources, preferential policy 
treatment and regulatory constraints, the state continues to intervene in the operation of 
the media market, thus blurring the boundaries between the state and the market (Pan, 
2000). Yet the state power is decreasing with the press sectors being closer to the market 
sphere, while the market power is increasing; and the vise-a-versus is also true. The 
market dynamism (as granted by the state) has allowed different types of press various 
scopes in pursuing managerial autonomy and operational liberalization. In the figure, the 
closer a group box is to the market sphere, the more autonomy and liberalization that the 
newspapers in the box enjoy. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, three primary groups of Chinese newspapers, Party 
organ papers, other organ papers, and non-organ papers, 57 distinguish themselves from 
each other because of their different bureaucratic affiliations, organizational practices, 
market share, and content appeal. Bureaucracy takes place at all administrative levels of 
the Chinese press. Yet compared to the other types of newspapers, the first group Party 
organ papers, which are directly controlled by the CCP’s propaganda departments at 
different levels and represent the orthodox party-line voice in the central government, 
various provinces and autonomous regions, and municipalities, have traditionally been at 
the highest political ranking and are subject to the tightest political control in any given 
political administrative region (Chen & Guo, 1998; Guo, 2001), while enjoying the 
higher preferential policy treatment and editorial priority and privileges.58 Such political  
                                                 
57 Ideas were partly drawn from Pan’s (2000) work to categorize Chinese newspapers into such three 
groups. 
58 For instance, central and provincial Party organs enjoy tax privileges. In terms of editorial priority, Party 
organs generally have mandatory propaganda topics to cover. Coverage of the Party and important national 
affairs always appears on front pages and pages ahead of international news pages. For example, during the 
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ranking decreases from the national to the provincial and to the municipal levels of 
administration.59 Despite individual variations, Party organ papers at the provincial and 
municipal levels tend to be more dependent on advertising and outside business than 
central-level Party papers (Chen & Lee, 1998);60 therefore, they are closer to the market 
sphere than central-level papers. Regardless of their differences in terms of administrative 
hierarchy, all Party organ papers heavily rely on state-subsidized office subscriptions 
rather than private subscriptions.61 Because of their emphases on policy guidance and 
ideological propaganda, the readership of Party organ papers is mostly in the officialdom 
(Chen & Guo, 1998). Party members, government officials, and intellectuals get a sense 
of the prevailing political climates by paying particularly close attention to who and what 
                                                                                                                                                 
time from 1942 to 1986 when the People’s Daily discussed journalism reforms, international news had 
never appeared in its front pages. Until now, international news seems still not to be allowed as the top line 
in a front page, although it may occasionally appear in front pages (Chen, 2005). Compared to other levels 
of Party organs, central Party organs enjoy most editorial privileges. All important reports and documents 
of the central government can only be first printed in central Party organ papers, such as the People’s 
Daily, and usually on front pages, and then further copied verbatim by other newspapers. The author 
personally experienced how editorial privileges work at the Xinhua News Agency, a monopoly in the 
provision of international news in China. The story happened in the late 1990s. Two high-ranking managers 
of the commercial website, Sina.com, one of the largest news portals in China, came to the agency to 
apologize for using news stories printed in foreign newspapers without getting advice from the agency. One 
of the deputy editors-in-chief of the Reference News told these two guys, “We actually could sue you 
because the central government has only authorized the agency with such rights.” The Sina guys promised 
never to do it again. For now, Internet news portals in China, like mass appeal newspapers and tabloids, 
bend these rules by rewriting politically safe and commercially attractive international agency stories or 
Internet reports (Zhao, 2000). This seems to come from one of the work traditions of Party papers before 
China’s reforms. As one of the Party disciplines, Party organs could use only wire news provided by the 
Xinhua News Agency. The underlying logic was that the fundamental task of Party papers is to guide the 
Party’s work instead of being voluntary spokespersons for foreign news agencies. In addition, to use wire 
news provided by bourgeois news agencies would be misleading to the Party’s work (Chen, 2005).  
59 In China’s political and economic system, rank always constitutes a determinant of occupational status 
and reward. Media organizations, especially the Party press, are absorbed into the national administrative 
rank system which consists of the ministerial level (bu), the district or bureau level (ju), and the county or 
division level (chu). For instance, the central-level organs, such as the People’s Daily and the Economic 
Daily, are at the bu level, whereas the provincial Party organ newspapers, which are usually named after 
the province, such as the Hunan Daily, are at the ju level. See Pan (2000) for more information on the 
administrative ladder. 
60 Zhao (2000) has particularly seen the rising market power of municipal Party organs. 
61 According to Chen and Guo (1998), for example, more than 80 percent of the subscription funding for 
provincial level Party newspapers are directly subsidized by the state. Zhao (2000) named central and 
provincial Party organs as “losers in the press market” (p.9). 
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get reported in high-ranking newspapers (Guo, 2001). Compared to the other two groups, 
this group of newspapers is most subject to the state power, thus staying far inside the 
Party-state sphere in Figure 4.1. 
The second group of other organ papers in the schema refers to those organ 
papers (jiguan bao) published by official, semi-official or non official organizations, 
bureaucratic authorities, and/or large state-own enterprises. This group of newspapers is 
still in the name of “organ” because of its bureaucratic nature. Yet unlike Party organ 
papers, the newspapers in this group are NOT directly led by the CCP committees at 
various levels. They function as the institutional voice of a given organization, institution 
or enterprise aimed at promoting its policies and the operational goals while serving 
specialized readers based on occupational backgrounds and/or socio-economic interests. 
Because of their more social ties and less tints of Party ideology, the degree that they are 
subject to the state power is less than Party organ papers. On the other hand, the 
newspapers in this group are more self-financially supported because they do not have 
the privileges of resources that their Party organ peers enjoy. Therefore, they are farther 
away from the Party-state sphere but span more over the market sphere in Figure 4.1. 
These papers mainly include professional newspapers published by government organs or 
professional organizations for certain fields (e.g., the Procuratorial Daily published by 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, and the China Post News published by the 
China State Post Bureau), target newspapers (e.g., the Worker’s Daily owned by the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions, and the China Women’s News published by the 
ACFW), and enterprise/trade newspapers (e.g., the Chinese Petroleum Daily owned by 
the China National Petroleum Corporation and aimed at promoting the Party’s 
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ideological propaganda within the corporation).62  This group of newspapers also 
includes those published by satellite parties other than the CCP (e.g., the Unity News, the 
national organ paper of the China Kuomindang Revolutionary Committee63, and the 
organ papers of provincial committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC)). Like Party organ papers, most of these kinds of organ papers are 
rarely seen on the streets. They are mostly subscribed to with public money and for 
consumption in offices and factory workshops. 
The third group in Figure 4.1 is non-organ papers, which are now the majority of 
newspapers in China in terms of circulation and advertising revenue. The newspapers in 
this group differentiate themselves from the first two groups because they are not set to 
be the mouthpiece of a given Party or a work unit. Their main functions are not 
promoting the Party’s line or the policies of a given institution or enterprise. Instead, they 
are more targeted to mass audiences. They may or may not belong to the major Party 
organ unites, government departments, or semi-official organizations. This group 
primarily comprises of city newspapers, evening and morning newspapers, digest papers, 
special-subject papers (e.g., sports newspapers), and others that are less ideologically 
oriented than the Party mouthpieces. Among them, city newspapers (or metro papers) and 
evening newspapers, together with some newspapers published by semi-official 
organizations, such as the Beijing Youth Daily,64 and some popular professional and 
enterprise papers and special-subject papers, constitute what scholars often call “mass-
                                                 
62 In China, the conventional hierarchy of power units at the same jurisdictional level is the Party, the 
government, the trade union, the Youth League, the Women’s Federation, and enterprises. According to 
Chen and Lee (1998), Fang (1999), and Guo (2001), these types of newspapers also include those more 
market-oriented tabloids specifically targeting certain audiences.  
63 One of China’s eight democratic parties. 
64 See more information about the newspaper in the fifth sector. 
 72
appeal” papers or the mass press, and depend primarily on private subscriptions and 
newsstand purchases by individuals to attract advertising.65 They are grouped into 
official or semi-official papers, since they have more or less official backgrounds or are 
tied with Party organ papers at various levels of jurisdiction. Among them, city 
newspapers are all subsidiaries of provincial Party organ papers (Zhao, 2000). For 
example, the famous Southern City Newspaper (Nanfang Dushi Bao) is published by the 
Southern Daily (Nanfang Ribao), the Party organ paper of the CCP Committee of 
Guangdong Province, and belongs to the Southern Daily Group. Scholars in mainland 
China acknowledge the parental relationships between Party-organ and city newspapers, 
holding that city newspapers are the agents of Party papers at the provincial level to 
capture the market benefits (e.g., Wei, 2005; Yuan, 2003). History has also seen the 
institutional ties of evening and morning newspapers with the Party press, in that Chinese 
evening and morning newspapers are usually published by municipal Party organ papers 
(Fang, 1999).66 After being pushed into the market, these newspapers have found 
themselves striving for maximum readership and profit (Guo, 2001). Although they all 
are more or less institutionally tied with state authorities at different levels, they are 
distinct from Party organ papers in terms of ideological control, financial management, 
social influence, and editorial content. They also differ from other organ papers because 
                                                 
65 See Zhao (2000) for the example of comparing the municipal Party organ, the Beijing Daily, and one of 
its subsidiaries, the Beijing Evening News, and the shrinking office subscriptions of Party papers. Chen and 
Guo (1998) also reported that in 1992, evening newspapers in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Shaanxi 
surpassed their parental Party organ papers both in advertising dollars gained and net revenue growth rate. 
According to Huang (2000, 2001) and Rosen (2000), the most popular newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Chengdu, based on consumer spending, are all mass-appeal papers. For example, by 1995, 
there were 128 officially registered evening papers. 90 percent of their subscribers are individuals, not work 
units (gongzuo danwei) (Rosen, 2000). 
66 See more discussions about the differences and the institutional relationships between Party newspapers 
and mass-appeal newspapers, such as city newspapers and evening newspapers, in Zhao (2000).  
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they are more intensively market-driven. Among the three groups, this group of 
newspapers is most subject to the market power, thus standing furthest inside the market 
sphere in Figure 4.1. 
Within the group of non-organ papers, non-official newspapers separate 
themselves from official or semi-official papers by their being independent from 
institutions, organizations, or enterprises with Party-state backgrounds. The examples 
include those papers with non-Party backgrounds from the very beginning of their 
launching (e.g., the Xinmin Evening News, which is an unofficial paper originally 
published by capitalists before the New China was established), and industry-involved 
newspapers (e.g., the Computer Weekly).  
Generally speaking, non-organ papers are more accessible to advertisers but less 
reliant on centralized allocation of resources with the dramatic expansion of advertising 
volume in the process of market maturity. Therefore, they enjoy less control from the 
central authorities, greater autonomy in management, and more popularity among 
residents in large- or medium sized metropolitan areas. With increasing financial 
autonomy, these newspapers have seen more human-interest oriented and increasingly 
diversified content (Pan, 1997; Chen & Lee, 1998; Guo, 2001).  
4.4. People’s Daily: The Flagship Mouthpiece of the CCP 
Two influential newspapers both published in Beijing were selected as 
representatives of Chinese newspapers for this current study. One is the People’s Daily, 
the national mouthpiece of the CCP; and the other is the Beijing Youth Daily, one of the 
most influential mass-appeal newspapers in China. In addition to the newspapers’ nature 
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in terms of their positions in the Party-state sphere and the market sphere, the two papers 
were selected to minimize the influences of regional differences. 
The People’s Daily was launched on June 15, 1948, as a regional Party organ 
paper of the CCP’s North China Branch, and was changed to the Party’s central organ 
paper on August 1, 1949. In 1952, its circulation increased from about 40,000 as a 
regional paper to 480,000, becoming the most influential and authoritative newspaper 
with the largest circulation (Fang, 1999, p.3). The leading status of the People’s Daily in 
Chinese newspapers did not meet any challenges until the 1990s. As the discussions 
above suggest, the share of Party organ newspapers in the market had dramatically 
declined by the mid-1990s.67 Despite some attempts at expansion, newspapers like the 
People’s Daily were unable to compete with mass-appeal papers for individual 
subscribers or advertising revenues (Bacani & Law, 1996). During the period from 1982 
to 1996, the circulation of the People’s Daily plunged sharply from 5.2 million to about 2 
million (Chinese Journalism Yearbook 1997, as cited in Huang, 2001; Zhongguo xinwen 
chuban tongji ziliao huibian, 1998, as cited in Wu, 2000). 68 With the largest circulation 
among all the publicly circulated daily newspapers,69 the People’s Daily had always 
dominated the advertising market and headed the list of top ten newspaper advertising 
revenue earners (Chen & Guo, 1998; Lee, 2000). From 1990, however, the paper’s 
                                                 
67 According to Rosen (2000), as late as 1988, there were 407 party-organ newspapers, constituting 25 
percent of the publicly circulated papers. Yet with more than 600 new papers entering the market during 
the late 1980s to 1996, a perceptible shift appeared.  
68 Based on the author’s observations as a journalist in China and the confidential interview conducted by 
the author, the circulation figure of the People’s Daily has been about one million since the late 1990s, 
although it claims to have a three-million circulation on its website. See its website, “Introduction to the 
People’s Daily,” http://www.people.com.cn/GB/1018/22259/2220957.html [in Chinese].  
69 This does not take into account of the Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi), which had been seen as an 
internal publication even though it became a publicly circulated paper in 1985. In fact, this newspaper has 
been heading the list of circulation among all Chinese newspapers.  
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advertising revenue plummeted and the paper had dropped out of the nation’s top 10 
revenue list by 1995 (Chen, 1996; Chen & Guo, 1998). 
While continuing to be a tool of Party propaganda, the People’s Daily has 
continuously taken steps to increase its revenues, such as expanding pages, allotting more 
coverage to economic news, publishing regional editions and increasing its satellite 
publications, which are mostly market-oriented (e.g., the Securities Times (Zhengquan 
Shibao), the International Finance News (Guoji Jingrong Bao), the Market (Shichang 
Bao) and the Satire and Humor (Fengci yu Youmo)). Currently, the People’s Daily prints 
16 pages during weekdays.70 The first four pages reports breaking news. The next eight 
pages, from Page 5 to Page 12, cover in-depth reports. The other pages are special 
sections and/or weekly sections,71 mainly publishing non-politically oriented content 
such as coverage of culture, science and technology, and essays. Currently, there are 
eight daily newspapers, including two regional editions and one overseas edition, five 
weekly newspapers, and 11 magazines published under the People’s Daily, which also 
operates a website, People’s Daily Online, one of the most influential and authoritative 
websites with the largest volume of updated databases in China (Ye, Gan, Xia, Zheng, 
Tan, Pu, & Hu 2001). 
Under the jurisdiction of the CPD, the People’s Daily with a political rank at the 
ministry level72 is one of the primary elements of the propaganda system (xuanchan 
xitong). It acts as the chief conduit of official interpretations of important political, 
                                                 
70 The first and fourth pages of the copies printed in Beijing are in color. Only eight pages are printed on 
Saturdays and Sundays. Its two regional versions of East-China and South China publish 20 pages per day. 
71 There are three weekly sections, such as Economics Weekly on Mondays, Society Weekly on 
Wednesdays, and Mother Earth Weekly on Fridays. 
72 Refer to Footnote 59 for the administrative ladders of media organizations in China. 
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economic, social and cultural events to Party members and ordinary people across the 
country (Lynch, 1999). CCP leaders have consistently used the paper to give Party guides 
and/or political directives, explicitly and implicitly, on important occasions.73 As one of 
the four major national media agenda-setters (Zhao, 1998), the People’s Daily enjoys the 
highest editorial priority and privileges.74 Government documents and important 
editorials in the People’s Daily are aired on the national radio and television and 
reprinted by local news media, especially provincial Party organs (Zhao, 1998). Local 
newspapers, while enjoying some level of autonomy in terms of news selection, usually 
scrutinize the People’s Daily for signs regarding coverage of important issues or events 
with political implications (Lynch, 1999).  
The central concept that underlines the practice of the People’s Daily is the “Party 
principle” (dangxing yuanze), which comprises three basic components: “that the news 
media must accept the Party’s guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the 
Party’s programs, policies, and directives; and that they must accept the Party’s 
leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational principles and press policies” (Tong & 
Cheng, 1993, as cited in Zhao, 1998, p.19). Although Chinese journalists and scholars 
have been discussing the issue of reorienting Party organs in a commercialized society,75 
the CCP has never changed the foundation of the Party-control system and loosened its 
                                                 
73 For instance, Mao himself wrote a number of key editorials. Some famous pieces include “Press Du 
Yuming to Surrender,” “Carry the Revolution through to the End,” and “Five Criticisms White Paper.” 
Even today, editorials regarding policies or important issues are usually conceived and drafted by a special 
group, and then modified under the instructions from the CCP Central Committee. One of the examples is 
the editorial on April 26, 1989, which defined the student demonstrations as “counter-revolutionary 
turmoil,” and was widely believed to have been written by Party officials (Zhao, 1998).  
74 Refer to Footnote 58. 
75 See, for example, Liu and Sun (2005), Peng (2004), and Wang (2004),  
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tight control over its flagship mouthpiece, the People’s Daily.76 In 1996, then- President 
Jiang Zemin visited the People’s Daily and emphasized the need to maintain political 
loyalty (Li, 1998). In 1998, when the paper celebrated its 50 anniversary, Jiang wrote a 
piece of dedication, “Adhere to taking the correct lead of public opinion, enthusiastically 
propagate the Party line, theories, and policies, and fully play the role as the leader of 
national newspapers (Jianchi zhengque yulun daoxiang, jiji xuanchuan dang de lilun 
luxian fangzheng zhengce, fahui quanguo baozhi paitoubing zuoyong)” (The memorabilia 
of the People’s Daily). Within the ideological framework, the People’s Daily still closely 
follows the Party line, selecting news and editorials often on the basis of their relevance 
to the central theme of the Party. Its fundamental role is “to inform the public after an 
authoritative decision has been reached” (Rosen, 2000, p.155, italic original). The 
national importance of the People’s Daily to the CCP means its fortune should be subject 
to the market power at minimum. 
4.5. Beijing Youth Daily: An Example of Transcending Its Official 
Origin 
The Beijing Youth Daily was founded on March 21, 1949, originally as an official 
organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League Beijing Committee. When it resumed 
publication on March 7, 1981, the newspaper was a weekly four-page tabloid only 
available in the Beijing region with a circulation of 29,000 copies and an official subsidy 
of RMB ¥260,000 (about US$30,000 at the time, Zhao, 1998, p.141). Soon after its third 
                                                 
76 In the scheme I posed in the last section, the People’s Daily is at the top rank in the group of Party 
organs, mostly in the Party-state sphere and under the strong influence of the state power. In He’s (1996) 
three-tier system, the People’s Daily is in the first tier tightly controlled by the Party’s central leadership. It 
is not unusual for the paper’s staff to receive phone calls of condemnation from the central leaders. See Liu 
(1990) for examples. 
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resumption of publication in July 1987,77 the Beijing Youth Daily, along with many of 
other Chinese media, recognized “news is also commodity,” and started packaging 
(baozhuang) its news in an entirely new way on January 3, 1989, when the name of the 
layout designer for the first time appeared on its front page.78 Since then, the Beijing 
Youth Daily has been a pioneer in experimenting with new operational and editorial 
measures, such as contracting the paper out to its staff,79 eliminating lifetime tenure and 
disregarding the official wage system, using large and sensational headlines and huge 
eye-catching photos, and creating various special sections and pages, such as “News 
Weekly” (on Tuesdays, beginning in 1993),80 “The World of Literature, Culture, and 
Sports” (on Thursdays) and “Youth Weekend” (on Saturdays, beginning in 1992). These 
special sections and new journalistic practices created a journalism shock wave, from 
form to content, in the early of 1990s (Qiu, 1995), during which time other official organ 
papers were limiting their reforms to discussion rather than implement (Zhao, 1998).81  
Thanks to the efforts of a group of “most energetic and reform-minded” news 
people (Zhao, 1998, p.141), the Beijing Youth Daily has risen as an influential popular 
daily newspaper proclaiming “Provide One Thing Only – News” as its logo (Huang, 
                                                 
77 In this research, although an effort was made to search for explanations as to why the interruptions 
occurred, none could be found. 
78 The newspaper assigned responsibility for individual pages to subeditors, who then planned the layout of 
the entire page (Rosen, 2000). 
79 The newspaper voluntarily cut its financial connection with the government by signing a four-year 
contract (1991-94) which had made the paper become financially independent without receiving any 
subsidy from the city who in return allowed it to keep all of its profits (Zhao, 1998). 
80 See Zhao (1998) for detailed information on how the newspaper uses this edition to “make the most out 
of news values” (p.143). 
81 Zhao attributed its ability to experiment with all kinds of reforms mostly to the obscure status and 
relative lack of direct control from authorities of the newspaper with one of the lowest official rank (chu, 
the county or division level), compared to many of other newspapers in Beijing, and its relative lack of 
vested interest in the Party media system. Its innovations were to a great degree based on “self-
determination, self-development, self-financing, and self-restraint” (1998, p.141). 
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2000; Zhao, 1998). Currently, this broadsheet newspaper is distributed to readers both at 
home and abroad. With its annual circulation growth rate of 30%, an unmatchable rate in 
press circles, the Beijing Youth Daily, now enjoys a daily circulation of 600,000 (Beijing 
Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com; Zhang, 2006), almost four times the circulation 
reported in1994 (Rosen, 2000). Street sales and private subscriptions account for the 
majority of its circulation, while office subscriptions are much lower than for other 
official organ papers (Zhao, 1998). A single issue of the paper during regular week days 
is currently 68 full-size pages. Headquartered in Beijing, the Beijing Youth Daily has five 
printing sites in China.82 It has incorporated data-transfer via satellite link in its 
production, which is instrumental in helping the paper to achieve its goal of covering all 
of China and the world. Within a decade, the newspaper has grown from a four-page 
weekly tabloid into a conglomerate that publishes ten newspapers and one magazine, and 
runs one website and more than 10 businesses, such as an advertising company, a book 
store, an arts center, a high-tech firm, a public relations firm, a grocery store, a medical 
clinic, a resort, and so on, in a wide range of areas (Beijing Youth Daily acquires 
Qianlong.com; Wang, 2005; Zhao, 1998). It has evolved into the second-largest 
newspaper group after the Guangzhou Daily Group by revenue (Hui & Bei, 2004).  
The Beijing Youth Daily is seen as the most interesting case of an organ paper that 
has transcended its origin (Rosen, 2000), not only in terms of its readership, but also its 
content and business management. As the organ of the Beijing Youth League, the Beijing 
Youth Daily was exclusively targeted at youth in the past. With its introducing a series of 
reforms, the Beijing Youth Daily does not limit its audience to youth any more. Instead, 
                                                 
82 The paper began printing in color in 1999. 
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the newspaper covers all fields of public interest, according to its editor-in-chief Zhang 
Yanping (Zhang, 2006). Its readers consist of business employees (23.2%), government 
employees and office workers (20.3%), university students (13.3%), and educational, 
cultural, scientific and health workers (10.4%) (Pu, 1994, as cited in Zhao, 1998). 83 
Among them, only 1.8 percent are leading cadres, compared to 13.4 percent of the 
People’s Daily readers (Zhao, 1998).  
As a part of its strategy for success in a crowded marketplace, the Beijing Youth 
Daily pays special attention to stories with wide public interest or concern, and puts 
forward the motto: “use news values to push the main paper to the market” (Zhao, 1998). 
It is not uncommon for the paper to raise important questions and generate heated debates 
about contentious issues and the new phenomena that have arisen under the impact of a 
market economy (see Rosen, 2000). The paper won high praise in public opinion polls for 
its emphasis on investigative reporting and consumer issues. Its approval rate among the 
public was “far higher” than the average of national papers, according to a survey 
conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of Chinese People’s University 
(Rosen, 2000). On January 1st, 2004, the China Dominant-Journalism Development 
Center (CDDC) 84 published The 2003 Report of the Influence and Credibility of 
Newspapers and Magazines in Mainland China, which lists the Beijing Youth Daily as  
the most influential newspaper in Beijing.85
                                                 
83 As the author observed in the 1990s, many newsrooms at the elite media, such as the Xinhua News 
Agency, the People’s Daily, the CCTV, the China Daily, and other organ newspapers subscribed to the 
Beijing Youth Daily, and occasionally took it as an example of reform to learn. 
84 A non-profit website for journalism and communication research in mainland China. See the website 
http://www.cddc.net. 
85 Part organ papers were excluded from the report. The most credible newspaper in Beijing was the Beijing 
Evening News. 
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Since the 2000s, the Beijing Youth Daily has taken big steps to commercialize its 
operation management, further enhancing the feeling of its readers that the newspaper is 
more like a commercial one instead of an organ paper. Its advertising company, Beiqing 
Chuanmei (Beijing Media Corporation Limited, HK$1000),86 formed from the 
newspaper’s non-editorial operations, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s H share 
market on December 22, 2004, at a value of HK$4 billion (US$512 million), which made 
the newspaper the first mainland media enterprise to list overseas. In 2005, the Beijing 
Youth Daily succeeded in purchasing 51 percent of stock shares of a fashion magazine in 
mainland China, which cost RMB ¥2 million (about US$240,964). Soon after its 
announcement of planning to use RMB¥200 million (about US$24.1 million) in the way 
of entire capital cash purchase to merge a national capital morning newspaper into its 
media group, the paper officially began on August 31, 2005, its expansion strategy of 
“kua meiti, kua hangye, kua quyu” (cross-media, cross-industry, cross-region), which 
covers print media, online media, radio broadcast stations and television stations, by 
successfully acquiring a controlling stake in Qianlong.com, a Beijing-based popular news 
portal (Beijing Youth Daily acquires Qianlong.com; Wang, 2005). 
Yet the newspaper’s market-oriented taste and defense of the interests of common 
people against corrupt officials and businesses does not suggest it is free from political 
boundaries. Despite its seeking public sales, as Zhao (1998) pointed out, the newspaper 
still works hard on a balance between the Party line and the bottom line. Although it is 
                                                 
86 According to its annual report issued in April, 2005, the Beiqing Chuanmei, the main advertising 
company for the Beijing Youth Daily and its subsidiaries, realized a business income of RMB ¥1.1 billion 
(about US$132.5 million), increased by 2.9% compared to the previous year. The advertising revenue 
amounted to RMB ¥814 million (about US$98 million). The net profit grew by 26.8% to RMB ¥194 
million (about US$23.4 million, Wang, 2005). 
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not unusual that contradictions between appealing to its readers and being politically 
correct come up in daily operations,87 there is no overall contradiction between being 
commercialized and promoting the official ideology, which is what most Chinese 
newspapers do in China. As a matter of fact, the Beijing Youth Daily has perfected the 
“art of propaganda” to make both “masters” happy (Zhao, 1998).88 Within the 
overarching framework of government policies, and political and cultural ideology, 
Rosen (2000) found that the debates and discussions of public interest sponsored by the 
newspaper did not fall outside the parameters of Party initiatives. 
4.6. Conclusion 
 The Chinese press, now facing the challenges to meet the needs of both the leader 
and the led, has become increasingly diversified in both structure and function, while it is 
undergoing a process of conglomeration (Huang, 2001; Zhao, 2000). As a reflection of 
the broad changes of economic reform since 1978, especially the 1990s, there has been a 
steep rise of various publications other than Party organ papers, ranging from evening 
newspapers, city newspapers, targeted-population papers, enterprise newspapers, and 
special-subject newspapers, in terms of both the number of titles and the volumes of 
circulation and advertising revenue. Because of the government’s different expectations 
and different structural and financial policies towards them, the newspapers  
                                                 
87 The newspaper is also famous for frequently getting into trouble and being subject to leadership changes 
as a result of its challenges against the authorities. Yet such challenges are big enough to get readers’ 
attention but inconsistent enough to avoid being closed down (Zhao, 1998). The paper’s low official status 
in terms of administrative hierarchy also provides its safety margin to “play the edge ball,” which is 
mentioned in Footnote 43. 
88 See more examples in Zhao (1998) about how the newspaper repackages the official ideology, sometimes 
even using sensationalism.  
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place differential weights to propaganda and objective content (Guo & Chen, 1997), 
while they all face the challenges of serving the state and the market, and commonly have 
the responsibility of promoting economic modernization, a new official line in reform 
China, as part of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).  
In the scheme of Chinese newspapers unevenly developed within the Party-state 
sphere and the market sphere (Figure 4.1), Party organ papers particularly distinguish 
themselves from the other two groups for their dominating position in the Party-state 
sphere, thus enjoying most editorial priority and privileges while suffering the tightest 
control of the CCP. As the flagship mouthpiece of the CCP, the People’s Daily is at the 
top level of Party authorities; therefore, its role as a propaganda tool to facilitate 
government policies and promote Party ideology are emphasized more at this paper than 
at other Party organs at lower levels, other organ papers, and non-organ papers. In 
contrast, the Beijing Youth Daily, which has undergone the transcendent process from a 
typical organ paper targeted at youth to a hybrid of an official organ and a mass appeal 
newspaper, are much more market-oriented in terms of both editorial tendency and 
operation management. The paper’s financial autonomy and marginal official status make 
it possible to stretch its editorial boundaries. Yet it is still limited within the overall 
framework of political and cultural ideology. 
 The literature review suggests that the content presented in the Chinese 
newspapers might differ, to a more or less degree, across the sectors of news 
organizations, even if the news organizations are under the same umbrella of political and 
cultural systems. For instance, the study of Luther and Zhou (2004) presents the 
differences of valences [positive, negative and neutral] of frames between the People’s 
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Daily, and the China Daily, the only daily newspaper published in English with a major 
target of foreign readers. Although this is a very good starting point to detect whether 
differences in media content exist across the structural levels of the Chinese press, more 
systematic research needs to be done to see how such influences might interact with other 
macro factors such as the political system and cultural traditions. The selection of the 
People’s Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily for this study is a result of a thorough 
literature review of the emerging commercialized media market and uneven structures of 
newspapers in China.  
 Unlike their peers in other societies, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore, where the media are largely privately owned and 
government controls are exerted through laws, regulations, licenses, and taxes 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), the media in China are primarily government-owned with 
government control exerted through media financing in addition to the control 
mechanisms above. Therefore, it is acceptable to select two newspapers with different 
financial statuses, such as the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily to represent the 
Chinese press as a whole for the cross-cultural analysis to avoid the bias toward neither 
type of newspaper. It is also meaningful to separate the two newspapers for the purpose 
of testing the impacts of the factors at the extramedia level, such as government control 
and the marketplace. 
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CHAPTER V.  
OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES 
 
5.1. Research Objectives and Study’s Significance 
The literature review of research on the Internet in China and factors influencing 
the construction of media content suggests a good opportunity to study the media 
treatment of the Internet in China. As discussed before, the research on the Internet and 
China’s Internet is very productive. Yet only one study has approached the Internet in 
China from the perspective of news media coverage. Moreover, the pictures of China’s 
Internet in media have not fully been drawn in terms of framing. Comparisons of the 
treatment could be done both within a country, where the factors at the first four levels in 
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model are examined, and across societies, where the 
broadest level regarding socio-political, ideological and cultural factors are paid 
particular attention.  
The Internet has been at the forefront of the information revolution in China. It is 
an integral part of the overall information and communications technology (ICT) sector, 
which is high on the Chinese government’s new policy agenda for creating a national 
information infrastructure. Yet for China, the only large communist country, the Internet 
is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the Chinese government is trying to realize 
informatization (xinxihua) over the country through Internet development, which is 
viewed by the state as critical to China’s future growth and international competitiveness 
(Zhou, 2004a); on the other hand, it has attempted to exert its own control of this 
information infrastructure by means of heavy regulation and technical measures to reduce 
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the “undesirable” political impact of the global computer network (Zhou, 2004b). This is 
contrary to the idea emphasized in countries such as the United States that the Internet is 
in nature free of control and a force for democracy. The topic of China’s Internet, which 
involves multiple aspects of a society, has drawn intensive attention from governments, 
media, and academic circles both inside and outside China. Therefore, such a topic is 
very suitable for a cross-cultural study. The intrinsic antinomy of China’s Internet 
policies and the contradiction between the Chinese government’s political control of the 
Internet and the principles of the free flow of information provide a good opportunity for 
a framing study, since power and ideology have been articulated from the very beginning 
of framing research. 
As far as the literature on media content is concerned, research tends to examine 
the factors at the lower levels in the Shoemaker and Reese model, such as gate keeping of 
individuals, media routines, and organizational elements. Few studies have virtually 
moved onto the higher level, especially empirically, although scholars have to a great 
degree been aware of the importance of the factors, such as ideology, political system, 
and culture, in shaping media content.  
The literature review has also mentioned that considerable research on media 
framing has been carried out exploring the relationship between media frames and 
individual frames, and how media frames influence the way in which individuals 
perceive and construct reality. The first part of the framing process, that is, how reality is 
constructed, how media frames are formed or the types of frames that result from this 
process, and how various factors at both micro and macro levels – especially those at the 
macro level – play a role in this process, has largely been ignored. Carragee and Roefs 
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(2004) criticize that recent framing research “have neglected the relationship between 
media frames and broader issues of political and social power” (p.214). Particularly, in 
previous empirical studies of media framing, questions of power and ideology, which are 
usually inquired in the context of critical analysis, typically have not been raised. As 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) put it, scholars concerned with ideology typically have 
adopted a critical approach, emphasizing “more general, abstract theorizing than testing 
specific hypotheses with empirical data” (p.223).  
The current study set out with three primary objectives: 1) To identify the patterns 
of newspapers’ treatment of the Internet in China; 2) To empirically test the influence of 
factors at two broadest levels, such as the extramedia and ideology levels, in Shoemaker 
and Reese’s model on media content by incorporating the framework of framing studies; 
3) To make a contribution to the literature of framing research by introducing Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions as independent variables to explain the variations of the presentations 
of generic news frames. 
There are some studies being done cross-culturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, & 
Semetko, 2001). However, such studies do not present clear relationships between media 
frames and certain factors influencing content, in that the focus of such studies tends to 
only present the differences of media frames and the researchers tend not to empirically 
correlate the factors influencing media content to the presentations of media frames.  
Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that most studies in 
this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by singling out one 
factor. As a result, the interactions between factors are easily ignored.  
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 This study may fill those gaps by looking at news frames of the Internet and 
China’s Internet in the newspapers published in five societies, and empirically testing the 
relationship between news frames and the factors at the higher level in the Shoemaker 
and Reese model. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect patterns among countries 
and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences between an arbitrary pairing 
of two countries.  
Last but by no means least important, the comparisons between the national Party 
Organ newspaper, the People’s Daily, and its local counterpart, the Beijing Youth Daily, 
with relative institutional and financial autonomy in China will serve as a preliminary 
investigation of whether news frames vary along with the changing structure of media in 
China. 
5.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Major goals in this study include identifying and outlining the issues related to the 
Internet in China, which issues more frequently appeared in news stories, how the issues 
were framed, and what the dominant frames and their variations were. Several research 
questions are raised to address these concerns: 
 
RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most 
frequently taken as the primary subject of a given story within each society? 
RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one 
another in reporting the issues? If so, how? 
 
RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the 
newspapers of each society?  
RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with 




 A second goal is to examine how much variations in media framing could be 
explained by such factors at the macro levels as political systems, social norms and 
cultural values, and their interactions, by comparing the newspapers published in 
different countries. The variations were examined quantitatively by measuring the 
frequencies of generic news frames, and running seven logistic regression models for 
seven generic news frames. 
 
RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered, 
how much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could 
be explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found? 
  
Particular attention is paid to such issues as the Internet use in China, the issues of 
Internet censorship and/or regulations, and the political and social impact and 
consequences of the Internet in China, since all these three issues are controversial with 
political and cultural implications, and most frequently discussed in the literature of 
China’s Internet. Therefore, it will be very interesting to see how the newspapers across 
the societies used news frames to report these issues.  
RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often 
associated with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and 
regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet as primary 
subjects? 
RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be 
associated with societies? 
 
In addition, the variations of framing stories across societies were also measured 
by the political tendency and/or tolerance index (PTI) scores of news stories, which were  
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counted based on the information regarding the three issues.89  
RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the 
newspapers’ coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly 
differ from one another?  
RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly 
contribute to the differences? 
 
 The Internet has begun to permeate into China, especially in cities. While 
bringing numerous benefits to people’s daily lives, the Internet has also been perceived as 
a challenge to the political authorities of the CCP in China because of its potential to 
provide an alternative channel for the voices of dissent. I would assume that the media 
from societies with more political freedom might be more likely to discuss such 
controversial issues as China’s control of the Internet than in the media from societies 
with less political freedom. To marginalize such issues, the media from societies such as 
China and Singapore might be more likely to devote more space to those issues such as 
Internet diffusion and use, and the socio-cultural impact of the Internet, which are closely 
tied to daily life. Also, as discussed above in the literature review of generic news frames, 
the conflict frame has commonly been used in Western media in storytelling. Compared 
to the factual frame, the conflict frame “with two clearly polarized parties,” as Richards 
and King (2000) suggest, “brings an element of drama.” The effects of storytelling in 
such a news frame are assumed to be much stronger than the factual frame. Therefore, the 
researcher assumed that even though such controversial issues as Internet censorship and 
regulations were mentioned, the media from societies with less political freedom might 
have presented them in factual frames so as to understate their importance. Also they 
might have interpreted such issues from the perspective of morality to justify censoring 
                                                 
89 Refer to Chapter 6 and the coding forms (APPENDIX B) for detailed information on PTI. 
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content, such as pornography, which is socially and culturally controversial. With the 
above assumptions and the assumptions underlying Hofstede’s (1980, 1983) cultural 
value dimensions, the following hypotheses were proposed: 
 
H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of 
Internet censorship and regulations in China will more likely to be mentioned or 
discussed. 
H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of 
Internet use in China will more likely to be mentioned or discussed. 
 
H2: Among those news stories concerning the Internet use in China, there will be 
more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from 
societies with more political freedom. 
 
H3a: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations in China, the factual frame will be more likely to be present in the 
newspapers from societies with less political freedom. 
H3b: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations in China, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in 
the newspapers from societies with less political freedom. 
H3c: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations in China, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the 
newspapers from societies with less political freedom. 
H3d: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations in China, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in 
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom. 
H3e: Among those news stories concerning the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations in China, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the 
newspapers from societies with more political freedom. 
 
H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and 
implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political 
aspects in the newspapers from societies with more political freedom. 
 
H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in 
the newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of 
power distance. 
H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the 
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of 
individualism vs. collectivism. 
 
 92
 The third goal of the current study is to see whether the news coverage and frames 
in the Party organ dailies would differ from the local newspapers with more financial 
autonomy. 
 
RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China’s Internet 
appear to exist between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily?  
 
RQ7: Was the presentation of each generic news frame associated with the types 
of Chinese newspapers? 
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CHAPTER VI.  
METHODOLOGY 
 
A content analysis was conducted to identify the issues related to the Internet in 
China and the news frames used to cover these issues during the period of 2000 to 2004 
in the newspapers of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom. Samples of news stories drawn from ten selected newspapers were analyzed to 
compare the thematic choices or news frames used to depict the Internet in China. 
6.1. Selection of Societies 
 Five societies, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom, were selected in this study. Among them, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
belong to “Greater China” (Harding, 1993; Shambaugh, 1993), or “cultural China” (Frith, 
1996). They are joined by a set of cultural values that includes collectivism, 
modernization, authoritarianism and relative noncompetitiveness (Martin, 1996). One 
might assume that with increased affluence, population growth and increased trading 
activity with Western nations, some of the unique cultural characteristics of these 
societies have diminished. Yet much of Chinese culture remains and exerts a strong 
influence over everyday life. It would be meaningful to compare Eastern culture and 
Western culture, especially between China and the United States. China is regarded as 
typical of Eastern culture while the United States is typical of Western culture (Porter & 
Samovar, 1997). Based on the indexes of cultural dimensions, China is more 
collectivistic, higher in power distance, and more long-term oriented, whereas the United 
States is more individualistic, lower in power distance, and more short-term oriented 
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(Hofstede, 2001).90 The United Kingdom was added into this study in order to expand the 
scope of cultural comparison. Chinese communication differs from its Western 
counterpart. Hall’s (1976) differentiation between low and high-context cultures is a 
dimension of socio-cultural variability that is used to explain cultural differences in 
communication-related processes, especially between Eastern and Western societies. It 
would be of significance to determine how wide, if any, the “culture lag” exists in these 
differing societies in terms of perceiving the Internet, the so-called fourth medium.  
Cultural values are assumed to have influences on the perceptions of the Internet 
presented in the media.  For instance, the Singapore government has drawn up a list of 
“good” and “bad” Asian and Western values (Stravens, 1996) shared in its country. 
Among the Western values perceived as “good” for Singapore are “a political system 
based on democracy,” the “rule of law” and the “egalitarian belief in affording equality of 
opportunity to all.” Among the values perceived to be “bad” for Singapore are “excessive 
materialism and hedonism,” “living beyond one’s means,” “too much emphasis on the 
rights and interests of the individual and too little emphasis on the rights and interests of 
the community and the state,” and “inability to make sacrifices in the short-term for long-
term benefits” (p.277). Compared to Americans, these shared values may prompt in 
Singaporeans a stronger belief in the role of government and less emphasis on symbols 
and actions that glorify individual identity. Such differences are assumed to have impacts 
on media frames. 
Although the selected Chinese societies have their own unique aspects of history, 
culture, and consumption patterns, including variations in personal values and interest, 
                                                 
90 They are relatively close in terms of uncertainty avoidance. 
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they seem to have similar cultural backgrounds influenced by Confucius culture. One of 
the reasons for selecting these societies of Confucius culture is based on the assumption 
that if the media frames presented in the newspapers in these societies with close cultural 
traditions vary along the cultural dimensions, then we will be more confident to 
generalize such conclusions to the comparisons between those societies with very 
different cultural backgrounds. By looking at several culturally different societies, we 
may be able to see a more dynamic process in which positive and negative effects of 
different factors or dimensions might offset one another. This process cannot be 
examined in the comparative study only between two societies. 
6.2. Selection of Newspapers 
Two newspapers published in either Chinese or English in each of the selected 
societies, were purposely selected. Two English newspapers were chosen respectively for 
the United States and the United Kingdom, where only English is the official language. 
Because of the bilingual nature of official language policy in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
two newspapers, each representing Chinese or English, were chosen for these two 
societies. For China, where Chinese is the only official language, two Chinese 
newspapers, the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily were selected based on the 
literature presented in Chapter 4. 
The New York Times and Los Angeles Times were selected for the United States, 
because they both rank among the national leaders, covering international news widely, 
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and geographically representing the East and West Coast. 91 For the newspapers 
published in the other societies, the reliable Newslink list of newspapers 
(http://newslink.org/), which contains the links to major newspapers over the world, was 
used to locate only national daily newspapers, either Chinese or English. Those specialty 
newspapers such as the Commercial Daily, Asian Business News, and Financial Times, 
and non-daily newspapers were excluded. The final list included the South China 
Morning Post 92 and Sing Tao Daily 93 in Hong Kong, the Lianhe Zaobao 94 and Straits 
Times 95 in Singapore, and the Times and Guardian in the United Kingdom. All these 
newspapers are influential in their home societies.  
6.3. Time Frame for the Study 
The time frame, from 2000 through 2004, was chosen for the comparison study 
across societies, because for the first time in history, the growth of international 
connection bandwidth outstripped the increase of user population in the second half of 
                                                 
91 For the New York Times, the Lexis-Nexis Academic database was used to locate the relevant articles. 
Because of copyright laws, the database does not include stories written by freelance reporters, which 
might be a potential limitation of this study. Refer to the section of data collection for the collection of the 
articles in the Los Angeles Times.  
92 Founded in 1903, the leading English language newspaper in Hong Kong is currently published by the 
SCMP Group. The newspaper, with a total readership of 322,040 in 2005, has the highest percentage of 
readers being business decision makers and opinion leaders among all major Hong Kong newspapers 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Morning_Post).  
93 Published in 1938, the newspaper enjoys one of the longest publishing histories among Chinese 
newspapers in Hong Kong. With 9 overseas bureaus, the paper, positioning itself for the middle class, 
circulates over 100 cities around the world (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sing_Tao_Daily).    
94 As the most-read Chinese daily in Singapore, the Lianhe Zaobao, with subscribers in Southeast Asia, 
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United Nations, is regarded as an important source of political and 
economic news on East Asia, especially China. It was established in 1983, following the merger of two of 
Singapore’s oldest Chinese newspapers – Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh. 
(http://www.zaobao.com.sg/pages/lianhe.html).    
95 First published in 1845, the Straits Times is the oldest newspaper of any kind in Singapore. With 11 
bureaus in major cities over the world, it is the only broadsheet English-language newspaper with general 
news coverage in the country (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straits_Times).  
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year 2000. The bandwidth capability for international connection in China made a 
quantum leap from 351 Mbps in January 2000 to 1234 Mbps in July 2000, increasing 
almost tenfold, while the number of computers connected to the Internet, only 747,000 in 
January 1999, had surpassed 6,500,000 by July 2000 (see Table 2.1). Also, the world 
began in 2000 to be more aware of the development of the Internet in China. A 
preliminary search in the LexisNexis database found only a few related articles available 
in each year before 2000.  
6.4. Data Collection  
Only news stories were collected for this study. Editorials, opinions, readers’ 
letters, etc., were excluded. The Lexis-Nexis database was used for consistency to locate 
the related news stories for the newspapers published in English, the New York Times, 
Times, Guardian, 96 and Strait Times. The Los Angeles Times is unavailable in this 
database. The archive index of the Los Angeles Times’ online version was used to locate 
the related news articles; then the microfilm copies of the newspaper were used for full 
texts.97 The Factiva database was used to find news stories from the Chinese newspapers 
published in Hong Kong and Singapore. For the newspapers in China, the online archives 
of the two Chinese newspapers were used. 
In all the searching, the following combination of key words “‘China’ AND 
‘Internet’ OR ‘network’ OR ‘Web’” (with a Chinese version “‘zhongguo dalu’ OR 
                                                 
96 The Times does not file any stories with the Lexis-Nexis database unless it is written by its employees. 
No articles from the Reuters, AP and other wire services are included in the database. The Guardian is 
published only six days. These might have been the reasons for the few numbers of the relevant articles in 
the two newspapers, thus introducing some bias in sampling. 
97 The Home Edition was used. 
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‘neidi’ (mainland China) AND ‘yintewang’ OR ‘hulianwang’ OR ‘wangluo’ OR 
‘wangye’”) was used to search for full texts. Eliminated from the sample were articles in 
which the key words were mentioned, but were unrelated to the main topic concerning 
the Internet in mainland China.98  The procedure resulted in a total population of 6,088 
news stories with the Internet in mainland China as primary subject (1148 for the 
People’s Daily, 3,574 for the Beijing Youth Daily, 485 for Hong Kong, 662 for 
Singapore, 153 for the United States, and 66 for the United Kingdom),99 and a total 
population of 1,994 non-primary stories, in which China’s Internet-related issues were 
mentioned in one or several sentences, but the primary subject of a given story was not 
about the Internet in China (645 for the People’s Daily, 183 for the Beijing Youth Daily, 
353 for Hong Kong, 385 for Singapore, 246 for the United States, and 182 for the United 
Kingdom).100
6.5. Sampling 
The sample strata were determined based on the origin of the newspaper and the 
differentiation between primary and non-primary stories.101 A simple random sampling 
method was used to draw samples from each stratum. The statistics software JMP was 
                                                 
98 Those discussing the Internet in Hong Kong were also excluded. 
99 To examine the differences between the People’s Daily and the Beijing Youth Daily, the sub-population 
of China was divided up into two separate groups. 
100 Primary stories and non-primary stories were treated in this study differently. Non-primary stories in 
were primarily coded for the theme of the related sentence(s) in question (see APPENDIX A for the 
detailed instructions about how to differentiate primary stories and non-primary stories). Therefore, the 
sub-population of each society was also separated varying with the groups of primary or non-primary 
stories. 
101 Because one of the goals was to compare the two newspapers from China, the sample strata were further 
determined by the population of the relevant stories of each newspaper within China. 
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used to obtain the random numbers. In order to determine a desirable sample size for my 
research project, several decisions involving my judgment were made step by step.  
The present study primarily involved a series of binary variables (presenting or 
not presenting a type of frame), which was the most important attribute of the outcome 
variables. Because of the exploratory nature, this study took the estimate of the 
proportion of the population possessing that attribute (presenting or not presenting a type 
of frame) as 50%. Then the margin of error in estimating the proportion was determined. 
That is an assessment made as to how accurate or representative a sample was needed. 
Since the current study did not involve some crucial considerations of factors such as 
fatal diseases, where a very small variance may cause serious effects, the confidence 
interval ± 10% was used, which means the sample would possess the attribute in question 
within ± 10% of the population value, e.g., 50% ± 10%. This way, the sample size could 
also be reduced substantially. The next step was to determine the confidence level. While 
a sample size that would prevent the researcher from carrying out this study in a timely 
fashion was avoided, a large enough sample size was used so that the proportion 
possessing the attribute could fall within the specified margin of error. It is customary to 
choose the 99% confidence level for extreme confidence; the 95% level for reasonable 
confidence; and the 90% level for a slightly less level of confidence. The 95% confidence 
level was chosen. Thus, in this study, randomly drawn samples from a population will 
possess the outcome attribute – presenting a type of news frame – within a range of error 
of ± 10%, 95 times out of 100. The last step was to use the formula “n = (pq)/SE2” and its 
adjusted version with a corrected factor “n = (pq)/( SE2 +pq/N)” to determine the 
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Table 6.1. Sample Sizes of Primary & Non-Primary Stories in Newspapers 








Kong Singapore U.S. U.K. 
Population 1148 3574 485 662 153 66Primary Stories Sample  96 96 96 96 59 39
Population 645 183 353 385 246 182Non-primary 
Stories Sample 96 63 75 77 69 63
 
 
sampling sizes for the newspapers in each society based on the knowledge about the 
population sizes involved in the study.102
As a result, a full list of the sample sizes for both primary and non-primary stories 
was obtained (see Table 6.1). The total sample was 925, 482 for primary stories and 443 
for non-primary stories. To reduce the bias that might be introduced by the year of 
articles, I further stratified the sample based on the proportion of each year of articles 
within each society.103
6.6. Unit of Analysis and Coding 
 The process of identifying the frequently appearing issues related to China’s 
Internet and the presentations of generic news frames were carried out through a 
                                                 
102 If the population is large such that the sample will not be more than 20% of the population, it is not 
necessary to introduce a correction factor. In this study, p = .5 (the estimate of the proportion of the 
population possessing the attribute), q = 1 – p = 1 - .5 = .5, SE = (10%)/1.96 = 0.051. Therefore, for the 
case where the population was large enough, the sample size was: n = 0.25/0.002601 = 96. This was the 
case for China, Hong Kong, and Singapore. For the United States and the United Kingdom, where the 
populations were relatively small, a correction factor was introduced, and the second formula was used. In 
the formula, N represents the population size. For detailed information on the application of the formulae, 
see http://www2.uta.edu/sswmindel/S6324/Class%20Materials/Sampling/sampsize.pdf. See also Tamhane 
and Dunlop (2000).  
103 Again, within China, the samples for the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily were separately drawn.  
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quantitative content analysis. The correlations between the news frames and the issues in 
questions and the variances of such correlations and the presentations of news frames 
across the societies were quantitatively examined. The comparisons of the newspapers in 
China were also conducted quantitatively. 
The unit of analysis was the individual news article. A coding book was designed 
based on three primary research interests (see Appendix B(I) and Appendix B(II)). In 
coding, the first set of questions asked what issue(s) related to the Internet in China 
was(were) mentioned or discussed in a given article, and which issue was the primary 
subject of the article. The second set concerned the extent to which the article in question 
framed a given issue from a political perspective and/or presented tolerance to political 
views that were not favorable to the Chinese government. This part, called “Political 
Tolerance Index” (PTI), included a series of questions, such as whether the Internet use 
discussed in the article stressed the political aspect, whether dissident content or users 
were mentioned, whether the discussion regarding China’s Internet control, if any, 
stressed the necessity of regulating the Internet or the position unfavorable to the 
regulation, whether the discussion stressed the Chinese government’s ability or success in 
regulating the Internet or its impossibility or failure in regulating the Internet, and so 
on.104 The third set of questions asked whether the article presented a certain type of 
news frame, and whether the frame was associated with the primary subject. Under 
several questions, some further questions were developed regarding the primary agent(s) 
or actor(s) involved in Internet-related practice. 
                                                 
104 See the coding forms in APPENDIX B for detailed information. Two additional categories, “not 
ascertainable” and “not applicable,” were set for the stories with no value judgment or neutral judgment 
and those that have nothing to do with these questions. Refer to APPENDIX C for the guidelines for these 
two categories. 
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 In order to establish intercoder reliability figures, two trained bilingual coders105 
coded a random sample of 10 percent of the English newspaper articles and the same 
percentage of articles from the Chinese newspapers.106 Detailed instructions used to 
categorize different Internet-related issues, and determine which Internet-related issue 
was the primary subject of a given article and whether a certain type of news frame was 
present, were given in the coding guidelines (see Appendix C). Before coding, discussion 
of the meanings of the PTI questions and the generic news frames took place. With all of 
the Internet-related issues and the news frames listed in the coding sheet, the coders had 
the opportunity to code for more than one issue and one frame, but only one primary 
subject within each article.  Scott’s pi, a reliability measurement approach stricter than 
Holsti’s coefficient, was used for calculating the reliability figures. To take account of the 
probability of agreement by chance, Scott (1955) developed the pi index, which corrects 
for the number of categories used and also for the probable frequency of use: 
 
    % observed agreement - % expected agreement 
  Reliability = ———————————————————— 
        1 - % expected agreement 
 
The coefficients for the key variables generated from such calculation were well 
beyond the generally accepted .70 for content analysis. For the English newspapers, the 
intercoder reliability figures for several of the main variables were as follows: 1.00 (the 
Internet-related issue taken as the primary subject of a story), .74 (the Internet-related 
issues mentioned or discussed other than the primary subject), .88 (the PTI questions), 
                                                 
105 Cultural bias might have been introduced because both coders were native Chinese fluent in English. 
106 The sample used for calculating intercoder reliability figures were all primary stories, because the 
categories designed for non-primary stories were consistent with those for primary stories. 
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1.00 (the presence of a factual frame), .93 (the presence of a human interest frame), 1.00 
(the presence of a conflict frame), .93 (the presence of a responsibility frame), 1.00 (the 
presence of a morality frame), .94 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), and 
.94 (the presence of a leadership frame). For the Chinese newspapers, the intercoder 
reliability figures for the same variables were as follows: 1.00 (the Internet-related issue 
taken as the primary subject of a story), .89 (Internet-related issues mentioned or 
discussed other than the primary subject), .92 (the PTI questions), 1.00 (the presence of a 
factual frame), .95 (the presence of a human interest frame), .97 (the presence of a 
conflict frame), .95 (the presence of an economic consequence frame), .97 (the presence 
of a morality frame), 1.00 (the presence of a responsibility frame), and .93 (the presence 
of a leadership frame). 
6.7. Independent and Dependent Variables 
As discussed in the literature review of media framing, the frame-building process 
concerns the relationships between media frames and the factors influencing media 
content. In this study, the focus was on how political systems, and cultural dimensions, 
the independent variables, might impact on the presentations of the issues and the news 
frames covering the Internet in China in the newspapers across cultural societies, the 
dependent variables. 
The variable of political systems was operationalized based on the ratings of 
Freedom House (Table 6.2). Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual 
assessment of the state of freedom in all countries (and territories), now known as 
Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2004). It measures freedom according to two 
 104
Table 6.2. Five Year Ratings Timeline of Freedom House  
(Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
China 7,6,NF 7,6,NF 7,6,NF 7,6,NF   7,6,NF 
Hong Kong 5,3,PF 5,3,PF 5,3,PF 5,3,PF 5,3,PF 
Singapore 5,5,PF 5,5,PF 5,4,PF 5,4,PF 5,4,PF 
U.S. 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 
U.K. 1,2, F 1,2, F 1,2, F 1,1, F 1,1, F 
        (Source: Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls107) 
 
 
two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights include the right 
to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact 
on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state. It is claimed that the country 
and territory ratings “generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both 
governmental and nongovernmental.” In this study, the overall status was used, with 1, 2 
and 3 respectively taking on the values “not free,” “partly free,” and “free,” as one of the 
independent variables representing variance in political systems across the five selected 
societies. 
Freedom House does not maintain a cultural-bound view of freedom. For 
comparisons of cultural impacts, the index scores of cultural dimensions presented in 
                                                 
107 Each country or territory is assigned a numerical rating, which is calculated based on the methodology 
described below, on a scale of 1 to 7. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least 
amount of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an 
overall status of “Free (F),” “Partly Free (PF),” or “Not Free (NF).” Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5 
are considered “Free,” 3.0-5.0 “Partly Free,” and 5.5-7.0 “Not Free.” 
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Hofested’s study (Table 6.3) was adopted, when the set of logistic regression models was 
built (see the next section) and the hypotheses related to the dimensions were tested. 
The scores of Political Tolerance Index (PTI), which were calculated from the 
answers to the series of PTI questions, measured the extent to which the newspapers were 
predisposed to reporting the political aspect of the Internet in China, and presented 
certain tolerance to the content or views unfavorable to the Chinese government. The 
scores were obtained following two steps: 1) A score scale was set up for each checked 
PTI question. A score of “0” was assigned to the non-political aspect of a given issue 
(e.g., non-political use of the Internet, non-political aspect of Internet regulation, etc.), or 
the position favorable to the Chinese government (e.g., it is necessary to regulate the 
Internet, or it is possible for the government to control the Internet, or the Internet 
development will strengthen the current regime), which was taken as the reference point. 
A score of “+1” was assigned to the opposite of the reference. Those “unascertainable” 
 
 
Table 6.3. Index Scores of Cultural Dimensions 
 










China a 80 30 20 118 
Hong Kong 68 29 25 96 
Singapore 74 8 20 48 
U.S. 40 46 91 29 
U.K. 35 35 89 25 
a Unlike the others, China was not included in the IBM database of Hofstede’s 1980 seminal work.  
(Source: Scores from Exhibit A5.1 and A5.3 in Hofestede, 2001.) 
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answers for the articles mixed with both political and non-political, or favorable 
and unfavorable sides, were given a score “0.5.” 2) The sum of scores for all PTI 
questions yielded the total PTI score for each article. 
6.8. Statistics Methods 
 Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and percentages, I× J contingency 
tables, and Chi-square tests, were used to address the first two sets of research questions, 
the fourth set of questions, and the first four sets of hypotheses. For RQ3, a set of logistic 
regression models were built to predict whether a type of news frame occurs or not: 
logit(π) = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5 X5,108 where X1 stands for the status of 
freedom, X2 for Power Distance, X3 for Uncertainty Avoidance, X4 for Individualism vs. 
Collectivism, and X5 or Long-/Short-Term Orientation. Similar approaches were adopted 
when the two newspapers published in mainland China were compared. To address the 
fifth set of RQs regarding the PTI scores, ANOVA and the forward stepwise method for 
regression models were used. Regression models were also built to address the fifth set of 
hypotheses. 
Two statistical software programs, SPSS and JMP, were used in this study. 
                                                 
108 This is a main effect model. The interaction terms between the factors were considered when all of the 
potential models were run and the best fitted one was selected. 
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CHAPTER VII.   
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
7.1. What Issues Were Reported and Highlighted? 
 
RQ1a: Which issues appeared most frequently and which issue was most frequently taken 
as the primary subject of a given story within each society? 
RQ1b: Did the newspapers from different societies significantly differ from one another 
in reporting the issues? If so, how? 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows the frequencies of Internet-related issues appearing in the sample 
of both primary and non-primary stories. Among all issues in question, the issue of 
Internet diffusion and use in China was most frequently mentioned in the newspapers 
from two Chinese societies, mainland China (61.54%, 216 of 351 articles) and Singapore 
(48.55%, 84 of 173), and one Western society, the United Kingdom (53.92%, 55 of 102). 
The newspapers from Hong Kong paid most attention to events about e-commerce, 
Internet business and industry in mainland China (46.2%, 79 of 171), closely followed by 
the issue of Internet diffusion and use (45.03%, 77 of 171). In Singapore, the issue of 
Internet economy, with a percentage ranked second (40.46%, 70 of 173) drew much 
attention. In the United States, the issue most frequently appearing in the newspapers was 
Internet censorship and regulations in China, accounting for 55.47% (71 of 128 articles). 
The percentage of the issue was also relatively high in the U.K. newspapers, ranked 
second (39.22%, 40 of 102). 
When the five societies were compared, Chi-square tests indicated that significant 
within-issue differences existed across societies in terms of whether an article mentioned
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Table 7.1. Percentages of Articles with Internet-Related Issues  















of the Internet 
Others b
China 
(N = 351) 
216 


























































a Both primary and non-primary stories were included. Each article was allowed to have more than one 
issue checked. 
b The issues, such as Internet technologies, Internet security and other cybercrimes, and other issues listed 
in the coding sheet were combined into one category for analysis. Same in the tables below. 
c % of N. Same for all percentages in the table. 
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a certain type of issue. The differences came most from three societies, mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and the United States, which had high cell Chi-square values for most issues 
(see Table 7.2 and Table 7.3).109 The newspapers from mainland China were significantly 
more likely to mention the issue of Internet diffusion and use (61.54%, 216 of 351), and 
other issues (16.24%, 57 of 351). The observed frequency counts of these two issues 
were significantly larger than the expected counts, especially with regard to the first issue 
(216 vs. 184.8). The issues, such as Internet censorship and regulations (13.96%, 49 of 
351), e-commerce, Internet business and industry (29.06%, 102 of 351), and the 
consequences and implications of the Internet (5.98%, 21 of 351), were less likely to be 
mentioned in China’s newspapers. Their observed frequency counts were all significantly 
smaller than the expected, particularly the issue of Internet censorship and regulations (49 
vs. 89.6).  In contrast, the U.S. newspapers presented the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations (55.47%, 71 of 128) and the consequences and implications of Internet 
(15.63%, 20 of 128) much more often than China and the other societies. Their observed 
frequency counts were significantly larger than the expected. The observed count of the 
articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was more than twice 
as many as the expected (71 vs. 32.7). Hong Kong stood out for its significantly greater 
likelihood of discussing e- commerce, Internet business and industry in mainland China 
(46.2%, 79 of 171), and less likelihood of mentioning the issues of Internet diffusion and 
use (45.03%, 77 of 171), and the consequences and implications of the Internet (2.92%, 5 
of 171). Their observed counts were significantly smaller than the expected, especially in
                                                 
109 Each cell Chi-Square value represents how much contribution the given cell has made to the total Chi-
Square statistics. A high cell value means the difference between the observed and expected counts in the 
cell is substantial. Most of the association between variables, if any, comes from the cells with a high value. 
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Table 7.2. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in  
Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies  
(Issues of Internet Diffusion & Use, Internet Censorship & Regulations,  
and E-Commerce, Internet Business & Industry) a
 
Internet diffusion & 
use 
(χ2 = 21.15, df = 4, 
 p < .001) 
Internet censorship 
& regulations  
(χ2 = 97.48, df = 4,  
p < .0001) 
E-commerce, 
Internet business & 
industry  
(χ2 = 22.84, df = 4, 
 p < .001) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
China 
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a The cell Chi-Square values with a significantly large difference between the observed and expected 
counts are highlighted in the table. Standardized Pearson residuals were calculated to determine whether 
such differences were significant. If the absolute value of a residual was more than two, the difference 
between the observed and expected counts was significant. Same in the tables below. Refer to Simonoff 
(2003, pp.215-218) for the explanation on the formula used to calculate standardized residuals and an 
example. The formula is as follows: 












Table 7.3. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in  
Both Primary and Non-Primary Stories across Societies  
(Issues of Consequences & Implications of the Internet, and Other Issues) 
 
Consequences & 
implications of the Internet  
(χ2 = 24.28, df = 4, p < .0001) 
Other issues  
(χ2 = 19.44, df = 4, 
 p < .001) 
 
Yes No Yes No 
China 














































































































regard to the latter issue (5 vs. 14.8).  
Unlike these three societies, Singapore and the United Kingdom with relatively 
small cell Chi-Square values showed little deviations from the expected counts in many 
issues. Singapore significantly contributed to the total Chi-Square statistics in only one 
issue. What made Singapore different from its Eastern peers was its newspapers’ greater 
likelihood of discussing the consequences and implications of the Internet in China, with 
the observed count significantly larger than the expected (24 vs. 15). The percentage of 
such articles (13.87%, 24 of 173) in Singapore’s newspapers was very close to the one in 
the U.S. newspapers, and even higher than that in the U.K. newspapers. The United 
Kingdom was distinctive in two issues. In the U.K. newspapers, the observed count of the 
issue of Internet censorship and regulations was about twice as many as the expected (40 
vs. 26). The percentage of the articles mentioning the issue in the U.K. newspapers 
(39.22%, 40 of 102) was second-ranked after the United States, much higher than the 
Eastern societies, with a percentage ranging from 13.96% to 23.12%. In addition, like 
China, the frequency of mentioning the issue of e-commerce and Internet business in the 
U.K. newspapers was significantly smaller than the expected count.  
In terms of primary subjects, the Internet-related issues were unequally 
highlighted in the newspapers within each society (see Table 7.4). In China, the observed 
frequency of the issue of Internet diffusion and use as the primary subject of a given story 
was more than twice as many as the expected frequency, much more than those of the 
other issues. In the other two Chinese societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the issue of e-
commerce, Internet business or industry, with a positive high value of frequency residual 
for both societies, was the most salient concern of the newspapers. This issue was the 
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Table 7.4. Comparisons of Internet-Related Issues as Primary Subject 
















of the Internet 
Others 
Observed 96 17 45 4 27
Expected 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8
China 
(χ2 = 135.74,  
df = 4,  
p < .0001) Residual 58.2 -20.8 7.2 -33.8 -10.8
Observed 13 18 53 1 11
Expected 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2
Hong Kong  
(χ2 = 82.33,  
df = 4,  
p < .0001) Residual -6.2 -1.2 33.8 -18.2 -8.2
Observed 19 20 46 1 10
Expected 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2
Singapore 
(χ2 = 59.1,  
df = 4,  
p < .0001) Residual -.2 .8 26.8 -18.2 -9.2
Observed 4 32 20 2
Expected 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5
U.S. 
(χ2 = 41.59,  
df = 4,  
p < .0001) Residual -10.5 17.5 5.5 -12.5
Observed 6 19 8 5
Expected 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
U.K. 
(χ2 = 13.16,  
df = 4,  
p < .005) Residual -3.5 9.5 -1.5 -4.5










second most prominent issue in the newspapers from mainland China. Unlike their 
Eastern counterparts, the U.S. and U.K. newspapers made the issue of Internet censorship 
and regulations most prominent by frequently highlighting it as the primary subject. The 
issue of the consequences and implications of Internet was less profiled in all Eastern 
newspapers. The issue did not exist as a primary subject in any of the U.S. and U.K. 
samples. 
Significant differences also existed across the societies in terms of the prominence 
of the Internet-related issues (χ2 = 141.77, df = 16, p < .0001; see Table 7.5). The main 
differences appeared to occur in the issue of Internet censorship and regulations. The 
subtotal of the five cell Chi-Square values of the issue (57.02) accounted for 40.22 
percent of the total Chi-Square statistics. The cell Chi-Square values for China, the 
United States and the United Kingdom were particularly high. Compared to their Eastern 
counterparts, China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the two Western countries were much 
more likely to highlight the issue as the primary subject of a given story. Particularly in 
the United States, the observed count was almost three times as many as the expected (32 
vs. 12.9). 55.17 percent of the articles in the U.S. newspapers took this issue as primary 
subject with a cell Chi-Square value as high as 28.34, more than twice as many as those 
in Hong Kong (18.75%) and Singapore (20.83%), and almost seven times as many as that 
in China (8.99%). In China’s newspapers, the observed count was much smaller than the 
expected count (17 vs. 42). 
The United States, together with the United Kingdom again, was distinct for its 
newspapers’ less frequently taking Internet diffusion and use in China, the second issue
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a χ2 = 141.77, df = 16, p < .0001. The articles with more than one primary subjects were excluded.
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mainly causing the across-society differences, as the primary subject of a given story. 
The observed count of the issue was less than one fourth as many as the expected value. 
The percentage of the issue (6.9%) was less than half as many as Hong Kong (13.54%), 
Singapore (19.79%) and the United Kingdom (15.79%), and only one eighth as China. In 
contrast, the newspapers from China had 50.79 percent of the sample articles taking the 
issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject, which enjoyed the highest cell Chi-
Square value across issues and societies. 
China was also in a sharp contrast to Hong Kong because of their newspapers’ 
treatment of events in China’s e-commerce and Internet business. Compared to the 
others, the newspapers in Hong Kong made the issue more salient by frequently taking it 
as its primary subject, with a percentage as high as 55.21%, more than twice as many as 
China (23.84%). The observed count was much larger than the expected (53 vs. 34.6). 
Singapore was also more likely to highlight the issue as its primary subject, with the 
observed count significantly larger than the expected (46 vs. 34.6). Like China, the 
percentage of the issue in the U.K. newspapers was relatively low (21.05%). 
In terms of the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet, there 
seemed to be no significant differences across societies, although the observed frequency 
in the newspapers from China was a little larger than the expected one (4 vs. 2.4). As far 
as other unspecified issues are considered, only the United States was found to differ 
from the other societies in that its percentage of the article taking the issue as primary 
subject, 3.45%, was much lower than all the others ranging from 10.42% to 14.24%. The 
observed frequency count was even less than one third of the expected count. 
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7.2. How and Why Were the Issues Framed in Certain Ways, If Any? 
 
RQ2a: Regardless of the types of issues, which news frames dominated in the newspapers 
of each society?  
RQ2b: Would the pattern of the presentations of news frames be associated with the 
societies? If so, what variations of the presentations existed across the societies? 
 
 
Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 summarize the frequency counts of different 
types of news frames used in primary stories about the Internet in China in the selected 
newspapers across societies. It is not surprising to see the factual frame, accounting for 
more than 80 percent of articles in every single society, dominated in all newspapers. In 
addition to the factual frame, the dominating type of news frame in the newspapers of 
each society was respectively the human interest frame in China (33.16%), Singapore 
(22.92%) and the United Kingdom (33.33%), the economic consequences frame in Hong 
Kong (25.00%), and the conflict frame in the United States (47.46%). The three types of 
news frames, such as the leadership, morality, and responsibility frames, were rarely used 
in most newspapers.  
As shown in Table 7.6, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, significant differences existed in 
the presentation of each type of news frame. The main differences appeared to occur in 
Hong Kong and mainland China, which differed from the other societies in many aspects. 
Besides the leading percentage of the factual frame, news articles from Hong Kong 
reported the highest percentage (25%, 24 of 96) of the articles with the economic 
consequences frame presented, which was significantly higher than the other societies 
with a percentage ranging from 6.67% to 18.64%. In contrast, the percentages of the 
human interest, responsibility, morality and leadership frames present in the Hong Kong
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Table 7.6. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames 
in Newspapers across Societies 
(Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Conflict Frame) a 
 
Factual Frame 
(χ2 = 17.46,  
df = 4, p < .005) 
Human Interest 
Frame 
(χ2 = 33.7,  
df = 4, p < .0001) 
Conflict Frame 
(χ2 = 73.98,  
df = 4, p < .0001) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
China 






















































































































































a Only primary stories were coded for the presence of news frames.
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Table 7.7. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames  
in Newspapers across Societies  




(χ2 = 20.48,  
df = 4, p < .001) 
Responsibility 
Frame a
(χ2 = 8.846, df = 4,  
p < .05) 
 















































































































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square 
was used for each type of news frame. 
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Table 7.8. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames  
in Newspapers across Societies  
(Morality Frame and Leadership Frame) a
 
Morality Frame 
(χ2 = 17.44, df = 4,  
p < .0001) 
Leadership Frame 
(χ2 = 7.834, df = 4,  
p < .05) 
 
Yes No Yes No 
China 














































































































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square 
was used for each type of news frame.
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newspapers, compared to the other newspapers, were significantly lower, respectively 
accounting for 3.13%, 1.04%, 0% and 0%. China differentiated itself from the others in a 
different way. Its newspapers were more likely to use the human interest (33.16%, 63 of 
189), morality (8.89%, 16 of 189) and leadership frames (6.67%, 12 of 189), respectively 
with a percentage significantly higher than the others, but less likely to present a conflict 
frame with a percentage (4.95%, 9 of 189) much lower than the others ranging from 
8.33% to 47.46%. The observed count of the articles with a conflict frame in China was 
significantly low, less than one third as many as the expected count (9 vs. 27.377). 
By contrast, both the U.S. and U.K. newspapers were particularly likely to 
provide a conflict frame for their news treatment of the Internet in China.110 In addition 
to the factual frame, the conflict frame had the highest percentage respectively in the two 
countries, 47.76% (28 of 58) and 30.77% (12 of 38), much higher than their Eastern 
counterparts. The U.S. newspapers posting a cell Chi-Square value as high as 41.213, 
accounting for 55.71 percent of the total Chi-Square statistics, were particularly 
distinctive in presenting a conflict frame. Except for the conflict frame, the U.K. 
newspapers seemed to be normal in the presentations of the other types of news frames.  
Singapore was the one least contributing to the total Chi-Square statistics. It 
appeared to be the benchmark for comparing two opposite sides in each frame except for 
                                                 
110 Detailed investigations found that a large number of the articles with a conflict frame in the U.S. and 
U.K. newspapers involved the Chinese government or people representing government, accounting for 80.5 
percent of all conflict accounts in total (see Table D.1 in APPENDIX D). Among them the conflicts 
between the two groups, the government or people representing government and individual(s) as ordinary 
people, were most salient, accounting for 56.1 percent alone. The U.S. newspapers especially highlighted 
this type of conflict, which had a dominant percentage, 58.6% (see Table D.2 in APPENDIX D). The 
percentages of this type of conflict in the newspapers from three Eastern societies were relatively low, 




the responsibility frame. The newspapers from Singapore had the greatest likelihood to 




RQ3: In general, when political systems and cultural dimensions are considered, how 
much variations in the presentation of each of the generic news frames could be 
explained? Would any interaction effects of the factors be found? 
 
Table 7.9 shows the results from running logistics regression models with the 
parameters identified by the forward stepwise method. Among the examined factors, 
freedom status was the leading significant one in predicting whether such four news 
frames as the factual, human interest, economic consequences and leadership frames 
were presented in newspapers. 
Compared to the others, the difference between the not-free society, China, and 
the partly-free and free societies contributed most to the variations of the presentation of 
the factual frame. The newspapers in the not-free society were less likely to present a 
factual frame than the societies at the second and third levels of freedom status. Two 
cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance (UAI)111 and long-/short-term orientation 
(LTO), were significantly associated with the presentation of the frame. A society with a 
higher score on UAI and LTO was more likely to provide a factual frame. Without the 
influence of any other factors, a society with a UAI score one unit more was 1.057 times 
more likely to present a factual frame as much as its reference society. Such a chance for 
                                                 
111 The abbreviations in Hofstede (2001) are used: PDI stands for power distance; UAI stands for 
uncertainty avoidance; IVD stands for individualism vs. collectivism; LTO stands for long-/short-term 
orientation. 
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Table 7.9. The Effects of Political Systems and Cultural Dimensions  
on the Overall Presence of News Frames 
 
 β a Wald χ2 Unit Odds Ratio b
Factual Frame (R2= .084, χ2 = 27.239, df = 3, p < .0001)  
 Intercept -5.753  
 Freedom Status (1- 2&3)  -3.394** 4.645** .032
 UAI .056** 4.317** 1.057
 LTO .078** 4.267** 1.081
Human Interest Frame (R2= .081, χ2 = 43.437, df = 3, p < .0001)  
 Intercept 4.769***  
 Freedom Status (2-1) -3.757**** 18.55**** .023
 Freedom Status (3-2) -.562 1.37 .570
 LTO -.046*** 12.42*** .955
Conflict Frame (R2= .158, χ2 = 63.335, df = 3, p < .0001) 
 Intercept .278  
 IVD -.032 1.228 .969
 LTO -.043** 6.196** .958
 UAI .082* 2.897* 1.085
Responsibility Frame c
Morality Frame c
Economic Consequences Frame  (R2= .047, χ2 = 19.514, df = 2, p < .001) 
 Intercept -3.084****  
 Freedom Status (1-2&3) -.887**** 16.043**** .412
 LTO .011** 4.658** 1.011
Leadership Frame (R2= .060, χ2 = 9.518, df = 2, p < .01) 
 Intercept .012  
 Freedom Status (1-2&3) 1.954** 3.916** 7.058
 LTO -.039* 2.742* .962
a The equation for a simple logistic regression model is as follows: log [p/(1- p)] = α+ βx, where p denotes 
the probability of presenting a type of news frame when an explanatory variable Х, e.g., a cultural 
dimension, takes value x; α is the intercept and β is the parameter of the explanatory variable. The order of 
parameter estimates is based on the one of entering the model in the step history of stepwise regression. 
b For log odds of Yes/No. 
c No parameters were selected when the forward stepwise method was conducted with the probability to 
enter set as .10. There was evidence showing the results were unstable. It might be caused by the fact that 
the numbers of articles with the frame in question in the newspapers from the societies other than China 
and Singapore were few. 
* p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .001, **** p< .0001
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a society with a LTO score one unit more was 1.081 times as much as for the 
reference.112  
Whether an article provided a human interest frame was significantly associated 
with freedom status and long-/short-term orientation. In the model, the difference 
between the partly-free societies and the not-free society was the one contributing most to 
the variations of presenting the human interest frame. Without the impacts of other 
factors, the newspapers from the partly-free societies were less likely to provide a human 
interest frame than those from the not-free society. Yet whether a society was a partly-
free or free society did not make a big difference in predicting the possibility of 
presenting the human interest frame, which was also negatively associated with the 
cultural dimension of long-/short-term orientation. The higher scores on LTO a society 
had, the less likely the newspapers in the society were to present a human interest frame. 
The presentation of the conflict frame was associated with three cultural dimensions, 
individualism vs. collectivism (IVD), long-/short-term orientation, and uncertainty 
avoidance. Yet the association with the dimension of individualism vs. collectivism was 
not significant in the model. The dimension of long-/short-term orientation negatively 
predicted whether an article provided a conflict frame, whereas the dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance, which was significant only at the level of α = 0.1, was positively 
                                                 
112 Because of the reversed order of the scores of the two dimensions assigned to some societies, the 
interaction between the two dimensions was detected. Take the comparison between Hong Kong and the 
United States as an example. With 17 more units of scores on UAI (see Table 6.3), the probability of 
presenting a factual frame in the U.S. newspapers theoretically should be 17.96 (17×1.057) times as much 
as in the Hong Kong newspapers (see Table 7.9). Yet, with 67 more units on the LTO score, the probability 
in the Hong Kong newspapers should be 72.43 (67×1.081) times as much as in the U.S. newspapers. Such 
an interaction at least partially explained why the percentage of presenting this type of frame in the Hong 
Kong newspapers was actually significantly higher than in the U.S. newspapers. The positive association 
between the dimension of long-/short-term and the presence of the factual frame might be because instead 
of being interested in arguing about what is true, people in a long-term oriented culture stress what has been 
done, as Hofstede (1991) suggested.  
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associated with the presence of the frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on 
LTO and a higher score on UAI, such as the United States, were more likely to present a 
conflict frame.  
 Freedom status, specifically the difference between the non-free society and the 
partly-free and free societies, was significant in predicting the presentations of both the 
economic consequences frame and the leadership frame. The dimension of long-/short-
term orientation was significant at the level of α = 0.1. The effect directions of the two 
factors were different. A society at a higher level of freedom status and a higher score on 
LTO was more likely to present an economic consequences frame, but less likely to 
present a leadership frame. Yet a free society did not differ much from a partly-free 
society in predicting the presence of these two frames. 
 
RQ4a: In the newspapers of each society, which news frames were most often associated 
with the issues of Internet diffusion and use, Internet censorship and regulations, and the 
consequences and implications of the Internet as primary subjects? 
RQ4b: For each of these issues, would the presentations of news frames be associated 
with societies? 
 
Among the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject, 
the most frequently used news frame was the factual frame in the newspapers in China 
(58.14%, 75 of 96), Hong Kong (100%, 13 of 13), Singapore (78.95%, 15 of 19), and the 
United Kingdom (83.33%, 5 of 6), and the human interest (100%, 4 of 4) and conflict 
frames (100%, 4 of 4) in the U.S. newspapers (see Table 7.10). The second-ranked 
frames were respectively the economic consequences frame in Hong Kong (15.38%, 2 of 
13), and the human interest frame in all other societies, China (33.33%, 32 of 96), 
Singapore (42.11%, 8 of 19), and the United Kingdom (50%, 3 of 6). There were no 
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Table 7.10. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories 
with Internet Diffusion and Use as Primary Subject 
 


































































































a % of N. Same for all percentages in the table. 
 
 
articles with Internet diffusion and use as its primary subject that used the conflict frame 
in the newspapers from mainland China and Hong Kong. In the Hong Kong newspapers, 
three other frames such as the leadership, morality and responsibility frames were also 
missing. These frames, together with the economic consequences frame, were missing in 
the U.K. newspapers. The news frames missing from the stories with Internet diffusion 
and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers were the economic consequences and 
morality frames. 
Chi-Square tests suggested that significant across-society differences were found 
in the presentations of the factual (χ2 = 10.594, p < .05), human interest (χ2 = 12.857, p < 
.005), and conflict frames (χ2 = 70.789, p < .0001), especially the conflict frame, which 
had the highest total Chi-Square statistics. No significant differences were found in the 
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other frames.113 As shown in Table 7.11, the U.S. newspapers were particularly singled 
out from the others for its significantly higher percentages in the presentations of the 
human interest and conflict frames, which both were 100 percent. Both frames had a 
significant difference between the observed and expected counts. The U.S. newspapers 
had a lower percentage in presenting a factual frame (25%, 1 of 4), significantly lower 
than those in the other societies, ranging from 78.13% to 100%. Hong Kong was the 
second distinctive society, different from the others in the factual and human interest 
frames. The newspapers from Hong Kong were more likely to use the factual frame with 
the observed count significantly more than the expected count, and less likely to provide 
a human interest with the observed count significantly less than the expected. The 
percentage of the related articles with a human interest frame (7.69%, 1 of 13) was much 
lower than the others ranging from 33.33% to 100%. In contrast to the United States and 
Singapore, where the newspapers used the conflict frame in framing the issue of Internet 
diffusion and use significantly more often than what were expected, the newspapers from 
China did not present such a frame even once, leaving the observed count zero, 
significantly less than the expected count of 6.957. The U.K. newspapers did not present 
any unusual patterns on all the news frames. 
In terms of the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject, the 
most frequently used frame was still the factual frame in all societies (Hong Kong, 100%, 
18 of 18; the United States, 93.75%, 30 of 32; Singapore, 90%, 18 of 20; the United 
Kingdom, 84.21%, 16 of 19; and China, 82.35%, 14 of 17; see Table 7.12). Particularly
                                                 
113 The count number of each cell was so few, and the p value for testing the responsibility frame was 
0.068, larger than 0.5. It was considered insignificant.  
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Table 7.11. Comparisons of News Frames for Stories with Internet Diffusion and 
Use as Primary Subject across Societies 
 
Factual Frame 
(χ2 = 10.594, a 
df = 4, p < .05) 
Human Interest Frame 
(χ2 = 12.857, a  
df = 4, p < .005) 
Conflict Frame 
(χ2 = 70.789, b  
df = 4, p < .0001) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
China 






















































































































































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square 
was used.  
b 50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher’s exact test was used. 
Table 7.12. Percentage of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames in Stories  
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with Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject 
 
































































































a % of N. Same for all percentages in the table.
 
in Hong Kong, the frame dominated in the newspapers with the other types of news 
frames rarely used. The second frequently used frame varied with societies. The 
newspapers in the two Western societies, U.S. (50%, 16 of 32) and U.K. (36.84%, 7 of 
19), together with one Eastern society, Singapore (30%, 6 of 20), used the conflict frame 
most often after the factual frame. In the newspapers from China, the responsibility frame 
(29.41%, 5 of 17) was used most often in addition to the universal one, the factual frame, 
closely followed by the morality frame (23.53%, 4 of 17), in framing the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations. 
According to Chi-Square tests, no significant differences in the presentations of 
the factual, economic consequences, leadership and responsibility frames in framing the 
issue of Internet censorship and regulations existed across societies. Differences were 
found only in three types of news frames, the human interest frame (χ2 = 13.758, p < .05), 
the conflict frame (χ2 = 19.463, p < .001), and the morality frame (χ2 = 15.011, p < .0001; 
see Table 7.13). Hong Kong and the United States were vastly different in their usage of 
the human interest frame. None of articles in the Hong Kong newspapers used it to frame 
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations, with the observed count significantly less 
than the expected. In contrast, the U.S. newspapers used the frame significantly more 
often than what was expected, enjoying the highest percentage (28.13%, 9 of 32) among 
all societies. The U.S. newspapers also had the highest percentage of the related articles 
(50.00%, 16 of 32) in presenting a conflict frame, with the observed count almost twice 
that of the expected count. This was in a sharp contrast to the cases in mainland China 
(0.00%) and Hong Kong (5.56%, 1 of 18). In addition to the distinctive pattern of 
presenting the conflict frame, China was also separated from the others for its 
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Table 7.13. Comparison of News Frames for Stories with Internet Censorship and 




(χ2 = 13.758 a  
df = 4, p < .05) 
Conflict Frame 
(χ2 = 19.436,  
df = 4, p < .001) 
 Morality Frame 
(χ2 = 15.011,b  
df = 4, p < .0001) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
China 






















































































































































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square 
was used.  
b 50% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Fisher’s exact test was used.
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newspapers’ usage of the morality frame to interpret its Internet censorship and 
regulations, which was significantly more often than the expected and had a high 
percentage, 23.53% (4 of 17), far more than the others, ranging from 0.00% to 10%.  
As far as the issue of the consequences and implications of the Internet in China is 
concerned, very few articles were found to take it as primary subject (see Table 7.14). 
There were only four in the newspapers in China, and one in both the Hong Kong and 
Singapore newspapers. No such articles were found in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. It 
is interesting to see the percentage of articles from China’s newspapers using the 
leadership frame was very high. Yet a Chi-Square test could not be conducted with such 
few counts across societies. 
 
RQ5a: In terms of political tendency and/or tolerance presented in the newspapers’ 
coverage of the Internet in China, did the societies significantly differ from one another?  
RQ5b: If so, did political systems and/or any cultural dimensions significantly contribute 
to the differences? 
 
 
The U.S. newspapers enjoyed the highest mean of the Political Tolerance Index 
scores (M = 1.959, SD = 1.781), followed by the United Kingdom (M = 1.263, SD = 
1.428), Singapore (M = .745, SD = 1.245), Hong Kong (M = .623, SD = 1.111), and 
China (M = .155, SD = .385). 114 As shown in Table 7.15, China was singled out for its 
mean significantly lower than the other societies. In contrast, the average PTI score 
reported by the U.S. newspapers was significantly higher than China (MD = 1.804), Hong 
Kong (MD = 1.337), Singapore (MD = 1.214), and the United Kingdom (MD = .697).115  
In addition to China and the United States, Hong Kong also significantly differed from   
                                                 
114 A high mean indicates more political tolerance. 
115 The group sizes were unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes was used. 
Table 7.14. Percentages of Articles Using Different Types of News Frames among Stories  
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with the Consequences and Implications of the Internet as Primary Subject 
 

































































(N = 0)  
U.K. 
(N = 0)  
a % of N. Same for all percentages in the table.
 
Table 7.15. Multiple Comparisons of PTI Means across Societies a 
 
95% Confidence Interval 





Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Hong Kong -.4674** .1126 -.7890 -.1458
Singapore -.5902*** .1221 -.9387 -.2417
U.S. -1.8040*** .1815 -2.3236 -1.2844
China  
(N = 261) 
  
  
  U.K. -1.1073*** .1614 -1.5715 -.6432
China .4674** .1126 .1458 .7890
Singapore -.1228 .1626 -.5830 .3374
U.S. -1.3366*** .2109 -1.9353 -.7379
Hong 
Kong 
(N = 102) 
  
U.K. -.6400* .1939 -1.1910 -.0889
China .5902*** .1221 .2417 .9387
Hong Kong .1228 .1626 -.3374 .5830
U.S. -1.2138*** .2162 -1.8269 -.6007
Singapore 
(N = 108)  
  
  
U.K. -.5171 .1995 -1.0838 .0495
China 1.8040*** .1815 1.2844 2.3236
Hong Kong 1.3366*** .2109 .7379 1.9353
Singapore 1.2138*** .2162 .6007 1.8269
U.S. 
(N = 98) 
  
  
U.K. .6967* .2405 .0147 1.3786
China 1.1073*** .1614 .6432 1.5715
Hong Kong .6400* .1939 .0889 1.1910
Singapore .5171 .1995 -.0495 1.0838
U.K. 
(N = 80) 
  
  
U.S. -.6967* .2405 -1.3786 -.0147
a The PTI score scale is as follows: 0, assigned for the articles stressing the non-political aspect of a given 
issue, or the position favorable to the Chinese government; 1, for the articles stressing the political aspect of 
a given issue, or the position unfavorable to the Chinese government; 0.5, for the articles mixed with both 
aspects, or two sides above. The Levene’s Test (F = 60.63, df1 = 4, df2 = 644,  p < .0001) suggested that the 
error variances across societies were not equal. Therefore, Tamhane’s T2 that does not assume equal 
variances was used. 







the United Kingdom, with a negative mean difference. No differences were found 
between two peers, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
As a result of the forward stepwise regression model,116 three independent variables, 
freedom status (F = 17.730, p < .0001) and two cultural dimensions, power distance (F = 
17.435, p < .0001) and individualism vs. collectivism (F = 7.934, p < .005), were selected 
(see Figure 7.1).117 The other two dimensions were dropped out. The difference between 
the not-free society, China, and the partly free societies, Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
first one entering the model, contributed most to the variations of the PTI scores,  
 
 
 * Freedom Status: 1 = not free, 2 = partly free, 3 = free; PDI: power distance; IDV: individualism vs. 
collectivism 
 
Figure 7.1. PTI Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method 
                                                 
116 For the stepwise regression control, both the probabilities to enter and to leave were set as .10. 
117 In the effect tests, for freedom status, F = 17.730, df = 2, p< .0001; for power distance, F = 17.435, df = 
1, p< .0001; and for individualism vs. collectivism, F = 7.934, df = 1, p= .005. 
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followed by the dimensions, power distance and individualism vs. collectivism. Based on 
the stepwise results, a regression model with these three predictors was generated (R2 
=.245, F = 52.104, df = 4, p < .0001, see Table 7.16). Specifically speaking of freedom 
status in this model, the partly-free and free societies did not significantly differ from 
each other in predicting the variations of PTI scores. Yet China, the only country with 
freedom status not free in this study, really made a difference for its significant 
association with a low PTI score. The two cultural dimensions, power distance (PDI) and 
individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), positively predicted PTI scores. Higher scores on 
the dimensions led to higher PTI scores, which means the more tolerant to inequality of 
power and the more individualistic a society, the more likely newspapers in the society 
would be to report events about the Internet in China from a political perspective and/or 




Table 7.16. Parameter Estimates of PTI Predictors 
 
Term β Std Error t Ratio 
Intercept -9.8352*** 2.3711 -4.15***
Freedom Status[2-1] 1.1949*** 0.2113 5.66***
Freedom Status[3-2] -2.2023 2.0050 -1.10
PDI 0.1008*** 0.0241 4.18***
IDV 0.0964** 0.0342 2.82**
**  p < .005, ***  p < .0001 
 
                                                 
118 Since the variable, freedom status, was the most significant predictor and had a much larger parameter 
estimate, the positive effect of the two cultural dimensions was relatively reduced, particularly on the not-
free society, China. 
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7.3. Results from Testing Hypotheses 
 
H1a: In the newspapers from societies with more political freedom, the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed. 
H1b: In the newspapers from societies with less political freedom, the issue of Internet 
diffusion and use in China will be more likely to be mentioned or discussed. 
 
 
 H1a was strongly supported. Significant differences existed across the levels of 
freedom status (χ2 = 90.394, df = 2, p < .0001). With the increasing freedom, the 
percentage of the articles mentioning the issue of Internet censorship and regulations 
increased from 14.81% in the not-free society to 22.03% in the partly-free societies and 
to 49.34% in the free societies (see Table 7.17). For both the not-free and partly-free 
societies, the frequencies of the articles with the issue were significantly less than the 
expected. The case for the free societies was opposite. The logistic regression model 
generated with freedom status as the predictor suggested that the variable was positively 
associated with the probability for an article to mention or discuss the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations (see Table 7.18). Each level of freedom status was 
significantly different from one another in predicting the probability of the issue being 
mentioned. The odds of the issue being mentioned in the newspapers from the partly-free 
societies were 1.748 times as much as that in the newspapers from the not-free society.  
The odds in the newspapers from the free societies were 3.289 times as much as that from 
the partly-free societies. Fishers’ exact tests showed that the probability of mentioning 
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in China was greater for the partly-free 
societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free societies, and 
for the free societies than the not-free societies. 
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Table 7.17. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet 
Censorship and Regulations Mentioned in Newspapers 
 























































Table 7.18. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Censorship 
and Regulations in Logistic Regression Model a
 
Term β Std Error χ2 Odds Ratio 
Intercept -1.8186*** 0.1540 139.44 . 
Freedom Status[2-1] 0.5584** 0.2015 7.68 1.7478 
Freedom Status[3-2] 1.1907*** 0.1852 41.33 3.2893 
a  Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ2 = 92.976, p < .0001. 






H1b was partially supported. Significant differences were found across societies 
with different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 13.371, df = 2, p = .0012; see Table 7.19). 
Yet, differences mainly existed between the not-free and partly-free societies, and 
between the not-free and free societies. In the newspapers from the not-free society, the 
observed count was significantly larger than the expected. In contrast, the difference 
between the observed and expected counts was significantly negative in the newspapers 
from the partly-free societies. Although the observed frequency count was also less than 
the expected in the newspapers from the free societies, such a difference was not 
statistically significant. Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the probability of mentioning 
the issue of Internet diffusion and use in China was greater for the not-free society than 
the partly-free societies, and for the not-free society than the free societies. Generally, the 
newspapers from the not-free society had a greater likelihood of mentioning the issue of  
 
Table 7.19. Association between Freedom Status and Whether the Issue of Internet 
Diffusion and Use Was Mentioned in Newspapers 
 





















































Table 7.20. Freedom Status and the Presence of the Issue of Internet Diffusion  
and Use in Logistic Regression Model a
 
Term β Std Error χ2 Odds Ratio 
Intercept 0.4700*** 0.1097 18.35 . 
Freedom Status[2-1] -0.5980*** 0.1540 15.08 0.5499 
Freedom Status[3-2] 0.0410 0.1706 0.06 1.0419 
a  Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ2 =13.287, p < .005. 
***  p < .0001 
 
 
Internet diffusion and use than the partly-free societies (see Table 7.20). The partly-free 
and free societies did not significantly differ from each other. 
 
H2: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing Internet use in China, there will 
be more mentioning of dissident users and/or content in the newspapers from societies 
with more political freedom. 
 
 H2 was strongly supported. Whether an article mentioned dissident users and/or 
content was very significantly associated with the levels of freedom status (χ2 = 152.829, 
df = 2, p < .0001). The percentage of the articles with the issue mentioned dramatically 
increased with the increasing level of freedom status, from 2.29% to 25.20% to 73.26% 
(see Table 7.21). In the newspapers from the not-free society, the observed frequency 
count of such articles was significantly small, only one eleventh of the expected count (4 
vs. 44.652). In contrast, the observed count in the newspapers from the free societies, the 
observed count was about three times as many as the expected (63 vs. 21.943). The 
logistic regression model generated with freedom status as the predictor shows that the 
odds of mentioning dissident users and/or content for the newspapers from a society at a 
higher level was much higher than from societies at a lower level (see Table 7.22). For  
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Table 7.21. Association between Freedom Status and Whether Dissident Users 
and/or Content Mentioned in Newspapers 
 
























































Table 7.22. Freedom Status and the Presence of Dissident Users and/or Content  
in Logistic Regression Model 
 
Term β Std Error χ2 Odds Ratio 
Intercept -3.7554*** 0.5058 55.12 . 
Freedom Status[2-1] 2.6672*** 0.5455 23.90 14.4000 
Freedom Status[3-2] 2.0958*** 0.3180 43.43 8.1318 
a  Effect Wald test for freedom status: Wald χ2 =87.954, p < .0001. 






instance, the odds for newspapers from the partly-free societies were 14.4 times as much 
as that for the newspapers from the not-free society. The odds for the free societies were 
8.13 times as much as that for the partly-free societies. Fishers’ exact tests also showed 
that the probability of mentioning dissident users and/or content was greater for the 
partly-free societies than the not-free society, for the free societies than the partly-free 
societies, and the free societies than the not-free society. 
 
H3b: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as 
primary subject, the responsibility frame will be more likely to be present in the 
newspapers from societies with less political freedom. 
H3c: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in 
China as primary subject, the morality frame will be more likely to be present in the 
newspapers from societies with less political freedom. 
H3d: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in 
China as primary subject, the human interest frame will be more likely to be present in 
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom. 
H3e: Among those news stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations in 
China as primary subject, the conflict frame will be more likely to be present in the 




 H3a was not supported. No significant differences were found in using the factual 
frame to present the issue of Internet censorship and regulations across societies with 
different freedom status.  
 H3b was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with 
different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 7.068, p < .005). Yet, such differences mainly 
came from the difference between the not-free society, China, which contributed most to 
the total Chi-Square statistics (see Table 7.23), and the free societies (χ2 = 6.8, p < .01;  
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Table 7.23. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the 
Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship  
and Regulations as Primary Subject a 
 



















































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio Chi-Square 




see Table 7.24).119 The newspapers from China presented an unusual pattern in using the 
responsibility frame, with an actual count significantly larger than the expected. Fisher’s 
exact tests showed that the likelihood of presenting a responsibility frame in a story with 
the issue of Internet censorship and regulations was greater for the not-free society than 
for the free societies. There were no differences between the not-free society and the 
partly-free societies, and between the partly-free and free societies. 
H3c was partly supported. Significant differences existed across societies with 
different levels (χ2 = 13.237, p < .0001). The not-free society, China, used the morality  
                                                 
119 Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each 
pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s exact tests.  
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Table 7.24. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the 
Responsibility Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship  
and Regulations as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free) 
 







































frame in framing the issue of Internet censorship and regulations significantly more often 
than what was expected statistically (4 vs. 0.962; see Table 7.25). The percentage of the 
related articles with a morality frame was much higher than the societies at the other two 
levels. In contrast, societies at the free level had a zero observed count, significantly less 
than the expected count. Yet, significant differences existed only between this pair (χ2 = 
12.75, p < .001; see Table 7.26).120 Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the probability of 
presenting a morality frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and 
regulations as primary subject was greater for the not-free society than the free societies, 
and there were no differences between the not-free and partly-free societies, and the  
 
                                                 
120 Logistic regression was not run because the few numbers of articles may cause unstable results. Each 
pair of the levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s exact tests. 
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Table 7.25. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  
as Primary Subject a
 























































Table 7.26. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Morality 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary 
Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free) 
 





































partly-free and free societies. 
H3d was partly supported. Although significant differences were found across 
different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 8.043, p < .05; see Table 7.27), only the 
differences between the free and not-free societies (χ2 = 4.210, p < .05; see Table 7.28), 
and between the free and partly-free societies were significant (χ2 = 5.389, p < .05; see 
Table 7.29). Fisher’s exact tests indicated that the probability of presenting a human 
interest frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary 
subject was greater for the free societies than the partly-free societies and the not-free 







Table 7.27. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human 
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  
as Primary Subject a
 
Human Interest Frame  
Yes No 
Not Free 















































a 20% of cells have expected count less than 5; Pearson Chi-Square suspect. Likelihood ratio was used. 
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Table 7.28. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human 
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations 
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Not Free vs. Free) 
 






































Table 7.29. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Human 
Interest Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  
as Primary Subject (Partial Comparison, Partly Free vs. Free) 
 
Human Interest Frame  
Yes No 
Partly Free 
































H3e was supported. Chi-Square test suggested significant differences existed 
across societies with different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 15.629, p < .001; see Table 
7.30). The percentage of the articles presenting a conflict frame increased with the level 
of freedom status, from 0.00% in the not-free society to 18.42% in the part-free societies, 
and to 45.10% in the free societies, where the frequency number of such articles in the 
newspapers was significantly more than the expected count. The observed count in the 
newspapers from the not-free society was zero, significantly less than the expected. 
Because of the zero number, it caused the unstable result regarding the comparison 
between the not-free and free societies when the logistic regression model was run.  
 
 
Table 7.30. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations 
























































Therefore, each pair of different levels of freedom status was compared by using Fisher’s 
exact tests, which suggested the newspapers in the free societies were more likely to 
present a conflict frame in a story with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as 
primary subject than the partly-free (χ2 = 6.935, p < .001; see Table 7.31) and not free 
society (χ2 = 11.585, p < .001; see Table 7.32). So were the newspapers from the partly-
free societies than the not free society (χ2 = 5.622, p < .05; see Table 7.33). 
 
H4: Among those news stories mentioning or discussing the consequences and 
implications of the Internet in China, there will be more concerning political aspects in 
the newspapers from societies with more political freedom. 
 
 





Table 7.31. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  











































Table 7.32. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  












































Table 7.33. Association between Freedom Status and the Presence of the Conflict 
Frame in Stories with the Issue of Internet Censorship and Regulations  























Status Partly Free 

















different levels of freedom status (χ2 = 24.293, p < .0001). As shown in Table 7.34, the 
percentage of the articles with an emphasis on the political aspects of the issue of the 
consequences and/or implications of the Internet in China increased from 0.00% in the 
not-free society to 31.03% in the partly-free societies and to 66.67% in the free societies. 
Particularly, in the not-free society, the frequency count of such articles was significantly 
less than the expected (0 vs. 7.613), which was in a contrast to the free societies, where 
the count was significantly more than the expected (20 vs. 10.875). Significant 
differences also existed between each pair of the three levels of freedom status (χ2 = 
7.948, p < .005, for the comparison between the not-free society and the partly-free 
societies; χ2 = 7.491, p < .01, between the partly-free and free societies; χ2 = 23.032, p < 
.0001, between the not-free society and the free societies, which had the largest 
difference; see Table 7.35, 7.36 and 7.37). Fisher’s exact tests suggested that the 
probability of giving an emphasis on the political aspects of the related issue in an article 
was greater for the partly-free societies than the not-free society, and for the free societies 
than the partly-free societies and the not-free society. 
 
 
H5a: The role played by the government will be more likely to be mentioned in the 
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of power distance. 
H5b: The role played by individuals will be more likely to be mentioned in the 
newspapers from societies with higher index scores on the dimension of individualism vs. 
collectivism. 
 





Table 7.34. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of 
























































Table 7.35. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the  
Consequences and Implications of the Internet  























Status Partly Free 
















Table 7.36. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the 
Consequences and Implications of the Internet 











































Table 7.37. Association between Freedom Status and Aspects of the  
Consequences and Implications of the Internet  










































scores on the dimension of power distance (χ2 = 55.63, p < .0001; see Table 7.38). The 
percentage of the articles mentioning the role played by the government increased with 
the increasing score on power distance (PDI), from 6.78% at the lowest level, the United 
Kingdom, to 37.04% at the highest level, China. The probability of mentioning the 
government role in articles was positively associated with PDI scores. Yet it was not a 
simple linear association (see Figure 7.2). The exponential regression model121 suggested 
that the increasing tendency was miniscule when PDI scores were lower than 70. The 
 
Table 7.38. Associations between Country and Government Role  
Presented in Newspapers 
 
Government Role  
Yes No 
U.K. 
(PDI = 35; 
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(PDI = 68;  
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(PDI = 80; 














                                                 
121 The equation for the exponential regression model is as follows: p = 0.0990617 + 4.9e-36 Exp(PDI); R2 












Transformed Fit to Exp
 
 
Figure 7.2. Bivariate Fit to Exponential Regression Model of  






probability linearly changed with PDI scores. When PDI scores were at a high level, the 
probability increased at an exponential rate. 
H5b was not supported. Although the probability of mentioning the individual 
role played in the Internet in China significantly changed with different societies (χ2 = 
34.092, p < .0001), no particular association was found with the dimension of 
individualism vs. collectivism. In fact, the stepwise regression method suggested that 
freedom status, particularly the not-free societies and the partly-free and free societies, 






Figure 7.3. Significant Predictors Selected by Stepwise Method  
Associated with Mentioning the Individual Role in Articles 
 
7.4. The Differences between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily 
 
RQ6: Did any differences of reporting the issues related to China’s Internet appear to 
exist between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily?  
 
 
 Table 7.39 shows that the issue of Internet diffusion and use received most 
attention in both Chinese newspapers. The articles mentioning the issue accounted for 
51.81 percent and 64.15 percent of the total respectively in the People’s Daily and 
Beijing Youth Daily. Both newspapers also frequently reported events of e-commerce and 
Internet business in China, which enjoyed the second-highest percentage respectively,  
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Table 7.39. Articles with Internet-Related Issues Mentioned  
















of the Internet 
Others 
People’s Daily 











Beijing Youth Daily 















27.60% in the People’s Daily, and 30.19% in the Beijing Youth Daily. Chi-Square 
analyses found no between-newspaper differences in these two issues and other 
unspecified issues. However, the newspapers were significantly associated with the 
presence of two issues, Internet censorship and regulations (χ2 = 21.114, df = 1, p < 
.0001) and the consequences and implications of Internet (χ2 = 5.478, df = 1, p = .019; 
see Table 7.40). According to Fisher’s exact tests, the probabilities of mentioning these 
two issues were both greater for the People’s Daily than the Beijing Youth Daily. The 
percentages of the articles with the issues mentioned in the People’s Daily (23.44%, 
5.66%) were both issues.122 Significant differences were found only in the issue of 
Internet censorship and regulations (χ2 = 11.076, df = 1, p < .001; see Table 7.41). In the 
People’s Daily, the observed count of the articles taking the issue as primary subject was 
significant more than the expected. The case in the Beijing Youth Daily was opposite.  
 
                                                 
122 The differences in other unspecified issues between the two newspapers was significant at the level α = 
0.1. 
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Table 7.40. Differences in Mentioning Internet-Related Issues in Both Primary  
and Non-Primary Stories between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily 
 
Internet censorship & 
regulations  
(χ2 = 21.114, df = 1,  
p < .0001) 
Consequences & 
implications of the 
Internet  
(χ2 = 5.478, df = 1,  
p = .019) 
 
Yes No Yes No 
People’s 
Daily 






















Youth Daily  


























Table 7.41. Comparison of Internet Censorship and Regulations as Primary Subject 
between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily a
 
Internet censorship & 
regulations  
(χ2 = 11.076, df = 1,  



















Youth Daily  













a The articles with primary subject unascertainable were excluded.  
 
 159
Fisher’s exact test also suggested that the People’s Daily was more likely to use the issue 
as primary subject than the Beijing Youth Daily. 
 
 




Chi-Square tests found significant differences in the presentations of many types 
of news frames between the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily (see Table 7.42 and 
Table 7.43). Regardless the types of Internet-related issues, the People’s Daily was more 
likely to present the factual (χ2 = 10.575, df = 1, p = .0015), responsibility (χ2 = 8.889, df 
= 1, p = .0029), morality (χ2 = 9.818, df = 1, p = .0017) and leadership frames (χ2 = 
11.669, df = 1, p = .0006) than the Beijing Youth Daily. The percentages of the articles  
 
 
Table 7.42. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between 
the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily  
(Factual Frame, Human Interest Frame, and Responsibility Frame) 
 
Factual Frame 
(χ2 = 10.575, df = 
1,  
p = .0015) 
Human Interest  
Frame 
(χ2 = 9.199, df = 1,  
p = .0024) 
Responsibility 
Frame 
(χ2 = 8.889, df = 1,  
p = .0029) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
People’s 
Daily 






























































Table 7.43. Comparisons of the Presentations of News Frames between 
the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily (Morality Frame and Leadership Frame) 
 
Morality Frame 
(χ2 = 9.818, df = 1,  
p = .0017) 
Leadership Frame 
(χ2 = 11.669, df = 1,  
p = .0006) 
 
Yes No Yes No 
People’s 
Daily 















































with these frames in the former newspaper were respectively much higher than those in 
the latter. Yet, the Beijing Youth Daily, with a higher percentage, was distinctive for its 
greater probability of providing a human interest frame than the People’s Daily (χ2 = 
9.199, df = 1, p = .0024). No significant differences in the conflict frame and the 
economic consequences frame were found between these two newspapers.  
 In addition to the overall presenting of different types of news frames, this study 
also looked at how each type of news frame was associated with the issue of Internet 
diffusion and use as primary subject.123 As shown in Table 7.44, significant associations 
were found in the presenting of four types of news frames, such as the factual (χ2 = 5.275,  
                                                 
123 Two other issues focused upon in this study, Internet censorship and regulations, and the consequences 
and implications of the Internet, were not examined, because the numbers of the articles with these issues 
as primary subject were few, which caused difficulties in Chi-Square tests for each type of news frame.  
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df = 1, p < .05), human interest (χ2 = 4.155 df = 1, p < .05), morality (χ2 = 5.77, df = 1, p 
< .05), and leadership frames (χ2 = 10.746, df = 1, p = .001). The People’s Daily was 
more likely to use the morality and leadership frames in framing the issue of Internet 
diffusion and use, with the observed counts significantly more than the expected ones and 
the percentages much higher than the Beijing Youth Daily (13.56% vs. 1.72%; 16.95% vs. 
0.00%), which in contrast was more likely to present a human interest frame. Chi-Square 
tests found no differences in the presenting of the factual, conflict, economic 
consequences, and responsibility frames. 
 
 
Table 7.44. Differences in the Presentations of News Frames between the People’s 
Daily and Beijing Youth Daily in Framing the Issue of Internet Diffusion and Use 
 
Human Interest  
Frame 
(χ2 = 4.155, df = 1,  
p < .05) 
Morality Frame 




(χ2 = 10.749,  
df = 1, p = .001) 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
People’s 
Daily 






























































CHAPTER VIII.  
DISCUSSION  
 
Framing theory is one way to investigate what Gamson and Modigliani (1989) 
called an “issue culture,” providing interpretations and meaning for relevant events (pp.1-
2). The theory provides two relevant, commonsense understandings of what it means to 
“frame.” First, the media can be said to frame events and issues in the same way as a 
photographer frames a photograph, choosing what aspects to highlight or draw attention 
to, and what parts to leave out (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Similarly, a media frame 
can be likened to the frame of a house, providing the structure around which everything 
else fits, and influencing the overall style of the construction (Tankard, 2001). Framing 
studies typically begin with an attempt to identify issues and characterize frames. This 
current research considered media framing in such terms – a construction of reality, 
specifically the Internet in China, under the influence of the overarching socio-cultural 
factors in five societies with different political systems and cultural dimensions. It was 
created through absorbing not only what information was presented in the selected 
newspapers but, more importantly, how it was presented. The content analysis reveals 
that the presentations of the Internet in China were distinct in different newspapers across 
societies in terms of both the salience of issues and the use of news frames.  
This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis and considers the contributions 
of the present research to the scholarly literature, as well as the study’s limitations. 




8.1. Issue Salience and Its Implications 
One of the goals of the current study was to examine the salience of issues related 
to the Internet in China. The concept of salience was understood in the study as the extent 
to which an issue stood out from other issues in terms of its relation to other issues, or 
media awareness of a certain issue. It was gauged by the percentage of news articles 
dedicated to mentioning or discussing a given issue. Another instrumental part of media 
salience was prominence, which was measured in the study by the percentage of news 
articles taking a certain issue as the primary subject of a given story.  
 In terms of the first way to measure issue salience, the issue of Internet diffusion 
and use was given greater coverage and dominated over the other issues in China, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom, especially in China. Although the issue also received 
attention in Hong Kong and the United States, the dominant issues were different. The 
newspapers from Hong Kong showed more interest in events about e-commerce, Internet 
business and industry, whereas the U.S. newspapers paid most attention to the issue of 
Internet censorship and regulations in mainland China. The U.K. newspapers also 
devoted a relatively large volume of articles to reporting that subject. 
Internet censorship and regulations, a controversial subject matter with great 
political, social, and cultural meanings, was frequently highlighted as the primary subject 
of a given story in the U.S. and U.K. newspapers, especially in the U.S. newspapers. In 
contrast, their Eastern peers gave prominence to two other issues, e-commerce and 
Internet business in Hong Kong and Singapore’s newspapers, and Internet diffusion and 
use in the newspapers from mainland China, which also highlighted the economic issue.  
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Differences in the newspapers’ issue salience across societies could be as a result 
of the differences of True vs. Virtue in long-/short-term orientation cultures. People in 
low-LTO countries, such as the U.S. and the U.K., believe that there are absolutely clear 
guidelines about what is good and evil, and feel less satisfied with their efforts at doing 
good (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). Thus, journalists in such a society might have been more 
concerned about the problems in a given system. The search for truth and respecting for 
“musts” led U.S. and U.K. journalists to pay more attention to the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations. In contrast, among people in high-LTO cultures, such as 
mainland China and Hong Kong, what is considered good and evil depends on the 
circumstances. They do not feel a strong need to do more to correct social injustice 
(Hofstede, 2001, p.363); therefore, journalists in such a society might have switched their 
attention to the pragmatic practices with long-term benefits, such as Internet diffusion 
and use, and Internet business. Specifically for the newspapers from China, the attention 
paid to the issues of Internet diffusion and use, and e-commerce and Internet business 
might be also a natural result of the fact that what was covered was the Internet in its 
home country, which is in a nationwide process of adopting the new technology and 
promoting Internet economy.  
 The differences found in the presentation of issue salience across societies have 
important implications in terms of the role of news media in political life (Reese, 2001) 
and the effects of framing information on the audience’s attitudes, perceptions, and 
choices. According to Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992), the character of the topic of 
communication is critical to the effectiveness of the communication, which is what the 
constructionist perspective emphasizes. Their study demonstrated that issue salience is 
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critical to understanding the dynamics of political learning. It is assumed that most people 
will not read all of the articles and often will not read to the end of the articles selected. 
Therefore, it is logical to surmise that high salience issues would be likely to draw a high 
level of attention from readers. On the other hand, it makes sense to write stories 
addressed to those already “in the know.” It should come as no surprise that newspapers 
are less likely to “grab attention” on low salience stories. 
Along with Goffman’s (1974) argument that the framing of an event or activity 
establishes its meaning, Gamson (1989) pointed out that “facts have no intrinsic meaning. 
They take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes 
them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring 
others.” Thus, those issues being consistently emphasized could be more meaningful to 
audience members. As discussed in Chapter 3, an important distinction is between the 
frames that media use to portray different events or phenomena and the frames that 
individuals use to sort information and make sense of the world (Scheufele, 1999). The 
relation between the two has been intensively studied, usually in experimental settings, in 
order better to understand the effects of media frames. Studies suggest that news frames 
influence public opinion by making certain aspects of a story more salient, thereby 
activating specific thoughts and ideas for audience members (e.g., Iyengar, 1990a; Price 
& Tewksbury, 1997). These thoughts and ideas are likely to be applied when audience 
members evaluate groups, issues, and other story elements (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 
1997).  
Scholars employ the cognitive accessibility theory to explain this process, in 
which people have the inclination to use cognitive economic short-cuts or heuristics in 
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information processing (Iyengar, 1990b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Price & Tewksbury, 
1997). The “accessibility bias” (Iyengar, 1990b), or the “availability heuristic” (Schrum 
& O’Guinn, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), occurs automatically and simplifies the 
cognitive tasks of making judgments and interpretations. This means that when a subset 
of relevant information about issues regarding a given topic are consistently salient in 
news media, they are likely to be activated and remain accessible to audiences and, 
consequently, affect subsequent judgments and opinions. Applying this to the case of 
reporting the Internet in China, it can be inferred that the issue of Internet censorship and 
regulations, a high salient issue in the U.S. newspapers but a low salient issue in China, 
would be activated in a different way to audiences in these two countries, when people 
are called upon to make judgments or decisions with regard to Internet policies in China. 
For instance, when China’s Internet is considered, the first issue coming to the minds of 
U.S. audiences might be the issue of censorship. The Chinese government’s other policy, 
promoting public Internet access, might be ignored. Chinese audiences, unlike 
Americans, might not realize how serious the issue of censorship is in China and how 
important it is to the public life. 
8.2. Use of Generic News Frames and Behind the Presentations 
 In terms of generic news frames, this current research found that some frames 
were presented more often than other frames, and were more often evident for certain 
issues in a given society.  
Based on common sense, it is not surprising to see that the factual frame, a 
universal journalistic practice with presenting facts as one of its important principles, 
 167
predominated in all the newspapers from the five societies selected in the study. 
Regardless of it, the researcher’s attention was drawn to the unique patterns of the U.S. 
newspapers in using the frame in the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as 
primary subject. Like the newspapers from the other societies, the U.S. newspapers used 
the factual frame most in general. In fact, the percentage of the articles presenting the 
frame in the U.S. newspapers ranked second among the societies. Yet, the percentage for 
the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion and use as primary subject was the lowest 
one, significantly lower than the others, which otherwise exhibited similar patterns to 
their overall use of the frame, significantly predicted by a society’s political system and 
two cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance and long-/short-term orientation.  
The inconsistent patterns for particular stories shown in the U.S. newspapers 
inspired the researcher to take a more qualitative look at the stories in question. Detailed 
investigations found that instead of providing general information or discussing the 
determinants of Internet diffusion in China, the stories with the issue of Internet diffusion 
and use as primary subject in the U.S. newspapers focused on individuals’ use of the 
Internet, which were all framed as human interest and conflict stories (see APPENDIX E 
for the examples of stories). Both the human interest frame and the conflict frame, as 
explained in previous research on news values, are of great newsworthiness and are more 
effective in attracting readers’ attention (e.g., Altheide & Snow, 1979; Neuman, et al., 
1992). It might not have been interesting enough to tell a story about how the Internet is 
used in China to Americans if it had not been framed in such a way. This might also 
relate to idea of journalistic training in the United States. U.S. journalists try to show how 
individuals are affected by something instead of emphasizing only the big picture or 
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abstract ideas. The U.S. case suggests that further research needs to be done to investigate 
the factors contributing to those residuals that the factors at the macro socio-cultural level 
cannot explain how the use of news frames is associated with specific issues. These could 
be the effects of the lower levels in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, such as 
personal orientations of media workers, notions of newsworthiness and media routines. 
In addition to the factual frame, the second dominant type of generic news frame 
was respectively the conflict frame in the U.S. newspapers, the human interest frame in 
the newspapers from China, Singapore and the United Kingdom, and the economic 
consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong.  
The conflict frame was a salient feature in the Western newspapers’ treatment of 
the Internet in China. Particularly, the U.S. newspapers were most likely to present a 
conflict frame, a result consistent with what Luther and Zhou (2005) found and what has 
been emphasized in Western news media coverage (e.g., Neuman, et al., 1992; Richards 
& King, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). As pointed out by Neuman, et al. (1992), 
in the communication literature many references to the media’s emphasis on conflict as a 
means of attracting attention and readership and defining it as a good journalistic practice 
exist. Scholars have also given reasons for this. While Richards and King (2000) 
acknowledged the element of drama lies in the conflict frame, other scholars specifically 
addressed how well the conflict frame fits with the media’s game interpretation of the 
political world as an ongoing series of contests, each with a set of winners and losers 
(Gans, 1979; Patterson, 1980). Along this line of reasoning, the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations, which were more often taken as the primary subject in a 
given story in the Western newspapers, compared to their Eastern peers, should become 
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even more salient to U.S. and U.K. readers, when it was frequently presented in a conflict 
frame. 
Although the communication literature has seen the frequent presence of conflict 
stories in Western news media, no studies examined the presence of the conflict frame 
and other types of news frames within the context of cultural comparisons to see their 
correlations with socio-cultural differences across societies. Previous research has shown 
the inclination to downplay any conflict frame in Asian newspapers (e.g., Luther & Zhou, 
2005; Massey, 2000) and to accentuate harmony in the interpersonal communication 
practices in many of Confucian-based cultures (e.g. Chen & Chung, 1994; Kirkbride, 
Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1997; Leung, 1987; Merkin, 2004; Oliver, 1971; Peng 
& Nisbett, 1999). For instance, Merkin (2004) found that members in societies with a 
cultural long-term orientation were more likely to use harmonious and cooperative 
facework strategies than their short-term oriented counterparts. Yet there is no empirical 
evidence for the linkage between the presence of the conflict frame and cultural 
traditions. Making a contribution to it, this current study found that cultural factors, 
instead of political systems of societies, played an important role here.  
Two of Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions, long-/short-term orientation and 
uncertainty avoidance, were found to be significant in predicting the presence of the 
frame. Newspapers in a society with a lower score on long-/short-term orientation (LTO) 
and a higher score on uncertainty avoidance (UAI) were more likely to present a conflict 
frame. This is exactly the case for the U.S. and U.K. newspapers. According to Hofstede 
(2001), tolerance and respect for other people, and fulfilling social obligations have 
higher priority in short-term orientation societies than long-term orientation societies. In a 
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society with a low score on LTO, quick results and immediate gratification of needs are 
expected. People are less satisfied with daily human relations but more satisfied with 
making efforts to correct social inequality and injustice (pp.356-367). Therefore, we can 
assume that to journalists in such a society, controversy and/or confrontation in thoughts, 
opinions or views, and different parties and groups are tolerable. Being able to see and 
willing to present social problems and different interests, instead of sacrificing pursuing 
the absolute truth so as to maintain social stability and harmonic relationships between 
individuals, should be desirable. In addition, uncertainty-avoiding cultures, like the 
United States with the highest score on UAI among the examined societies, further 
strengthen the belief in an absolute truth (Hofstede, 2001, p.363). On the other hand, 
using a conflict frame to tell a story can more easily satisfy immediate gratification of 
needs of readers in such a society.  
Another type of news frame frequently addressed in the literature is the human 
interest frame. An article is considered belonging to the human interest frame when a 
particular individual, family or group of people is brought forward, or an emotional angle 
is brought to, as an illustration of a larger phenomenon or a wider issue (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999). The media emphasize 
human interest stories as a natural technique to attract the attention of their audiences, 
getting at the idea that personalization of news report plays an important role (Altheide & 
Snow, 1979). In the present study, all the newspapers, except for the ones from Hong 
Kong, exhibited a strong tendency to use the human interest frame.  
Overall, the newspapers from mainland China were particularly likely to use the 
frame, which enjoyed a frequency count significantly higher than the expected. Yet, it is 
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interesting to see the use of the frame in the Chinese newspapers had different patterns in 
treating stories with two different primary subjects, Internet diffusion and use, and 
Internet censorship and relationships. The overall likelihood of presenting the human 
interest frame was mirrored in the stories with the issues of Internet diffusion and use.124 
Yet, Chinese journalists rarely used this frame to report a story mainly concerning the 
issue of Internet censorship and regulations, a highly sensitive topic in China. On the 
surface, this seems to be contradictory to the finding that the not-free society was more 
likely to present a human interest frame than a society with freedom status at the partly-
free or free level. However, it is explainable when we take into account the nature of the 
human interest frame, together with the political economic backdrops in a home-nation to 
the issues in question.  
Experimental research has shown that stories using exemplars are effective since 
they are more easily remembered than stories with abstract or logic reasoning. They “tend 
to form judgments on the basis of vividness instead of validity” (Brosius, & Bathelt, 
1994). The “newsworthiness” of a human interest story depends partly on the possibilities 
to visualize it. Visual images in news are effective in conveying emotional meaning 
(Boholm, 1998, p.127; Ferreira, Boholm, & Löfstedt, 2000; Graber, 1996, p.90). Using 
such a frame is assumed to evoke general sympathy or affections for the ones involved in 
a given event. Therefore, practically, it is hard for journalists in China, a politically 
restricted country, to apply such a frame to a highly politically sensitive issue. Instead, it 
is more reasonable to imagine that Chinese journalists would more likely tell a human 
                                                 
124 In an additional examination, the human interest frame was frequently found in the stories with the issue 
of e-commerce, Internet business and industry as primary subject in the Beijing Youth Daily. 
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interest story about those issues, such as Internet diffusion and use, and e-commence, 
which more fit into the state-centric agenda to promote informatization and 
modernization, as discussed in Chapter 2. By using the human interest frame focusing on 
individual experiences to highlight such issues, the Chinese media would be able to divert 
the audience’s attention away from the problems of the system in place, as Iyengar and 
Kinder (1987) suggested. In addition, the uneven patterns of two Chinese newspapers 
might also explain the disparities in using the frame (see the discussion in the section 
below).  The case of the human interest frame in China, like the case of the factual frame 
in the United States, suggests again that besides the overall presentations of news frames, 
it is important to look at how a certain type of news frame is associated with a given issue 
in framing research, which may give us more information on the interplay between 
factors at the macro level and variables at the micro level that both influence media 
content. 
 Hong Kong stood out for its newspapers’ significantly less likelihood of using the 
human interest frame. As a matter of fact, its newspapers mainly relied on the factual and 
economic consequences frames in their coverage. It could be a typical example to see 
how the cultural dimension, long-/short-term orientation (LTO), came to play in the 
presence of news frames. In general, the patterns of influence of cultural dimensions 
varied with different types of news frames with one or two dimensions specifically 
significant. Yet, the dimension of long-/short-term orientation was found to be the only 
one significant in each of the logistic regression models, which indicates that this 
dimension is the most important cultural factor in predicting the presence of a generic 
news frame. The regression models show that without other factors being taken into 
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account, a society with a high score on LTO was more likely to use the factual and 
economic consequences frames, but less likely to use the human interest, conflict and 
leadership frames. This was exactly the case for Hong Kong, whose newspapers showed 
special interests in the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and industry and the 
economic consequences frame.  
 The economic consequences frame not only considers the actual, perceived, or 
future economic consequences, but also refers to the possible gains or losses. A careful 
reading following the quantitative study found that most of the Hong Kong articles with a 
distinct economic perspective referred to the actual or possible gains or losses. It can be 
assumed that the positive association of long-term orientation, which emphasizes events 
with effects in the future, with using the economic consequences frame perhaps has been 
strengthened by the business tradition in Hong Kong and its subtle connections with 
mainland China. This might be why the coverage of the issue of e-commerce and Internet 
business and the use of the economic consequences frame were particularly more often 
present than was expected statistically in the newspapers from Hong Kong. It is well 
known that Hong Kong is the least traditional of all provinces and territories of China. 
Hong Kong has long been the immediate center for trade between mainland China and 
the rest of the world. Its business community’s embrace of China is “largely pragmatic” 
(Alexander, 2001, p.6). Given the exposure of Hong Kong’s inhabitants to Western 
capitalist social values, and its economic relationships with mainland China, it is not 
surprising to see the intensive concerns about Internet business in mainland China and the 
frequent use of the economic consequences frame in the newspapers from Hong Kong. 
As Neuman et al. (1992) put it, the economic consequences frame reflects “the 
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preoccupation with ‘the bottom line,’ profit and loss, and wider values of the culture of 
capitalism” (p.63). They found that the application of the economic frame by the media 
tended to reinforce dominant capitalist social values. In addition, considering the political 
climate after the 1997 handover, we may reason that the protocol that “no one speaks ill 
of the Chinese government publicly” (Alexander, 2001, p.6) might have caused 
journalists in Hong Kong to downplay those politically sensitive issues, such as Internet 
censorship in mainland China, by switching their attention to the pragmatic issues of 
Internet diffusion and use, and Internet business, and mainly relying on the factual and 
economic consequences frames.  
8.3. Freedom Status and Beyond It 
 If the way that an issue or event is framed affects the way public policy is formed, 
then it is critical that we understand what factors influence framing. In the present 
analysis, in addition to the presence of Internet-related issues and news frames, the 
researcher also examined the correlations between the media’s use of framing and the 
political and socio-cultural factors, specifically freedom status and cultural dimensions. 
As shown in the previous sections, differences in the use of news frames existed across 
societies, and the differences in the newspapers’ usage of news frames were predictable 
on some dimensions but not on others. This section focuses on the effects of freedom 
status, while pointing out cautions that need to be considered in interpreting and 
generalizing the effects.  
 In general, freedom status was found to be significantly associated with how 
stories were framed, such as whether a certain type of news frame was presented, whether 
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a certain type of politically sensitive issue or content was mentioned, and whether a 
certain type of news frame was associated with a certain type of Internet-related issue. 
The differences across the levels of freedom status were particularly exhibited in 
reporting politically sensitive issues or content, such as the issues of Internet censorship 
and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, and dissident users 
and/or content. The presence of such an issue or content significantly increased with the 
increasing level of freedom a society enjoyed, from not-free to partly-free to free. Yet the 
implications of the differences of framing stories associated with freedom status could 
not be overestimated, given the following points: 
 First, it should be noticed that much evidence attributed the functions of freedom 
status mainly to the not-free society, China, which differed from the societies at the other 
two levels in many aspects, particularly the free societies. The partly-free and free 
societies did not differ much in terms of the presence of each type of news frames, and 
the associations between the presence of news frames and Internet-related issues, except 
for the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as primary subject. 
Such patterns could be true in general, saying that differences across the levels of 
freedom status mainly mirror in not-free societies. Yet this generalization has to be 
proved by taking a more representative sample from different levels of societies, 
especially from not-free societies, because there was only one sample from not-free 
societies in the current study. We may also attribute the disparities between China and the 
other societies to factors other than freedom status. For instance, the subject matter 
concerned in this study, the Internet in China, was a home-nation one for Chinese 
journalists.  
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 Second, even if we had had a representative sample, we might still not be 
confident in establishing a causal relationship mainly based on the information on various 
associations without taking into account confounding variables and controlling variables 
which might have influences. For instance, this study found that the presence of the 
conflict frame in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship and regulations as 
primary subject was significantly associated with freedom status. Yet, freedom status was 
not selected in the logistic regression model to predict the overall presence of the conflict 
frame. There could be at least two ways to explain. First, both the overall and specific 
presence of the conflict frame had nothing to do with freedom status. The association 
found in the stories regarding Internet censorship and regulations could be a result of the 
function of the cultural dimension of long/short-term orientation, which was found to be 
significant in predicting the presence of the conflict frame, or the combined effect of the 
dimension with other variables. The increasing direction of LTO scores that the examined 
societies had was consistent with that of freedom status. Another explanation could be 
that freedom status might have different functions in predicting the overall presence of 
the conflict frame and its presence in certain types of stories under the combined 
influences with other variables.  
 As a matter of fact, the present study shows that the presentations of news frames 
rarely were a result of the influence of one single factor. The interaction effects between 
variables were also detected (see Footnote 112 for an example). In addition, it should be 
noticed that: 1) There were only five samples in terms of country; and 2) the predicting 
variables were limited at the broadest level in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, 
and the best combined effects of different variables might have not been found.  
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All these suggest that important information might be missing if a cross-cultural 
study involves only two countries and singles out only one factor, such as country. Such 
studies may easily produce inconsistent results because the interaction effects of multiple 
factors are not taken into account together. Multicultural comparisons enable us to detect 
patterns among countries and cultures instead of restricting the research to differences 
between an arbitrary pairing of two countries. Although the current study brought five 
cultural societies in, it would be even better to have more cultures involved so that the 
test of the influences of political system and cultural dimensions on media content could 
be leading to more confident and valid conclusions.  
8.4. The Chinese Press: How Far Is It Pushing the Ideological Limits?  
 Another goal of the current study was to investigate extramedia influences in 
Shoemaker and Reese’s model, specifically the influences of the changing structure of 
media in China, if any, by comparing the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth Daily, which 
are at different administrative levels and enjoy institutional and financial autonomy in 
different degrees.  
 In terms of issue salience, it was found that compared to the People’s Daily, the 
Beijing Youth Daily was significantly less likely to present and highlight those issues 
particularly with political implications, such as the issues of Internet censorship and 
regulations, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. Although no 
significant differences in the presentations of the issue of Internet diffusion and use were 
found between the newspapers, they differed in the use of news frames for telling stories 
about the issue. The People’s Daily used more often the morality and leadership frames, 
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whereas the Beijing Youth Daily was more likely to rely on the human interest frame to 
highlight personal uses of the Internet. In general, the People’s Daily was more likely to 
use the responsibility frame, especially in the stories with the issue of Internet censorship 
and regulations. 
 The findings in issue salience seem to be a little confusing at the first look, 
because it might be hard to understand why the People’s Daily tightly controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party, discussed the politically sensitive issues, Internet censorship 
and regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet, even more often 
than the Beijing Youth Daily with more institutional autonomy. On the surface, the 
People’s Daily appeared to inform the public more of issues important to public political 
life, which seemed to be similar to what its Western counterparts did. Yet, the picture 
becomes clearer after we take a look at the stories regarding the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations in the People’s Daily.  
The examples included in APPENDIX E show that the emphasis of the stories 
about Internet censorship and regulations in the People’s Daily was different from those 
in the Western newspapers, or the newspapers from Singapore, which were more 
concerned with Internet censorship in terms of individuals’ political use of the Internet, 
such as blocking websites, monitoring online messages, and arresting Internet dissidents. 
The stories in the People’s Daily mainly reported events about regulating Internet content 
such as pornography and copy right, or business such as Internet cafés and online 
advertising, which are less politically sensitive. Also, they were mostly framed from the 
point of view of morality or responsibility. Among 15 articles with such a primary 
subject, six presented a responsibility frame and five presented a morality frame. The 
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purposes for shutting down porn websites and regulating Internet cafés (Wangba) were 
reported to protect adolescents from bad impacts so as to keep their morality standards. 
Individual businesses were taken on responsibilities for the social problems, such as 
safety violations and students’ Internet addiction and playing truant, which were claimed 
to come with Internet cafés. In such a way, the stories presented in the People’s Daily, 
the CCP’s flagship mouthpiece, justified the government’s censorship, such as shutting 
down websites and clearing up Internet cafés, which was consistent with the central 
theme of the Party’s concerns with minimizing harmful political and social impacts of the 
Internet. By doing this, the paper was on the right track within the boundaries of the 
state’s power and ideological control to propagate the Party line and maintain its political 
loyalty.  
 Unlike the People’s Daily, which is at a higher political ranking and enjoys more 
editorial privileges than local newspapers, the Beijing Youth Daily presented its 
inclination to marginalize politically sensitive issues, such as Internet censorship and 
regulations and the consequences and implications of the Internet. The inclination chimed 
with what the literature review presented in Chapter 4 suggests regarding the unevenly 
developed media in China: 1) Politically sensitive content is more subject to ideological 
control by the CCP; and 2) newspapers at the political periphery have greater autonomy 
than their peers at the center. Yet such autonomy is very limited. The Beijing Youth Daily 
could choose to stay away from helping the government to propagate its control of the 
Internet and its interpretation of Internet control within the context of socialist spiritual 
civilization. It might still not be able to push the ideological limits further to challenge the 
legitimacy of maintaining “public morality” in cyberspace by clearing up what the 
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government views as bad. Instead, the newspaper focused on individuals’ use of the 
Internet and stories of individual businesses, which were frequently presented in a human 
interest frame, so as to meet the needs of another master of the Chinese media, readers.  
 In terms of the presence of the issue of e-commerce, Internet business and 
industry and the economic consequences frame, the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth 
Daily did not show significant differences from each other. This might indicate that both 
of them were subject to the responsibility of promoting economic modernization as part 
of the ideological superstructure (Lee, 1990).  
 The literature has seen the diversified structure of the Chinese media. Yet studies 
on how the diversification is reflected in Chinese media content and to what extent the 
diversification has brought liberality to the Chinese media in terms of the media’s serving 
for public political life are few. The comparison of the People’s Daily and Beijing Youth 
Daily shows that differences existed in issue salience and use of different types of news 
frames. Yet in terms of those political sensitive issues (e.g., the issue of Internet 
censorship and regulations), the comparison suggests that we might need to be 
conservative to draw an inference that the Chinese media would enjoy more political 
liberality with its increased diversified structure. However, such a suggestion is based on 
the comparison conducted between only two papers. It should be more informative to 
include more local newspapers, especially those in the areas far away from Beijing, the 
center of politics and power. 
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8.5. Implications of the Research 
This research set out to determine how certain issues and news frames were 
consistently presented in news articles from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United 
States and the United Kingdom within the context of the Internet in China. It was 
expected that differences would exist because of the political and socio-cultural 
conditions under which the newspapers operate. It was anticipated that the generic news 
frames (i.e., factual, human interest, conflict, economic consequences, responsibility, 
morality and leadership) identified in previous studies would come to light. How these 
frames were presented, however, was expected to vary as a result of the papers’ differing 
cultural environment. It is hoped that this research has contributed to the literature of 
media content and framing by introducing freedom status and cultural dimensions as 
independent variables into a cross-cultural analysis of explaining the different patterns of 
using news frames across societies. 
 Going beyond the descriptive level of measuring the number of times that the 
types of Internet-related issues were mentioned and news frames were implemented, as 
much past research has done, the study added to both method and theory in two ways: 1) 
investigating certain issues with comprehensive implications to the public’s political and 
social life, such as the issues of Internet use and censorship, through their associations 
with the presentations of news frames; and 2) empirically introducing national-level 
variables, such as freedom status and cultural dimensions, into the procedure of 
establishing a variety of regression models to predict the presence of news frames and the 
ways to frame a story, and explicitly building the variables into the across-society 
comparison, as Przeworski and Teune (1981) suggested.  
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These approaches allowed the researcher to discover important links between the 
variables that previously were either assumed or were not investigated, as suggested in 
Shoemaker and Reese’s model, and provide a more thorough understanding of macro-
social influences on news construction so as to remedy the deficiencies of the tradition of 
framing research, which has focused on the effects of news frames on individuals’ 
attitudes and perceptions of media content, and has largely neglected how factors at the 
macro level, such as political and cultural values, play a role in the process of media 
framing. From this point of view, the present study made a contribution to our further 
knowledge of how media frames are formed. 
In addition, the current research also helped build the body of the literature in 
cross-culture studies on media content. There are some studies being done cross-
culturally (e.g., de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, such studies may not be 
able to present clear relationships between media frames and certain factors influencing 
content, in that the focus of such studies tends to present the differences of media frames 
and the researchers tend not to empirically correlate the factors to the presentations of 
media frames.  Furthermore, no systematic study has been done on a larger scale, in that 
most studies in this area are limited to comparisons between two or three countries by 
singling out one factor. As a result, differences in specific aspects, political systems or 
cultural values, are hidden under the cover of simple between-country differences. The 
interplay between factors and how positive and negative effects of different factors might 
offset one another are thus not detected. For instance, when significant differences were 
observed between two or three countries, it becomes problematic to determine whether 
the differences are attributable to political systems, cultural values, economic conditions, 
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or some combination of these. By introducing five different societies, the present research 
was able to make a good try to go beyond such limitations. 
8.6. Limitations of the Study 
 A significant shortcoming of this study is the sampling of societies. The sample  
consisted of only five purposely selected societies. Although it is meaningful to compare 
typical Western and Eastern societies, and attempts were made to expand the scope of 
cross-cultural comparisons, as discussed in Chapter 6 and the previous section, the 
number of samples was still few, which might have caused some problems 
methodologically. One of the limitations could be that the wide range of scores of each 
cultural dimension with many intervals missing might have biased the results. As 
mentioned in previous sections, this could be one of the reasons why many of the 
regression models generated in this study could not explain much variations of the 
presentations of news frames. In addition, this study empirically considered only the 
influence of ideological values varying with political systems and cultural dimensions 
across societies. Also, due to the non-representative samples, we have to be very cautious 
in generalizing the results to other societies. 
 Another concern is the limits brought by a quantitative content analysis in framing 
research. First, a content analysis cannot determine causality due to its lack of inference 
power. Although some predicting variables were introduced into the study and as 
discussed in previous sections, informed speculation and reasoning were provided, causal 
relationships still cannot be established. Second, the quantitative analysis was founded on 
the repetition of issues, news frames, or certain characteristics of content. Yet, many 
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powerful concepts central to framing do not necessarily have to be repeated often to have 
a great impact. Without a qualitative analysis, concepts implied between the lines of 
words, the connections between concepts, and what is more latently among the 
connotative levels of meaning cannot be revealed so as to further offer some insight and 
understanding about how these concepts might have influenced in framing a story, and 
how ideology plays out through the language. Furthermore, the content analysis provided 
no information on how the stories were perceived and interpreted by readers. 
 In addition, the current study focused on the presentations of generic news frames 
from the point of view of journalists, leaving room for other future studies to look at how 
framing is taken as a strategic action and acted out by multiple social actors by looking at 
news sources and frame sponsorship in news. Scholars also view framing as a part of a 
discursive process in which strategic actors, such as political actors, organizations, and 
social movements, use symbolic resources to participate in collective sense-making about 
public policy issues (Gamson, 1992, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 2001), and to work to 
“sponsor” the frames that appear in news (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). By relating news sources to types of news frames, we might be able to 
determine whether media’s maintaining the status quo in framing contests (Carragee & 
Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978) interplay with 
political systems and cultural values, and if so, how. 
8.7. Opportunities for Future Research 
 This study analyzed newspaper frames about the Internet in China over a five-
year period by selecting two newspapers from each of five societies, China, Hong Kong,  
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Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom. As discussed in previous sections, 
bringing more societies into a more systematic study that combines variables at different 
levels in the hierarchical model of Shoemaker and Reese could give us more confidence 
in the predicting power of regression models for the presence of generic news frames. For 
instance, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) argued that the influences on media content not 
only come from the journalists who write stories, but also from interest groups, news 
organizations themselves and their policies, e.g., political endorsements, editorial 
positions, and corporate procedures. Perhaps it is difficult to measure quantitatively; yet it 
is not entirely impossible. Meanwhile, research using a more qualitative approach could 
offer more insight into the procedure of frame building. In addition, a more complicated 
comparative research involving different social units at two different time periods could 
be considered to examine whether the influence of national-level variables would change 
over the time, although Chang et al (2001) pointed out such a comparison is “empirically 
less feasible” (p.418).  
Further research is suggested that includes more titles of newspapers and a variety 
of news media, including television, radio, and the Internet, to gain a more complete 
understanding of mass media portrayals of China’s Internet. This would be particularly 
meaningful in terms of comparative purposes for examining to what extent the influences 
of political and cultural values in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model on the 
patterns of news coverage could go beyond the boundaries of different types of news 
media. For instance, will news stories carried on the Internet, a universal medium more 
open to ordinary people to discuss political issues, exhibit less differences across 
societies?  
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 In terms of media content, an avenue of research to broaden the scope of the 
current study, focusing on only news articles, would be including editorials and 
commentaries in news media, which could provide more precise knowledge of and 
insight into a newspaper’s leanings toward such controversial issues as Internet use, 
Internet censorship, and the consequences and implications of the Internet in China. A 
qualitative analysis could provide greater understanding of whether frames in editorial 
content reflect the power structure in a given society, and if so, how. Besides this, further 
research could include non-news sources that people rely on in daily life to construct 
meaning about topics in the public arena. 
 Another question can be raised about the extent to which journalists’ individual 
frames may influence the procedure of media framing. As indicated in Figure 3.2, 
constructed reality plays a role in shaping individual frames in the long term, which in 
turn takes a function in how journalists, also as individual audiences who accept 
information from media sources, frame stories. Yet, the current study only examined a 
part of the process of frame building, from objective reality through media, leaving the 
interactions between media frames and individual frames and the roles of constructed 
reality unconsidered. If these functions are included, more residuals or variations could 
be explained. For instance, if a certain issue has been reported in a salient way over time, 
journalists could pick up this type of issue easily because of its availability and 
accessibility, as discussed in the first section. Therefore, further research should combine 
a variety of methods, such as content analysis, surveys, interviews, and experimental 
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GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING PRIMARY 
AND NON-PRIMARY STORIES 
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1. Primary stories vs. non-primary stories 
 
1) Does the headline of the story contain any key word(s), such as Beijing and Web, 
directly referring to China AND Internet-related object(s)? Examples:  
China Lists Controls To Restrict the Use Of E-Mail and Web 
Tracking the Web Across China 
Beijing Blocks Access to Google 
Such stories definitely are primary stories. 
 
2) If the headline of the story does not clearly suggest that the primary subject of the 
story is related to the Internet in China, then, does the lead in the story primarily present 
or discuss an issue/event/problem related to Internet in China? In some cases, it is very 
easy to answer the question as “Yes.” Then, such stories should be coded as primary 
stories. In some cases, it is more complicated. For example: 
 
From the headline “China's New Culture Starting To Take Shape,” it is not clear whether 
or not the primary subject of the story is related to the Internet in China. You should then 
look at the lead: 
 
For Sun Jiazheng, the Chinese culture minister, the emergence of a global culture 
wears many faces. On the one hand, moviegoers in Beijing can swoon at 
screenings of “Titanic.” On the other, computer jockeys in Shanghai might surf 
Web sites that carry “unhealthy” material. 
 
The lead suggests that the story could be the one with the primary subject related to the 
Internet in China, in which the cultural implications of the Internet in China might be 
discussed. Yet, it is still not clear whether or not such an issue would be the primary 
subject of the story. In such a case, you should consider the following question: 
 
3) Does the content related to the Internet in China, overall, dominate over other content 
in the story? If yes, then the story should be coded as a primary story. 
 
 
2. Other general rules concerning primary or non-primary stories 
 
1) Stories mainly discussing the Internet in Hong Kong are excluded from primary 
stories. 
 
2) The activities of foreign Internet companies in the Internet market of mainland China 
are considered to be related to the Internet in China. 
 
3) The oversea activities of China’s Internet companies are also considered to be related 
to the Internet in China. 
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4) Stories discussing the Internet in a broader area, such as Asia, with China as a part of 














APPENDIX B (I) 




Section 1: Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China’s Internet 
in the story. 
 
Variable 01: Newspaper Title 
1) People’s Daily 
2) Beijing Youth Daily 
3) Singtao Daily 
4) South China Morning Post 
5) Lianhe Zaobao 
6) The Straits Times 
7) The New York Times 
8) The Los Angeles Times 
9) The Guardian 
10) The Times 
 
Variable 02: Date of the story: ____________ (dd/mm/yy) 
 
Variable 03: The country/territory with which the newspaper is associated: 
1) Mainland China 
2) Hong Kong 
3) Singapore 
4) The United States 
5) The United Kingdom 
 
Variable 04: What issue is taken as the primary subject in the story? Please check ONLY 
ONE. 
1) Internet technologies 
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 05 through 
Variable 08] 
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09 
through Variable 11] 
4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry 
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes 
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO 
Variable 12 through 12a] 
7) Other (If other, please specify here: ______________________________) 
8) Not ascertainable [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 13] 
 
If check 2) for Variable 04, then, 
 
Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the 
mention of online content stresses more: 
 1) political use/content   
2) non-political use/content  
3) Not ascertainable 
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4) Not applicable 
 
Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or 
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, 
mentioned? 
1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive 
content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to 
project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme 
nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials? 
 1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
 Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any? 
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3) Government/people representing government 
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
6) Not applicable 
 
If check 3) for Variable 04, then,  
 
Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): Does the discussion regarding regulating 
the Internet in the story, if any, stress:  
1) the necessity of regulating the Internet 
2) the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet 
 3) Not ascertainable 
4) Not applicable 
 
Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): Does the discussion related to regulating 
the Internet in the story, if any, stress: 
1) Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the 
Internet 
2) the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak 
impact on Internet use 
3) Not ascertainable 
4) Not applicable 
 
Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet, 
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has 
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to: 
1) the political aspect 
2) other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
3) Not ascertainable 
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4) Not applicable 
 
 If check 6) for Variable 04, then, 
 
Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication 




4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
 
Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political 
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or 
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:  
 1) strengthening the current government or regime  
2) weakening the current government or regime  
3) Not ascertainable 
4) Not applicable 
 
Variable 13: Other than the primary subject, what issues related to China’s Internet are 
mentioned or discussed in the story? Please check as MANY as you can: 
1) Internet technologies 
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 14 through 
Variable 17] 
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 18 
through Variable 20] 
4) E-commerce, Internet business & Internet industry 
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes 
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO 
Variable 21 through 21a] 
7) Other(s)  (If other(s), please specify here: 
______________________________) 
8)   Not applicable 
 
If 2) for Variable 13 is checked, then, 
 
Variable 14 (PTI Question-01a): The discussion of Internet use or the 
mention of online content more stresses: 
 1) political use/content   
2) non-political use/content  
3) Not ascertainable 
4) Not applicable 
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Variable 15 (PTI Question-02a): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or 
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, 
mentioned? 
 1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 16 (PTI Question-03a): Is dissident content or politically 
sensitive content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does 
not want to project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, 
extreme nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials, 
mentioned/discussed? 
 1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
 Variable 17 : Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any? 
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3) Government/people representing government 
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
6) Not applicable 
 
If 3) for Variable 13 is checked, then,  
 
Variable 18 (PTI Question-04a): The discussion regarding regulating the 
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:  
1)  the necessity of regulating the Internet, or  
2)  the unfavorable position to regulating the Internet 
 3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
 
Variable 19 (PTI Question-05a): The discussion related to regulating the 
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses: 
1)  Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the 
Internet, or 
2)  the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet, or weak 
impact on Internet use 
3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
 
Variable 20 (PTI Question-06a): The concern over regulating the Internet, 
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has 
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to: 
1)  the political aspect 
2)  other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
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 If 6) for Variable 13 is checked, then, 
 
Variable 21(PTI Question-07a): What type of consequence or implication 




4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
 
Variable 21a (PTI Question-08a): If the political 
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or 
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:  
 1)  strengthening the current government    
2)  transforming China into a new society   
3)  Not ascertainable 




Section 2: The presence of frame.  
 
Variable 22: Is a factual frame present in the story? 
 1) Yes  2) No 
 
 If checked YES, then, 
Variable 22a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 23: Is a human interest frame present in the story? 
 1) Yes  2) No 
 
 If checked YES, then,  
Variable 23a: Who is(are) the agent(s)/actor(s) involved in the frame? 
(Check as MANY as you can.) 
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3) Government/people representing government 
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not applicable 
Variable 23b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
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Variable 24: Is a conflict frame present in the story? 
  1. Yes   2. No 
 
 If checked YES, then 
Variable 24a: Who are the counterparts involved? (Check as MANY as 
you can.) 
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
3) Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
4) Government/people representing government vs. 
Government/people representing government 
5) Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) 
as ordinary people 
6) Government/people representing government vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
7) Others (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
8) Not applicable 
Variable 24b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 25: Is a responsibility frame present in the story? 
  1. Yes   2. No 
 
 If checked YES, then 
Variable 25a: Who is suggested in the story being responsible for or 
having ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question? 
(Check as MANY as you can.) 
1)  Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2)  Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3)  Government/ people representing government 
4)  Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5)  Not applicable 
Variable 25b: Who is given credit? (Check as MANY as you can.) 
1)  Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2)  Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3)  Government/people representing government 
4)  Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5)  Not applicable 
Variable 25c: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
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   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 26: Is a morality frame present in the story?  
  1. Yes  2. No 
 
 If checked YES, then 
Variable 26a: Who provides the moral message/interpretation? (Check as 
MANY as you can.) 
1)  Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2)  Business man(men)/ corporate(s) 
3)  Government/ people representing government 
4)  Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5)  Not applicable 
Variable 26b: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 27: Is an economic consequence frame present in the story?  
  1. Yes  2. No 
 
If checked YES, then 
Variable 27a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
   1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 28: Is a leadership frame present in the story?  
  1. Yes  2. No 
 
If checked YES, then 
Variable 28a: Is the frame associated with the primary subject of the 
story? 
















APPENDIX B (II) 




Basic information of the story and the issue(s) related to China’s Internet in the 
story. 
 
Variable 01: Newspaper Title 
1) People’s Daily 
2) Beijing Youth Daily 
3) Singtao Daily 
4) South China Morning Post 
5) Lianhe Zaobao 
6) The Straits Times 
7) The New York Times 
8) The Los Angeles Times 
9) The Guardian 
10) The Times 
 
Variable 02: Date of the story: ____________ (dd/mm/yy) 
 
Variable 03: The country/territory that the newspaper is associated: 
1) Mainland China 
2) Hong Kong 
3) Singapore 
4) The United States 
5) The United Kingdom 
 
Variable 04: What issue(s) related to China’s Internet is(are) mentioned in the story? 
Please check as MANY as you can. 
1) Internet technologies 
2) Internet diffusion & use [If this is checked for Internet use, GO TO 
Variable 05 through Variable 08] 
3) Internet censorship & regulations [If this is checked, GO TO Variable 09 
through Variable 11] 
4) E-commerce & Internet business 
5) Hackers, Internet security & other cybercrimes 
6) The consequences & implications of the Internet [If this is checked, GO TO 
Variable 12 through 12a] 
7) Other (If other, please specify here: ______________________________) 
 
If check 2) for Variable 04, then, 
 
Variable 05 (PTI Question-01): The discussion of Internet use or the 
mention of online content more stresses: 
 1) political use/content   
2) non-political use/content  
3) Not ascertainable 
4) Not applicable 
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Variable 06 (PTI Question-02): Is(are) specific dissident user(s) or 
organization(s), such as Falun Gong, human rights organizations, 
mentioned? 
1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
Variable 07 (PTI Question-03): Is dissident content or politically sensitive 
content that the Chinese government is trying to avoid or does not want to 
project, such as anti-Communist, pro-democracy, corruption, extreme 
nationalism sentiments, criticism of officials? 
 1) Yes  2) No  3) Not applicable 
 
 Variable 08: Who is(are) the primary agent(s)/actor(s), if any? 
1) Individual(s) as ordinary people 
2) Business person(s)/corporate(s) 
3) Government/people representing government 
4) Other(s) (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
6) Not applicable 
 
If check 3) for Variable 04, then,  
 
Variable 09 (PTI Question-04): The discussion regarding regulating the 
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses:  
1)  the necessity of regulating the Internet, or  
2)  the opposite 
 3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
 
Variable 10 (PTI Question-05): The discussion related to regulating the 
Internet in the story, if any, more stresses: 
1)  Chinese government’s ability or success of regulating the 
Internet, or   
2)  the impossibility or failure of regulating the Internet 
3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
 
Variable 11 (PTI Question-06): The concern over regulating the Internet, 
the regulation/policy and/or the step/measure that the government has 
taken, or the law suit, if any, is more related to: 
1)  the political aspect 
2)  other aspect (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
3)  Not ascertainable 
4)  Not applicable 
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 If check 6) for Variable 04, then, 
 
Variable 12 (PTI Question-07): What type of consequence or implication 




4) other (If this is checked, specify here: ________) 
5) Not ascertainable 
 
Variable 12a (PTI Question-08): If any political 
implications/consequences are mentioned, such implications or 
consequences discussed in the story more emphasize on:  
 1) strengthening the current government or regime, or  
2) weakening the current government or regime  
3) Not ascertainable 























Part – 1: Identifying the primary subject and the issue(s) related to the Internet in 
China in a story. 
 
 
1. Identifying the primary subject of a PRIMARY story 
 
The issues related to China’s Internet in the coding sheet are not mutually exclusive but 
may be combined in the same story. Follow the steps to determine which one is the 
primary subject of a primary story: 
 
1) Content contained in headlines and leads is the important key. If the content is 
consistent in both the headline and lead of a story, then it should be taken as the primary 
subject of the story. For example:  
 
Headline: Web Sites' Merger Signals Consolidation of China's Internet Industry 
Lead: China's Internet industry, serving one of the most promising markets, is about to 
undergo a sweeping consolidation after the first major merger of the industry's short life. 
 
Then the primary subject of the story is coded as “e-commerce & Internet business.” 
 
2) If the consistency of the content in the headline and lead of a story is not very clear, 
then, a careful reading of the entire story is desired. For example: 
 
Headline: Complaints and Concern Rise Over Poor Policing in China 
Lead: The first boy disappeared in March 2001, then others went missing, all teenage 
boys, all regulars at the Internet cafes near the schools. Suspicious parents went to the 
police, who were not impressed. Maybe, the police said, the boys ran away. 
 
If the content of the story is dominated by or mainly centers around a certain issue 
included in the coding sheet, then the issue is the primary subject of the story.  
 
3) If the identified issue is not specifically addressed in the list, code it as “other,” and 
specify the issue. 
 




2. Identifying the issue(s) related to the Internet in China 
 
1) The category of “Internet technologies”  
 
 Includes: 
• The technological aspect of the Internet, such as the innovation and diffusion of 
an emerging technology applied to the Internet, the features and applications of 
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Internet technologies, such as e-platform, encryption software, Web browser, etc, 




• How Internet technologies benefit people and societies, which will be grouped 
into the category of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.” 
 
Specific cases: 
• Filtering/blocking software/technologies issue 
If a story mainly discusses the software/technology itself, such as the 
developer(s), and its advantages and applications, it will be grouped into this 
category. If the story mentions the software in the context of discussing the issue 
of Internet censorship in China, for instance, mainly discussing how the software 
is used to censor the content online, then it will be grouped into the category of 
“Internet censorship & regulations.”  
• Security issue 
The rule similar to the one above applies. When the technology of online security, 
such as encryption, firewall, etc., is mentioned or discussed, if the story 
emphasizes more on the technology itself, it will be grouped into this category. 
Otherwise, it will be grouped into the category of “hackers, Internet security & 
other cybercrimes.” 
 
2) The category of “Internet diffusion & use” 
 
 Includes: 
• General information on Internet diffusion and/or use in China, such as news 
release of how many people are there on the Internet, who’s on the Internet, the 
size of the Internet, how frequently people visit the Internet, etc. 
• Discussion of the determinants of Internet diffusion in China, such as Internet 
backbone and/or network infrastructure, access to the Internet and/or constituent 
technologies, perceived value of the Internet, demand for capacity and 
connectivity, etc., and the issue of digital divide. 
• The Internet use of ordinary people, organizations, or institutions, such as 
communicative interaction, message dissemination, e-learning, political 
involvement, etc. 
• Government initiatives to use the Internet to spread information, disseminate 
material, and provide channels for two-way communication, or use the Internet as 
a tool for self-promotion, Party propaganda, and/or for public goods and services, 
such as the launch of an official Web site for public use or e-governance, e-
education, or organizing a specific non-commercial online event getting ordinary 
people involved. 
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• The Internet use of Internet-based companies/corporations for purposes other than 
business, such as contributing to public goods, and organizing a specific non-
commercial online event, e.g., collecting e-signatures to bid for Olympics. 
 
Excludes: 
• Government’s involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet, which will be 
grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.” 
• The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for 
doing business, such as launching an e-commerce Web site, and providing 
commercial services via Internet technologies, etc., which will be grouped into the 
category of “e-commerce & Internet business.” 
• Discussion of how regulatory/legal framework affects/determines the Internet 
diffusion/use in China, which will be grouped into the category of “Internet 
censorship & regulations.” 
• The consequences and/or implications of Internet use, such as the implications of 
using Web to disseminate dissent content, which will be grouped into the category 
of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.” 
 
Specific cases: 
• Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet 
If the discussion is mainly from the perspective of the pervasiveness, geographic 
dispersion and/or connectivity infrastructure of the Internet in China, it will be 
grouped into the category “Internet diffusion & use.” If the discussion is mainly 
from the perspective of how the Chinese government controls the Internet through 
controlling access to the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet 
censorship & regulations.” 
• Individuals’ online shopping activities 
If such activities are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle of 
personal online behavior, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet 
diffusion & use.” If they are mentioned/discussed/perceived more from the angle 
of business, such as how commercial Web sites promote online shopping, it will 
be grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.” 
• Discussion of perceived value of the Internet 
If the discussion is more associated with how such perceptions determine the use 
of the Internet, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet diffusion & use.” 
If the discussion is more associated with social and/or cultural change, it will be 
grouped into the category of “the consequences & implications of the Internet.” 
• Discussion of Internet cafe 
If the discussion is centered on individual use of the Internet, such as who visits 
Internet cafés, what users are look for on the Internet, and how users enjoy 
Internet cafes, etc, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet diffusion & 
use.” If the discussion is centered on the business operation of Internet cafes, it 
will be grouped into the category of “e-commerce & Internet business.” If the 
discussion is centered on regulations that cover the operation of Internet cafes, 
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and lawsuits related to Internet cafes, it will be grouped into the category of 
“Internet censorship & regulations.” 
 
3) The category of “Internet censorship & regulations” 
 
 Includes: 
• Filtering/ blocking software and/or other technologies/methods used for censoring 
the online content. (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific cases in 
the category of “Internet technologies.”) 
• Discussion of the backbone networks and access to the Internet as a part of 
discussion of the strategies of controlling the Internet in China. (Refer to the 
guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet 
diffusion & use.”)   
• Specific steps or strategies taken by the Chinese government to control the 
Internet, such as closing down or blocking a specific Web site, creating special 
Internet police, etc., and individual anti-blocking methods or strategies, such as 
using proxy servers to bypass official blocks. 
• Any policies, regulations and/or laws regarding all Internet-related aspects, such 
as domain names, online content, online behaviors, and Internet industry. 
• Specific Internet-related lawsuits, such as intellectual property cases, and 
prosecutions and imprisonment of Internet users, including dissidents, and/or 
Internet-interested businessmen.   
• Discussion of Internet-interested policy bodies and/or the regulatory regime 
governing the Internet. 
 
4) The category of “e-commerce & Internet business” 
 
 Includes: 
• The Internet use of individuals and/or Internet-based companies/corporations for 
doing business and providing commercial services. (Refer to the guidelines above 
concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion & use.”) 
• The government’s involvement in e-commerce by using the Internet. (Refer to the 
guidelines above concerning the exclusions in the category of “Internet diffusion 
& use.”) 
• The trend of Internet industry in China. 
• Foreign companies/investors’ economic activities in Internet industry in China. 




• How e-commerce will transform China, which will be grouped into “the 
consequences & implications of the Internet.” 
 




• Domestic hacker activities in China and “cyberwars” against foreign countries, 
such as Indonesia, America and Japan. 
• Technical discussions related to hacking, such as phony IPs, distant assaults, 
backdoors, etc., and the technology of protecting online security discussed with an 
emphasis on Internet security rather than the technology itself. (Refers to the 
guidelines above concerning the specific cases in the category of “Internet 
technologies.”) 
• Virus and protection 
• General information on other Internet-related crimes, such as copy right piracy, 
theft of trade secrets, Internet fraud and spam, Internet harassment and threats, 
trademark counterfeiting, etc. 
 
Excludes: 
• Any specific law suits or cases involved in hacking, and other Internet-related 
crimes, and associated with regulating or controlling the Internet in China, which 
will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship and regulations.” (Refer 




• The encryption issue 
If the discussion is more technologically oriented, it will be grouped into the 
category of “Internet technologies.” If the discussion is centered on securing the 
Internet in China, it will be grouped in the category of “hackers, Internet security 
& other cybercrimes.” (Refer to the guidelines above concerning the specific 
cases in the category of “Internet technologies.) If the discussion is more from the 
perspective of regulations, such as the rules on the importation of encryption 
software into China, it will be grouped into the category of “Internet censorship & 
regulations.” 
 
6) The category of “other” 
 
Any other issues, concerns or events related to China’s Internet, which are clearly 
addressed in a story but not included in the categories above, will be grouped in this 
category. 
 
7) The category of “not ascertainable”  
 
This category applies to the cases where there are more than one issue addressed in a 
primary story and it is not easy to single out one as the primary subject of the story from 
the others. Before checking this category, read the story very carefully to find out 
whether or not the story gives more attention to a certain issue than the others. If that is 
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not the case, and the story equally emphasizes two or more issues, the category is 
checked.  
 
For other questions, such as the PTI questions, if a given story is mixed with the two 
opposite statements for a given question, and there is no way to weigh one over the other, 
the category is checked. 
 
8) The category of “not applicable” 
 
This category applies when a given question is not applicable to a given story, that is, the 
story has nothing to do with the subject matter or statement concerned in the given 
question.  
 
Part – 2: Identifying the frame(s) present in the story.  
 
(The instrument to measure whether or not a certain type of frame is presented is 
modified and created mostly based on the following research projects, such as Luther & 
Zhou, 2005, Semetko & Valkenburg, 1998, Valkengurg, Semetko, & De Vreese, 1999, 
and Zillmann, Chen, Knobloch, & Callison, 2004.) 
 
 
1. Identifying the Factual Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the factual frame: 
2. Does the story present the issue/event/problem in question mainly based on 
facts and/or factual interpretation?  
If yes, then, 
3. Does the story present the facts in a straightforward fashion?  
If yes, then a factual frame is presented.  
 
2. Identifying the Human Interest Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the human interest frame: 
1. Does the story provide a human example, a human face, a personal story or an 
emotional angle? 
If yes, then, 
2. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups play a role in or are 
affected by the issue/event/problem in question? 
Or, 
3. Does the story contain feelings of outrage, empathy or caring, or sympathy or 
compassion? 
If yes to any one of these two questions (#2 or #3), then a human interest frame is 
presented. 
 
3. Identifying the Conflict Frame: 
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Questions to measure the presence of the conflict frame: 
1. Does the story provide two parties, individuals, groups, or countries with 
different interests? 
Or, 
2. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the issue/event/ 
problem/thoughts/arguments in question? 
If yes to any one of these two questions (#1 or #2), then,  
3. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties, individuals, groups, or 
countries? 
Or, 
4. Does one party, individual, group, or country reproach another? 
Or, 
5. Does the story present a battle, confrontation, scuffle, clash, controversy etc.? 
If yes to any one of these three questions (#3, #4, or #5), then a conflict frame is 
presented. 
 
4. Identifying the Responsibility Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the responsibility frame: 
1. Does the story point out a specific problem/adversity/disaster? 
If yes, then, 
2. Does the story suggest that any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), 
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society 
is responsible for the problem/ adversity/disaster in question? 
Or, 
3. Does the story suggest that individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), 
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society 
has the ability to alleviate the problem/adversity/disaster in question? Or does 
the story give credit to any individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), 
company(-ies)/corporation(s), some level of the government and/or the society? 
Or, 
4. Does the story suggest that the problem adversity/disaster requires urgent action 
from individual(s), organization(s)/institution(s), company(-ies)/corporation(s), 
some level of the government and/or the society? 
If yes to any one of these three questions (#2, #3, and #4), then a responsibility frame is 
presented. 
 
5. Identifying the Morality Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the morality frame: 
1. Does the story interpret an issue/event/problem in terms of moral prescription, 
e.g., offering specific social prescriptions about how to behave? 
Or, 
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2. Does the story present an issue/event/problem for the sake of caring about the 
state of social morality or to promote ethical education in the society? 
If yes to any one of these two questions, then a morality frame is presented. 
 
6. Identifying the Economic Consequence Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the economic consequence frame: 
1. Is there a reference to the (actual, perceived, and future) economic 
consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action? 
Or, 
2. Is there a mention of the costs or the degree of expense involved? 
If yes to any one of these two questions, then an economic consequence frame is 
presented. 
 
7. Identifying the Leadership Frame: 
 
Questions to measure the presence of the leadership frame: 
1. Does the story mention any leader(s) involved in an issue/event/problem?  
Or, 
2. Does the story mention the notion of leadership related to the Internet in China? 
If yes to any one of these two questions, then, 
3. Does the story specifically address leadership activities, reactions, effectiveness, 
and/or roles played in the arena of the Internet in China? 

















CONFLICT TYPES IN STORIES WITH CONFLICT FRAME 
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Table D.1. Conflict Types in the U.S. and U.K. Newspapers 
 
Conflict type Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
0 0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
6 14.6
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
1 2.4
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
1 2.4
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
23 56.1









Table D.2. Conflict Types in the U.S. Newspapers  
 
Conflict type  Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
0 0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
4 13.8
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
1 3.4
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
1 3.4
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
17 58.6










Table D.3. Conflict Types in the U.K. Newspapers  
 
Conflict type  Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
0 0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
2 16.7
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
0 0.0
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
0 0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
5 41.7









Table D.4. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from China 
 
Conflict type  Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
1 11.1
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
4 44.4
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
2 22.2
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
0 0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
0 0.0








Table D.5. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Hong Kong 
 
Conflict type  Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
0 0.0
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
2 22.2
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
1 11.1
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
0 0.0
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
1 11.1









Table D.6. Conflict Types in the Newspapers from Singapore 
 
Conflict type  Count Percent a
Individual(s) as ordinary people vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
1 7.1
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. business 
person(s)/corporate(s) 
4 28.6
Business person(s)/corporate(s) vs. individual(s) as ordinary 
people 
2 14.3
Government/people representing government vs. 
government/people representing government 
1 7.1
Government/people representing government vs. individual(s) as 
ordinary people 
5 35.7























EXAMPLES OF PRIMARY STORIES WITH INTERNET 
DIFFUSION AND USE, AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND 




1. Internet Diffusion and Use 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The People’s Daily, January 
23, 2000. 
政府上网工程推出新举措 [Government 
Online Project makes new moves] 
The People’s Daily, February 
4, 2000. 
农民上网找买家 [Peasants go online looking 
for buyers] 
The People’s Daily, March 2, 
2000. 
中国人大新闻站点开通 [The news website of 
the National People’s Congress is open] 
The People’s Daily, January 
12, 2001. 
山东省开发“电子邮政” 
[Shangdong develops e-postal services] 
The People’s Daily, February 
16, 2001. 
全国农业网站达 2200 家 [Agricultural 
websites amount to 2,200 throughout the 
country] 
The People’s Daily, May 10, 
2002. 
西部大学校园网建设工程将启动 [The 
project of building universities’ campus 
networks in Western China will be launched] 
The People’s Daily, January 
2, 2003. 
给“新五类”网民画像 [Portraying “five new 
types” of netizens] 
The People’s Daily, 
December 11, 2003. 
中青网启用全新域名, CN 域名每月注册量超
过 1万 [The Youth Net starts using a new 
domain name; The number of registration for 
“.cn” domain names is over 10,000 per mouth] 
The People’s Daily, March 
20, 2004. 
我国全面启动下一代互联网建设 [China 
completely starts building next generation of 
the Internet] 
The People’s Daily, 
December 22, 2004. 
山东安丘市检察院—“网上监督”实现“在线
管理” [The Qiuan Procuratorate in Shandong: 
“online supervision” realizes “online 
management”] 
The Beijing Youth Daily, 
February 1, 2000. 
王刚上网任人数落 [Wanggang goes online 
letting people scold]  
The Beijing Youth Daily, 
September 5, 2000. 
网上传递谢师礼 [Pass gifts on the Internet in 
appreciation of teachers] 
The Beijing Youth Daily, July 
26, 2000. 
网络成为奥运新舞台 [The Net becomes the 
new stage of Olympics] 
The Beijing Youth Daily, 
October 24, 2001. 
新疆网民挑战网络生存 [Xinjiang Netizens 
challenge being online] 
China 
The Beijing Youth Daily, 
March 18, 2002. 
大学生帮花农办网站 [College students help 
flower peasants to launch websites] 
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1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued) 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The Beijing Youth Daily, June 
13, 2003. 
网驴不怵非典 [“Online donkeys” are not 
fearful of SARS] China 
The Beijing Youth Daily, March 
4, 2004 
以个人名义 开通学雷锋网 [Personally 
open a website of learning from Lei Feng] 
The Singtao Daily, January 9, 
2001. 
中国三千万人曾上网 [China has 30 
millions people with online experience] 
The Singtao Daily, April 3, 
2001. 




The South China Morning Post, 
August 2, 2002. 
China Web surfers No 2 in the world; User 
figures estimated to double every 12 to 18 
months 
The Lianhe Zaobao, March 18, 
2000. 
中国首家 WAP 中文信息网开通 [China 
opens the first Chinese WAP website] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, September 
23, 2000. 
北京市公务员 45.7%从未上过网 [45.7% 
civil servants in Beijing never go online] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, September 
29, 2000. 
上 海“88547”服 务 热 线 添 婚 姻 网 [The 
service hotline “88547” in Shanghai sets up 
an additional website for marriage] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, December 
12, 2000. 
《死亡日記》吸引千万读者  上海著名网上
作家陆幼青病逝 [ Death Diary attracts 
thousands and millions of readers; Shanghai 
famous online writer Lu Youqing dies] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
April 5, 2002. 
清明节即将到来   中国网上祭祀之风猛吹 
[Tomb-Sweeping Day is coming; The wind of 
online sacrifice is blasting in China] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
February 17, 2003. 
42%中国网民愿为下载软件付费  [42% 
Chinese Internet users willing to pay for 
downloading software] 
The Straits Times, September 
22, 2000. 
Singapore 
Dalian ports use PSA system 
The Straits Times, February 14, 
2002. 
SMS way to a Happy New Year; 
A whopping two million messages flood 
mobile phones and the Internet in Beijing in 
the hour leading up to the New Year 
The Straits Times, March 19, 
2003. 
Students in Beijing addicted to Internet; 
Nearly 15% of secondary schoolchildren are 
stuck on cyberspace and online games, and 
the problem is expected to worsen 
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1. Internet Diffusion and Use (Continued) 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The Straits Times, October 5, 
2003. 
Online, China’s protesters are too loud to 
ignore 
The Straits Times, January 6, 
2004. 
Chinese Internet users wield clout; 
Bombarded by thousands of furious online 
postings, police reopen case of a woman who 
got off lightly after causing a peasant’s death 
Singapore 
The New York Times, June 29, 
2000. 
In China, Web Revolution Means Games 
The New York Times, January 
16, 2004. 
Chinese go online in search of justice against 
elite class 
The New York Times, 
December 06, 2004. 
Beijing Loves the Web Until the Web Talks 
Back 
U.S. 
The Log Angeles Times, May 
18, 2002. 
Chinese surfers see more of Net
The Times, June 10, 2000. Internet use in China has doubled 
The Times, November 7, 
2000. 
Beijing decides to paint town grey 
The Guardian, January 15, 
2001. 
China tries to snare Tibet’s web visitors 
The Times, April 3, 2001. Chinese use the Net to speak out; Island a hub 
of military activity 
U.K. 
The Guardian, July 8, 2002. Mr Li’s diary reveals human dimension of the 
crisis in China 
 
 
2. Internet Censorship and Regulations 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The People’ s Daily, 
December 2, 2000. 
国内首例网站与传统媒体的版权案昨宣判 [The 
first Internet copyright case was ruled yesterday] 
The People’ s Daily, 
December 18, 2000. 
网络广告，亟待游戏规则 [Online advertising 
needs urgently game rules] 
China The People’ s Daily, July 
12, 2001. 
全国公安机关集中清理整治违法违规“网吧” 
[Public security bureaus over the country clear up 
and publish illegal “Wangba”] 125
The People’ s Daily, June 
19, 2002. 
昆明市网吧停业整顿 [Wangba in Kungmin City 
are closed down and rectified] 
                                                 
125 Wangba, Internet café or cyber café. 
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2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued) 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The People’ s Daily, 
January 30, 2003. 
网吧，请让未成年人止步！[Wangba, please let the 
youth under age stop!] 
The People’s Daily, 
March 21, 2004. 
安全文明上网 自觉远离网吧 [Go online in a safe 
and civilized way; Consciously stay away from Wangba]
The People’s Daily, 
July 18, 2004. 
坚决拥护和支持打击淫秽色情网站专项行动 [Firmly 
support the special action cracking down on obscene and 
porn websites] 
China 
The People’s Daily, 
August 7, 2004. 
全国各大商业网站全面清理涉“黄”信息 [Main 
commercial websites over the country completely clear 
up porn messages] 
The People’s Daily, 
October 31, 2004. 
上海：数百色情网 依法被关闭 [Shanghai: Hundreds 
porn websites are closed according to law] 
The South China 
Morning Post, 
October 4, 2000. 
Rules hailed for adding clarity as shares falter 
The South China 
Morning Post, 
December 6, 2000. 
Beijing seeks tighter Net bulletin-board controls 
The South China 
Morning Post, July 
1, 2003. 
Web sites told to clean up their content 
The South China 
Morning Post, 
January 26, 2004. 
Firms in uphill battle to stop porn 
Hong 
Kong 
The Singtao Daily, 
September 14, 2002. 
Google 网站部分解封 [Google is partly unblocked] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
May 18, 2000. 
中国新闻网站管理法规今年半年或出台 
[China will issue regulations on managing news websites 
in the first half of this year] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
June 4, 2000. 
主页点击率高达 145 万 上海查获首例网络色情案 
[Homepage hits reach 14.5 millions: The first case of 
porn websites is tracked down in Shanghai] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
June 10, 2000. 
中国监管互联网广告  [China supervises Internet 
advertising] 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
November 3, 2000. 
中国公安部：买卖电邮地址会受到法律制裁[China’s  
ministry of public security: Buying and selling e-mail 
addresses subject to punishment according to law] 
Singapore 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
June 24, 2001. 
“大陆多家网上论坛被关闭” [Many online forums in 
mainland are shut down] 
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2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued) 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The Lianhe Zaobao, 
February 18, 2004. 
网络异议作者杜导斌被控颠覆中国国家政权 
[Internet dissident writer Du Daobing is charged 
with subverting China’s state regime] 
The Straits Times, June 21, 
2000. 
Beijing easing up on Internet control, says report 
by think-tank 
The Straits Times, January 
22, 2001 
China fights losing battle to censor cyberspace Singapore 
The Straits Times, July 22, 
2003 
On patrol: 30,000 cybercops 
The Straits Times, 
December 30, 2004 
No let-up in China’s crackdown on liberals; 
Analysts say arrests are an attempt by govt to 
assert control as social unrest increases 
The New York Times, 
January 27, 2000. 
China lists controls to restrict the use of e-mail 
and Web 
The New York Times, 
August 24, 2000. 
China arrests owner of Internet café  
The Los Angeles Times, 
October 3, 2000. 
China issues new rules on Internet content
The New York Times, 
October 4, 2000. 
Tough new rules don’t faze Chinese Internet 
start-ups 
The New York Times, 
October 11, 2000. 
China lays out investment rules 
The New York Times, April 
21, 2001. 
China detains and isolates liberal computer wiz 
The New York Times, April 
26, 2001. 
Punching holes in Internet walls 
The Los Angeles Times, 
March 11, 2001. 
Talk of blast cleared from China Internet
The Los Angeles Times, 
September 10, 2001. 
Censors and surfers locked in a battle over Internet 
access; China
The New York Times, 
January 12, 2002. 
Testing China’s censors with a gay love story 
The New York Times, June 
17, 2002. 
Beijing mayor cracks down on Internet cafes 
after fatal fire 
The New York Times, 
September 4, 2002. 
Beijing blocks access to Google 
The New York Times, 
December 4, 2002. 
China has world’s tightest Internet censorship, 
Study Finds 
U.S. 
The New York Times, 
December 19, 2002. 
China: Internet publisher is detained 
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2. Internet Censorship and Regulations (Continued) 
 
Country Newspaper & Date Headline 
The New York Times, 
January 28, 2004. 
China urged to free 54 jailed in Internet use 
The New York Times, June 
12, 2004. 
China: Reprieve for Internet dissident 
The New York Times, June 
27, 2004. 
Despite an act of leniency, China has its eye on the 
Web U.S. 
The Los Angeles Times, 
June 12, 2004. 
Chinese Web activist gets suspended sentence
The Los Angeles Times, 
February 26, 2004. 
China clamps down on Web news discussion
The Times, January 28, 
2000. 
Internet in China stifled by new rules 
The Times, February 19, 
2000. 
China to censor website news 
The Times, March 14, 
2000. 
China softens IT restrictions 
The Times, March 27, 
2000. 
Beijing to curb online trade in audio-visual 
products 
The Guardian, June 3, 
2000. 
Beijing fails to hush Tiananmen whispers: 11 years 
on, defiant protesters and victims’ families refuse 
to let the massacre be forgotten 
The Guardian, June 8, 
2000. 
Beijing tries, but fails, to gag Internet hosts 
The Times, April 13, 2001 Internet censors cut the Chinese chat 
The Guardian, September 
27, 2001. 
In the Chinese doghouse: Authorities lifted a ban 
on the BBC, but not for long 
The Times, September 4, 
2002. 
Chinese block on Internet 
The Guardian, September 
5, 2002. 
Engine trouble: In the mid 1990s, two Stanford 
university dropouts dreamed up a search engine 
with a unique cataloguing system. Now Google is 
the biggest on the Web. But not everyone is a fan - 
some say it unfairly favours certain websites. The 
latest critic is China, which has blocked it 
completely. Oliver Burkeman investigates 
U.K. 





 Xiang Zhou, with an English name Julie, earned her bachelor of arts degree in 
Chinese Language and Literature from the Wuhan University, mainland China, in July 
1990 and was honored as one of the university’s top graduates. As an undergraduate at 
the Wuhan University, she was awarded the Wen Yiduo Literature Prize and the top 
paper in the Contest of Academic Theses at the Advancing Front in Sciences and Social 
Science Research for her research on modern Chinese romantic poetry. She also won a 
national prize for one of her creative poems. She was a four-year recipient of the Wuhan 
University Scholarship and the honor of Excellent Undergraduate Student.  
Because of her outstanding performance, she was waived from taking entrance 
exams and was recommended to the master program of Chinese language at the Wuhan 
University in September 1990. She majored in modern Chinese language with a 
concentration on Chinese rhetoric. She was awarded the Huang Kan Language Prize for 
her research on structural linguistics. Her master thesis won the Best Graduate Thesis 
Award. While co-teaching courses in Chinese, she also co-authored a textbook on 
traditional Chinese culture. 
Before she received her Master’s of Arts degree in July 1993, she reported for 
duty as a copy editor at the Xinhua News Agency, China’s state-run agency, in March, 
1993. During the time at the agency, she received a series of national and local awards for 
her professional achievements. She became a page principal in 1995, involved in taking 
charge of the front page and several columns of the Reference News. She co-launched the 
Wednesday Supplement of the digest daily newspaper, which was famous for its in-depth 
news analysis and lively international news features. She also worked part-time as a 
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special reporter/columnist for the Leisure Weekly, a weekly lifestyle newspaper published 
by the Beijing Press and Publications Administration. As a journalist in international 
news coverage, she specialized in U.S.-China relations and the Middle East, and 
published three books, including two volumes of translation, and hundreds of research 
papers and news articles in journalism and world affairs. Because of her achievements, 
she was awarded a national scholarship from China’s Minister of Education in 1999. 
With a goal to plunge herself into the course of journalism and communication 
education in China, Zhou came to the United States on August 16, 2000, for graduate 
studies. She first received a master’s degree in communications with an emphasis in 
journalism in August 2002, from the University of Tennessee, and then started her 
journey for a Ph.D. in communication with a primary concentration in new media and a 
secondary concentration in statistics. During the six-year period at UT, she received the 
Edward J. Meeman Fellowship in international communication for four years. In 2003, 
she became a lifelong member of Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society 
for the recognition of scholarship in mass communications because of her academic 
achievement and character. She was also featured in the 2004-2005 edition of The 
Chancellor’s List, a compendium recognizing the academic achievements of outstanding 
graduate students in America. She received the top doctoral paper award at the 27th 
annual College of Communication and Information Annual Symposium at the University 
of Tennessee in 2005.  
With primary research interests in the Internet, the Chinese media, international 
news, and framing, Zhou has presented papers at several international and national 
academic conferences, including the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
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Communications. Her research papers have appeared in the Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly and the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication. She 
received a Scholarly Activity and Research Incentive Funds Grant from the Research 
Office, the University of Tennessee, in 2005. She also received the GSS Travel Fund in 
2003 and 2004 from the University of Tennessee Graduate Student Senate, and the 
Montgomery-Howard Graduate Student Fund from the College of Communication and 
Information at UT in 2003, 2004 and 2006, for presenting her research papers at scholarly 
conferences. 
Zhou had taught Chinese at various levels for four years as a graduate teaching 
associate in the Department of Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures at the 
University of Tennessee. She is currently a research assistant under the leadership of Dr. 
Carol Tenopir, the interim director of the Center of Information Studies at UT. She will 
leave the United States for her professorship at the Shantou University in Guangdong 
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